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Abstract
Stochastic-Based Models for Electricity Market Analysis with High Wind
Energy Penetration
Sebastia´n Mart´ın , Yves Smeers & Jose´ A. Aguado
Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Engineering with International Mention
University of Malaga
Renewable energy is now seen as an almost indispensable instrument to overcome or at least
mitigate climate change. Wind and solar energy are among the most generally quoted re-
newable energy forms that are envisaged to offer the quantitative potential contribution to
decarbonization, and between them, wind energy is the one usually considered to be closest
to being economic. A system of incentives has been, and remains, necessary to foster the
development of intermittent sources with the view of increasing their penetration into gen-
eration systems, sometimes at levels that are unjustified by current market conditions. The
effects of incentive policies of the subsidy type are usually difficult to monitor, and unin-
tended consequences should not come as a surprise. This is the case in the European Union,
which has been at the forefront of the use of renewable energy with the result that subsidized
intermittent capacities are now jeopardizing the short term economics of conventional units
to a level that puts the adequacy of the system in question, with many new conventional
plants being mothballed or dismantled because they are not profitable.
This thesis concentrates on the situation going on in some European countries, where the
high penetration of renewable energy, combined with energy conservation and other events
related to the economic crisis have lead to a reduction of wholesale electricity prices that
questions the survival of conventional plants in the market. The main questions addressed
are the loss of conventional assets value, the cost of the subsidies implied by the current
policies, and the influence of the technical constraints (reserve, ramping constraints and un-
certainty in wind generation) for the system operation.
The methodology consist of using equilibrium models based on stochastic programming.
Two kinds of models are considered: i) a complementarity formulation for a multi-firm con-
figuration that accounts for the separation between the PX and the TSO, and ii) a welfare
maximization problem for a single firm configuration. All the models assume price taking
agents and no market power with the objective to simplify the economic discussion and con-
centrate on the economic and physical issues of market design.
The use of the models is illustrated on two questions motivated by the current phenomena
observed in Europe, that consist of conventional plants, necessary for providing services, are
driven out of the market because of low energy prices. The common wisdom (and the obser-
vation of the market) is that renewable energies induce a decrease of energy prices together
with a reduction of the activity, and the profit, of the conventional units. The models show
that this phenomenon indeed seems rather stable under different structural assumptions (pre-
mium to wind generation and risk aversion), but it may also crucially depend on the demand
for ancillary services (here frequency maintenance) induced by renewable energies and on
their pricing by the market design. We find that a higher demand for load following reserve
and an economically sound pricing (marginal cost pricing) restore the revenue of the con-
ventional plants. The question of the sustainability of conventional plants then leads to the
proper identification of the demand for services and the acceptance that they will be properly
remunerated.
xi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overall Introduction
Renewable energy is now seen as an almost indispensable instrument to overcome or at least
mitigate climate change. The concern is global even if its implementation still depends on
local attitudes in the different regions of the world. Wind and solar energy are among the most
generally quoted renewable energy forms that are thought to offer the quantitative potential
contribution to decarbonization, and between them, wind energy is the one usually considered
to be closest to being economic, at least when compared to conventional sources in “levelized
cost” terms. But levelized costs only offer a very imperfect picture of the competitiveness of
wind energy and other intermittent (non dispatchable) sources in generation systems (Joskow
[1–3]), with the result that special incentives have been and remain necessary to foster the
development of intermittent sources into generation systems, sometimes at levels that are
unjustified by current market conditions. Incentive policies of the subsidy type, whether for
fossil (IMF Report [4]) or renewable energy are always difficult to monitor, and unintended
consequences should not come as a surprise. This is the case in the European Union, which
has been at the forefront of the use of renewable energy with the result that subsidized
intermittent capacities are now jeopardizing the short term economics of conventional units
to a level that puts the adequacy of the system in question.
This thesis concentrates on a small, but potentially important, point of the evolution
currently going on in some European countries. Specifically the high penetration of renewable,
combined with energy conservation and other events related to the economic crisis have lead to
a reduction of wholesale electricity prices that questions the survival of conventional plants in
the market. The problem would be limited to a (already dramatic) loss of conventional assets
value and (equally dramatic) cost of the subsidies implied by this policy, if it were not for the
much more global adequacy problem that would emerge if it turns out that the generation
system cannot survive without these conventional plants. Several studies indeed pointed to
the limitations of the penetration of renewable energies in generation system because of their
current poor performance for the supply of system services such as frequency and voltage
control [5–12].
Basic economic reasoning tells us that this situation should not occur. A shortage of grid
services because of the mothballing or dismantling of conventional units due to lower energy
prices should increase the market value of these system services, and hence the additional
remuneration of the plants that provide them. The two possible outcomes are then: i) either
intermittent plants can provide the services and the elimination of conventional units will
continue; ii) or the conventional units are better positioned to provide those services, and a
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proper market design that remunerates these plants for the provision of services will keep (at
least a fraction of) them on line. This thesis presents several models that try to look into
that problem.
All the models of this thesis assume price taking agents. Several arguments can be
put forward to justify this assumption; we only refer to two: (i) invoking market power
requires assumptions on how this market power is exercised, and there are too many of these
assumptions (especially when there are several products such in our models) for the discussion
to remain unambiguous, (ii) the assumption of price taking agents simplifies the economic
discussion and allows one to concentrate on basic economic and physical issues of market
design.
With the aim of providing a framework for studying several factors affecting wind genera-
tion and its impact on the rest of the generation system, we elaborate our models on the basis
of general market principles, but where wind policy and some specific features (e.g. balanc-
ing, ramping products) are inspired by the Spanish system or the Midcontinent Independent
System Operator (MISO) [13, 14]. Resorting to particular implementations is unavoidable
when dealing with questions that are not yet standardized in the industry.
Because of the importance of incentive policies in renewable energy regulation and the
attention put on feed-in premium in the history of the Spanish system and in current Euro-
pean discussions [15], the model has been constructed on the basis of that policy, but with
the view of also studying the effect of a several other relevant factors present in real systems.
The factors considered are listed in what follows:
1) Premium to wind generation.
2) Level of wind availability.
3) Firms’ risk aversion.
4) Wind power forecast error distribution.
5) Reserve requirement set by the Transmission System Operator (TSO).
6) Level of demand with respect to the installed power capacity.
7) Mothballing of existing power plants.
8) Pricing scheme for capacity of balancing reserve.
9) Pricing scheme for energy from balancing reserve.
10) Number of firms.
11) Technical capacity for ramping.
12) Organization of the balancing mechanism.
13) Myopia on the perception of balancing cost in day ahead market.
We consider three modeling approaches that correspond to different market organizations.
One is a standard stochastic cost minimization model with fixed demand and single firm with
stochastic wind generation. This would have been the reference model during the regulatory
period; it is known that it can be interpreted as describing a perfectly competitive market
where all agents, including wind generators, pay for the resources that they use and are
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remunerated for the goods and services that they provide. The second model considers price
responsive demand and a single firm; compared to the first model and in the context of wind
penetration, it can be interpreted as a model where the variability of wind can be at least
partially accommodated by some demand side system. This second approach is posed as
a stochastic program maximizing the social welfare. This model also assumes a perfectly
competitive market. The third approach extends this latter model to a equilibrium model
with several firms and some market imperfections. It is posed as a complementarity problem,
[16–31]. The interest of this extension is to allow for the fact that the uncertainties due to
wind generation and its price effect are not necessarily internalized in a single firm model
(or alternatively in a model where short run risk can be traded). A multi-firm model such
as presented here accounts of the fact that, barring a sophisticated intraday market or some
financial market of the virtual bidding type, this trading is not possible. Each one of these
approaches is considered here in two settings, single period and multi-period, thus we study
six basic models.
For the sake of presentation, these models are presented in reverse order: The multi-firm
equilibrium model is the most general one and is presented first; the single firm equilibrium
model is a particular case, which is itself a generalization of the single firm cost minimization
model.
1.2 Methodology and Contributions
We construct different models trying to capture some important features of real markets, and
we apply these models in a number of situations to develop some insight on the impact of
these features on the outcome of the market. This section consists of four subsections: the
main features to be modeled are described in the first subsection; the modeling approach is
discussed in the second section; the philosophy for the case study is summarized next and
finally the conclusions close this section.
1.2.1 Market and Model Features
We try to only include in the models some elements necessary to emulate the behaviour of
the real markets with the view of building the capability to analyze some impact of wind
penetration. The following summarizes the main elements of the models.
We consider firms that can own two type of units, dispatchable units (conventional gen-
erators) or wind turbines (non-dispatchable). Incentives to wind generation are modeled as
a feed-in premium, that is an exogenous parameter ρ+. The models represent short term
markets and are thus constructed with exogenous capacities. Because we are interested in
the undergoing accelerated plant retiring process, the models are tested with different compo-
sitions of the generation park, in particular the difference is in the total dispatchable capacity
installed. We also consider two models for demand, fixed demand (exogenous parameter) or
price responsive demand (using a linear inverse demand function). Fixed demand model are
of the “energy only” type and rely on a price cap represented by a “Backup generator” that
sets an upper bound for the energy price in day ahead.
Regarding uncertainty, the models are formulated as two stages with wind generation
being the only uncertainty. We consider different wind forecasts µ (expected wind) scenarios
and deviations with respect to these forecasts that we represent on the event tree. These
deviations are accommodated in a real time through a balancing mechanism that we model by
taking inspiration from the Spanish system and some literature ([32]). The wind uncertainty
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is explicitly taken into account by the firms, that manage the associated risk including the
CVaR on the correction cost in their objective function. The firms define their position with
respect to risk through an exogenous parameter λ, from risk neutral (λ = 0) to complete risk
aversion (λ = 1).
We believe that we contribute to the literature by introducing a simplified, but still
comparatively involved model of the reserve market and balancing mechanisms. Both are
inspired by the Spanish system but the approach could be adapted to other situations. The
previous features are included in all models. When relevant and possible, we also introduce
ramping constraints that relate the generation capacity with the scheduled generation and
the ramping capability available. These are constructed on the basis of the literature and
an analysis of ramping products in the MISO system. These increase the system operational
flexibility at a low cost.
These models are used in simulations under different assumptions on feed-in premium ρ+,
level of risk aversion λ, wind forecast µ, ramping capability the price cap to energy in day
ahead.
1.2.2 Modeling Approaches
The models of this thesis are posed either as stochastic optimization programs or as com-
plementarity problems depending on the problems we want to focus on and computational
possibilities. We believe that our complementarity formulation of the stochastic equilibrium
model of the short term market contributes to the literature. In contrast with most of the
literature that poses the problem of wind accommodation through stochastic (e.g. [33, 34])
or robust (e.g. [35]) optimization, we state it in equilibrium terms with risk averse agents
and only consider optimization versions of the problem as particular cases. We justify the
departure from optimization on several grounds. The first one is that wind penetration is
generally supported by instruments that distort the market away from perfect competition
and hence from a pure optimization formulation. This is the case of the feed in premium,
which is the favorite EU proposal for reforming supports to renewable, as well as the feed in
tariff which has been the rule in many European countries. These instruments imply mar-
ket distortions that are incompatible with the perfect competition conditions implied by the
pure optimization formulation of the short term power markets (e.g. two prices for the same
product in a single market).
Instruments such as feed-in premium or tariffs also generate risk exposures that can be
quite different for conventional and wind generators. Barring a mechanism of the virtual
bidding type that does not exist in Europe, these risks are not tradable. This requires a
multi-agent setting where agents face different non tradable risks. This is not amenable to a
single agent representation (whether by stochastic, robust or risk function optimization) of
the problem. Last European systems contain idiosyncrasies that further distort the market
away from the perfect competition paradigm. One of them treated here implies non backward
recursive payoffs in the sense that day ahead prices are also used in balancing notwithstanding
the state of the world in real time. This forward passing of price is the opposite of the back-
ward mechanisms that states day ahead prices as expectation of real time prices in stochastic
programming. This again departs from what can be done by optimization formulations. We
thus believe that the equilibrium formulation is a significant and useful departure from the
more classical optimization approach at least for considering the European market design.
We work also with pure optimization problems in a single firm setting. The main reason
is computational as explained below. The economic counterpart of this simpler set up is
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twofold: the trade of risk between wind turbines and dispatchable generators is implicitly
included in the optimization formulation (which eliminates one cause of non convexity) and
both types of units pay for the ancillary services (only reserve in our models) according to
their participation in the market (which eliminates a second cause of non convexity).
The pure optimization approach has also two main variants depending on the model used
for demand. In the case of fixed demand the problem is posed as a cost minimization problem,
and in the case of price responsive demand, the problem is posed as a welfare maximization
problem. Another variant consist of the introduction of ramping products as they were pro-
posed at MISO, these products are defined on several periods and add operational flexibility
on top of the reserve. The idea of this products is to get a greater provision of ramping
capability committed well in advance to avoid the high cost of committing ramp capability
in a short time only when it is necessary. The advantage is that these products reduce the
average cost of the energy from reserve, and the disadvantage is that we are paying for some
products that we will use only with a low probability. We believe that the inclusion of the
ramping products is new in the literature.
1.2.3 Case Studies
We apply the models to explore factors and market features that could affect the energy price
and the firms’ profits. The lowering of electricity prices as a result of wind penetration and
the losses that it implied on the generator profits are indeed at the origin of the dramatic
asset impairment incurred by the utilities. The main objective of our case studies is thus to
understand how various factors and market features can affect these electricity prices and the
generators’ profits. The studies are summarized here with respect to what came out to be the
main driving factors of this analysis, namely the excess generation capacity and the ramping
possibilities. We refer to them as structural assumptions. For each structural assumption
(that is assumption of generation capacity and ramping possibility) we consider the impact
of different factors that we analyze systematically through the same four cases, namely:
• Impact of the wind forecast on the electricity price and revenue of wind and conventional
generators.
• Effect of the premium on the electricity price and revenue of wind and conventional
generators.
• Effect of risk aversion on the electricity price and revenue of wind and conventional
generators.
• Effect of the demand for reserve on the electricity price and revenue of wind and con-
ventional generators.
Each case consists of two situations corresponding to lower and upper bounds on the relevant
parameter. These cases are defined in Section 4.4.5. All simulations were conducted on the
same set of data; these data include the common parameters for the reserve constraints, the
demand elasticity, the confidence level for the CVaR, and other parameters that are described
in detail in Chapter 4.
This analysis is first conducted with the stochastic equilibrium model in complementarity
formulation (referred to as Case study 1). This model better account for the economic market
imperfections resulting from the market design. Besides the impact of the generation system,
which was expected to be a major determinant of electricity prices and conventional generates
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profits, the demand for reserve and the ramping capabilities turn out to be crucial factors. We
believe that this analysis is a contribution to the literature for three main reasons. Besides
showing the key role of the combination of ramping capabilities and demand for reserve as
well as the modeling problem that it creates, it also reveals the important economic and
numerical consequences of market imperfections. These appear through a multiplicity of
isolated equilibria (an undesirable phenomenon) and through numerical difficulties with the
very efficient PATH code, which required some numerical developments. The deep cause of
both phenomena lies in the non convexities implied by the market imperfections.
The demand for reserve and the modeling of ramping are multi hourly problems that
require a dynamic model. The above mentioned numerical difficulties encountered in the
complementarity models could not be handled in this dynamical set up. The optimization
formulation of the equilibrium problem drops some of these market imperfections: as stated
above the trade of risk between wind turbines and dispatchable generators is implicitly in-
cluded in the optimization formulation and both types of units pay for the ancillary services
according to their participation in the market. This makes the problem easily amenable to
a dynamic treatment that includes a better representation of ramping as well as the MISO
ramping products. This is handled in a second set of studies (referred to as Case Study 2),
The analysis here reveals the crucial role of the price cap on the revenue of the generators;
this is admittedly not a new results but the novelty of our analysis maybe that it here arises
from a much more realistic treatment of reserve and ramping. A by product of this analysis
is to also reveal the origin of the subsidies that are now underlying the creation of strategic
reserves to guarantee adequacy in Europe. Last we observe the changing role of the ramping
products depending on whether we work with a price responsive or fixed demand model.
1.2.4 Conclusion
To summarize, we study a number of representations of the market for single period and multi-
period, with price responsive or fixed demand, with price cap or without it, and with ramping
products or without them. All these models and structural assumptions are described in detail
in the next chapters.
While the thesis develops six theoretical models only three are used in the simulations.
Future work will concentrate on numerical development to extend the dynamical treatment
to the complementarity formulation and hence the use of the other models.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The Thesis consists of five chapters and two appendices, Chapter 1 is the present chapter. It
starts with an overall introduction that puts the subject of the Thesis in context and gives the
motivation for the study. It continues with a description of the methodology and a summary
of the contributions. The next section is this outline of the document, and Chapter 1 ends
with a brief literature review. The outline for the rest of the document is described in what
follows:
• Chapter 2: The detailed description of the proposed models begins in this chapter. The
chapter is devoted to a first type of equilibrium models that are posed as complementar-
ity problems. The market features included in the models in this chapter are described
in detail, with in particular: The modeling of wind uncertainty implemented, the ramp-
ing constraints, the day ahead market, the reserve market, the balancing mechanism
for correcting deviations, and the scenario trees for wind.
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Three variants of the models are discussed, together with a theoretical analysis of
the operating mode of these models depending on the wind forecast and the reserve
constraints. Finally, a description of the solution strategy implemented for the comple-
mentarity problems closes this chapter.
• Chapter 3: An extension of the models of Chapter 2 is described in this chapter. Only
the new features with respect to the previous models are presented: in particular,
the ramping constraints, and the new ramping products (following the proposals at
MISO). Three models are described also in this chapter, the first one is posed as a
complementarity problem, the other two are posed as pure optimization problems.
• Chapter 4: This chapter presents the case studies. It consists of three main parts:
– The first part contains three sections: In the first section, various formula used to
assess the outcome of the market are given. The second section is devoted to the
description of the dismantling process of the dispatchable units; finally the third
section reports the data used in the simulations for all the case studies.
– The second part uses the models described in Chapter 2 to assess the impact of
various policy of market characteristics on the outcome of the market (mainly the
energy price in day ahead and the firm’s profit).
– Finally the last section in the chapter is focused on the case studies conducted
with the models described in Chapter 4. It examines the dismantling process
of the dispatchable units, how it is affected by the market features, and how it
impacts the market outcome (energy price in day ahead and firm’s profits).
• Chapter 5: This chapter summarizes the proceeding discussions. It also includes a
summary of the particular contributions and the planned future lines of activities.
• Appendix A: This appendix contains additional data from the simulations; these data
are not directly relevant for the discussions of the previous chapters, but they give
additional details and complements.
• Appendix B: This appendix consists of an extended abstract of the Thesis in Spanish
language.
The symbols and the acronyms used along the text are listed and described in the Notation
and the Acronyms respectively.
1.4 Background
Because renewable energy contributes to reduce pollution and diversify energy supply, many
countries have provided incentives to foster their penetration, in particular for wind and
5Configuration for dispatchable generation is described in Section 4.4, Tables 4.6 and 4.7.
6The parameters’ values for cases 1 to 4 are described in Section 4.4, and a short summary is listed in
Table 4.12.
7We consider two alternatives for demand: Price responsive demand (using a linear inverse demand func-
tion) or fixed demand.
8“B. Gen.” stands for the generation cost of the Backup Generator in e/MWh, and it represents a price
cap for the energy price in the system, it is described with more detail in Section 4.3.
9In this context “optimal” means the minimum value of the price cap (cost of the backup generator) that
gives the minimum energy price in day ahead, this is explain with detail in Section 4.6.3.
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Table 1.1: Summary of the models studied
Single
Period
Multi-
firm
Fix. dem. P. Ramp.1 No MISO products3 Backup gen.4
Price
responsive
Parametric
Ramping1
No MISO products3
Backup gen.4 (2.4)
No Backup gen.4 (2.4)
Single
firm
Fix. dem. P. Ramp.1 No MISO products3 Backup gen.4 (2.6)
Price
responsive
Parametric
Ramping1
No MISO products3
Backup gen.4 (2.5)
No Backup gen.4 (2.5)
Multi-
Period
Multi-
firm
Fixed
demand
Common
Ramping2
MISO products3 Backup gen.4
No MISO products3 Backup gen.4
Price re-
sponsive
demand
Common
Ramping2
MISO products3
Backup gen.4(3.3)
No Backup gen.4(3.3)
No MISO products3
Backup gen.4(3.3)
No Backup gen.4 (3.3)
Single
firm
Fixed
demand
Common
Ramping2
MISO products3 Backup gen.4 (3.5)
No MISO products3 Backup gen.4 (3.5)
Price re-
sponsive
demand
Common
Ramping2
MISO products3
Backup gen.4 (3.4)
No Backup gen.4 (3.4)
No MISO products3
Backup gen.4 (3.4)
No Backup gen.4 (3.4)
Table 1.2: Summary of the case studies for the single period configuration.
Model Param. Ramp.1 Gen.5 Cases 1 to 46
Single firm, single period,
price responsive demand, no
backup gen., no MISO
products, (Section 2.5)
Ramping with
Λ = 1
B2.1 Table 4.13
B9.6 Table 4.15
Ramping with
Λ = 0
B2.1 Table 4.14
B9.7 Table 4.16
Table 1.3: Summary of the case studies for the multi-period configuration.
Model Demand7 B. Gen.8 Gen.5 Cases 1 to 46
Multi-period, single
firm, with MISO
products
Responsive (Sect. 3.4) - B9.5 Table 4.26
Fixed demand (Section
3.5)
100 B9.5 Table 4.27
300 B9.5 Table 4.28
1000 B9.4 Table 4.29
Optimal9 B9.4 Table 4.30
Multi-period, single
firm, without MISO
products
Responsive (Sect. 3.4) - B9.5 Table A.29
Fixed demand (Section
3.5)
100 B9.5 Table A.17
300 B9.5 Table A.20
1000 B9.4 Table A.23
Optimal9 B9.4 Table A.26
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solar energy resources. Several countries in Europe, like Denmark (4.16 GW of installed
wind power and a 27% of wind power share over total electricity consumption, data from
2012, [36]), Spain (22.21 GW, 16%), and Germany (29.06 GW, 11%), already show a high
penetration of wind energy in their electricity generation mix. This trend is expected to
extend to many other countries in the future.
High rates of wind and solar generation in power systems pose new challenges to policy
makers, system operators and generation firms. As pointed out in [37–39], challenges include
the impact of incentive policies, market design and operation issues (balancing market and
operational flexibility). Agents’ bidding behavior, the real cost of the wind power and the
modeling of the wind power generation have also an important role.
Green Targets, Feed-in Tariffs, or Feed-in Premiums, [40] are the most common incentive
policies. Their effects for wind are studied in [38] for the UK electricity market, and [41]
shows how subsidies to wind can, under certain conditions, lead to bids with negative prices,
greater global cost and emission increases.
The main operational problem associated with a high wind penetration comes from in-
termittency and unpredictability [42, 43]. In the case of large scale wind generation, which is
the case considered here, wind power is no longer intermittent but remains highly variable.
Balancing markets and operational flexibility are key elements of wind power integration.
Conditions for an optimal balancing market have been studied by several authors, who con-
clude that cost-reflectiveness with respect to the imbalance price is a key condition for a
balancing market to be optimal [32, 40].
The balancing market can be modeled through econometric relations giving balancing
prices as functions of energy or trough fundamental processes that could include an unit
commitment [44]. Because balancing is an evolving process subject to continuous discussion,
we do not rely on an econometric representation but introduce a fundamental equilibrium
model (without explicit unit commitment). This model can be adapted, sometimes at the
cost of additional computational manipulation, to different market designs (e.g. different
pricing schemes). This is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.4.
We refer to “flexibility reserve” as the reserve used in balancing to correct deviations
due to wind forecast errors. The determination of the optimal quantity and price of the
flexibility reserve is a question of great interest and a number of different solutions have been
reported. In [45] a methodology that takes into account the uncertainty in the load and
wind power forecasts and also the probability of generation failures is proposed to quantify
the requirement for system reserve given a certain level of system reliability. The proposed
methodology is applied to the all Ireland power system as a case study. A common approach
to deal with uncertainty is to rely on stochastic programming, as in [33, 34]. The value of
the operational flexibility is an other important notion, which has been studied, for instance,
in [46]. In [47] it is shown how to optimize the operation in a short-term forward electricity
market using the concept of “stochastic security”.
Regarding agents’ behavior, a number of strategies for optimal bidding have been proposed
in the academic literature. These strategies focus on uncertainty in the system and are often
based on stochastic programming. In [48], a model to derive the best offering strategy for a
wind power producer is initially posed as a mixed-integer nonlinear programming and, finally,
reformulated and solved as an equivalent linear programming. More micro analysis of the
behaviour of individual agents operating under uncertainty can be found in the literature
such as in [49].
The use of stochastic programming for determining optimal offering strategies of wind
power producers under uncertainty gives results more accurate than other methods that
10 1.4. Background
consider less information. This is shown in [50], and also in [51], where the model is posed as
a two-stage stochastic programming taking into account network constraints and a pool with
a significant number of wind producers. In [52], optimal offers in quantity are calculated for
wind power producers through a two-stage stochastic programming in which the information
of prices and wind energy available are incorporated as exogenous parameters using a scenario
tree. The CVaR is used as a measure for risk management.
Other approaches include second-order cone programming as in [35] where it was used
to solve an optimal self-scheduling problem for a single firm based on a security constrained
optimal power flow and considering risk management through the CVaR.
Chapter 2
Single Period Models
2.1 Introduction to Single Period Models
In this chapter we describe the framework for the definition of the models used to study the
market. The framework is described simultaneously with the definition of three models for
a single period configuration. Afterwards, this setting is extended to define the multi-period
models. The framework includes:
• The modeling of wind uncertainty in Section 2.2. Wind generation is the only source
of uncertainty considered here. It is modeled by mean of a probability distribution
for the wind power forecast error. The two approaches discussed are those based on a
Normal distribution or on a Beta distribution. We use the approach based on the Beta
distribution.
• A representation of the ramping constraints adapted to the single period configuration,
Section 2.3.
• A representation of the day ahead market (Section 2.4.2), the reserve market (Section
2.4.3), the balancing mechanism (Section 2.4.4), and the scenario for wind forecast
(Section 2.4.5).
Three single period models of the short term power market (day ahead and real time) are
presented in this chapter. They proceed from a multi-firm equilibrium model to a single firm
optimization model. These models differ by some small modeling pieces that are described
in detail in the next sections:
1) The most general model is posed as a multi-firm equilibrium problem, this model is de-
scribed in Section 2.4, their equations are listed in Section 2.4.6, and the corresponding
KKT conditions are summarized in Section 2.4.7. The model represents an industry of
price taking agents facing a linear inverse demand function. Each firm owns dispatchable
generators and wind turbines (non dispatchable generators). Wind speed cannot be fore-
seen in day ahead and is taken here as the only uncertain element in the model. It impacts
the cash flow accruing to firms in balancing and hence introduces a risk for those firms.
This uncertainty is modeled using a scenario tree and the corresponding risk captured in
each firm’s Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) calculated on the correction cost. Firms
sell at marginal cost and minimize their operation cost, including the balancing cost mea-
sured through their Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR). Each firm therefore solves a two
stage stochastic programming problem. The overall model is posed as a complementarity
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problem that includes the KKT conditions of the firms and market clearing equations.
Specifically the model comprises:
a) The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions from each firm ’s problem.
b) The global balance equations of the market, that in this case correspond to the reserve
requirements in the system with price responsive demand or the reserve requirements
and the total demand balancing in the case of fixed demand. The reserve requirements
are set by the TSO. Global equations for energy balance are not needed in the case of
price responsive demand because an energy balance equation is included in the problem
of each firm, and total generation automatically meets total demand. In contrast, in
the case of fixed demand, a global equation is needed to set total generation equal to
total demand1.
c) The KKT conditions of the problem of minimizing the generation cost from reserves.
This problem is posed as a single price auction organized by the TSO with the objective
of minimizing the cost of correcting deviations (mismatches between scheduled gener-
ation and scheduled demand). In this model only deviations due to the uncertainty
associated to wind generators are considered.
2) Section 2.5 describes a single firm equilibrium model obtained from the previous model
by setting the number of firms to one. Having a single firm does not mean introducing a
monopoly as one assumes that the firm is regulated to sell at marginal cost. The single
firm problem is simpler to use and also has a simpler economic interpretation in the sense
that a single generator internalizes the risks associated to both conventional and wind
generators. Except for this point, the single and multi-firm models are identical.
3) The last model in this chapter is described in Section 2.6. It can be seen as representing
an integrated company that minimizes its cost subject to an exogenous fixed demand.
As before, the firm owns dispatchable generators and wind turbines (non dispatchable
generators); it minimizes the operation cost. The operation cost includes the balancing
cost, that is measured through the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) in the objective
function. The problem is posed as a two stage risk function stochastic problem. This
third model is the only one that can be formulated as an optimization problem. The
formulation as a cost minimization problem indeed bypasses some of the intricacies of
price formation (both in day ahead and balancing) present in the other models as will be
discussed later.
Finally the chapter closes with Section 2.7, where several operation modes that can be
described by the models in this chapter are discussed, and Section 2.8 where the solving
strategy implemented for the complementarity problems in this chapter is described.
2.2 Modeling Wind Uncertainty in Single Period Models
2.2.1 Introduction
In this section we discuss and describe the model used for representing wind uncertainty,
which is the only source of uncertainty considered in the models studied in this thesis. The
1In the case of single firm configuration and fixed demand, the global balance equation for demand can be
included in the firm’s problem because the firm’s generation has to meet the total fixed demand.
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models are posed and solved for a short term horizon, hence we focus the discussion on the
wind forecast error distribution instead of the wind forecast distribution.
In general (Giebel et al [43]), the methods for wind forecasting usually involve approaches
based on Numerical Weather Prediction (NWP), as described in [53], and/or statistical ap-
proaches, [54]. A key feature of the wind forecasting models is the time scale, it is determined
usually by the constraints associated with the technical operation of the system and/or the
economic operation of the markets, for instance some of the activities listed in what follows:
• Turbine control itself: Milliseconds to seconds.
• Integration of wind power in the electrical grid: From minutes to weeks but usually in
the range of hours. This time scale is determined by the time constants in the grid that
depend on the typical activities in the grid, as described in [43]. The common activities
include:
– Allocation of reserves in day ahead based on wind forecast. For instance in Spain
this is done between 32 h and 4 h in advance, [55] (Spanish grid code, in Spanish,
Operation Procedure P.O. 3.1, Generation Scheduling, points 5.21, and 5.22 and
Appendix I).
– Optimal economic dispatch of conventional power plants. The time needed to
schedule these plants depends on the generation technology and usually is in the
range of 3-10 hours.
– Optimization of the firms’ strategies in the electricity market. In this case the
time constant depends on the scheduling of market processes, like for instance the
auctions in day ahead and intra-day markets, which in most European countries
are in the range of 0-48 hours.
– Maintenance planning, that usually requires longer time scales such as several
weeks. But the wind forecast is not taken into account usually for more than one
week because of the insufficient accuracy for time horizons longer than one week.
Two types of errors in predictions are usually considered, [43, 53]:
• Level errors: Referred to the amplitude of the values.
• Phase errors: Difference in the time when the expected values happen.
A number of authors, [43, 53, 54, 56–58], have identified the following factors as important
for wind power forecast error:
• Prediction horizon. Typical prediction horizon in the market operation are in the range
1h to 48h.
• Spatial dispersion. Correlation between the error values in different wind farms are
related with the distance separating them.
• Load factor = power outputinstalled power . The generation curve that relates the wind speed with the
power output of wind generators is non-linear, and hence transforms the wind speed
error, that usually fits a normal distribution, into a non-normal distribution of the power
output error. The non-linearity of the generation curve is one of the main reasons of
the dependence of power output error on the load factor. The dependence on the load
factor of the error variance of the power output was studied in [54, 56].
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The wind power forecast error seems to fit well to a beta distribution in the case of a
single firm, [54, 57, 59], and to a normal distribution in the case of large scale wind generation
, [44, 45, 47, 60, 61]. The main problem with the normal distribution is that it has an infinite
range, while the error is bounded because the power output is in the range between zero and
the installed power.
2.2.2 Wind Power Scenarios with Error Distribution N(0, σN)
In the case of large scale wind integration the wind power forecast error is assumed to be a
normal distribution N(0, σN ) with zero average and standard deviation σN that, according
to [54, 57, 60], depends on the forecast power output pF , the prediction horizon and the
installed wind power P . Values for σN depending on these parameters are given graphically
in [54, 57], and a linear fit for a prediction horizon of 24 hours given in [60] is reproduced
here:
σN =
1
5
pF +
1
50
·P (2.2.1)
The wind power generation is modeled as a random variable p = pF + w, where pF is the
forecast power output and w ∼ N(0, σN ) is the error in the forecast power output.
We simplify by considering the standard normal distribution. The standard value of the
error, z, is calculated dividing the original value by σN , z =
w
σN
∼ N(0, 1), thus w = z ·σN .
The wind power output must be in the range between the must-run power P , and the
total installed wind power P , these conditions set an upper bound and a lower bound for z:
• Upper bound: P ≥ p = pF + w = pF + z ·σN ⇒ z ≤ P−pFσN ≥ 0.
• Lower bound: P ≤ p = pF + w = pF + z ·σN ⇒ z ≥ P−pFσN ≤ 0.
The standardized variable z can takes values in the range
[
P−pF
σN
, P−pFσN
]
. Assuming a number
n of scenarios, we divide the range for z in n segments using n+ 1 points, P−pFσN = z1 < z2 <
. . . < zn+1 =
P−pF
σN
. Let be k the index for scenario, k = 1, 2, . . . , n, then each scenario k is
associated with the segment z ∈ [zk, zk+1], and the value and the probability of scenario k
are:
a) Value of scenario k: w(k) = σN
∫ zk+1
zk
x√
2pi
e−
x2
2 dx = σN√
2pi
(
e−
z2k
2 − e−
z2k+1
2
)
, that is the
expected value on the segment that defines the scenario.
b) Probability of scenario k, pr(k) =
∫ zk+1
zk
1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 dx, value of the probability density func-
tion integral of the standard normal distribution on the segment associated with the
scenario.
Three strategies have been tested to build the points P−pFσN = z1 < z2 < . . . < zn+1 =
P−pF
σN
:
a) Uniform partition: All the segments of equal length, l = zk+1 − zk, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
b) Segments with equal probability: pr =
∫ zk+1
zk
1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 dx, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
c) Segments with equal probability and an upper bound for the segment length. Minimizing
the number of points with the following constraints:
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• Probability: ∫ zk+1zk 1√2pie−x22 dx ≤ pr, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
• Length of the segment: zk+1 − zk ≤ lmax, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
For the three strategies the mean of the discretized distribution is equal to the mean of the
original distribution because each segment is represented by its expected value. However,
the variance could be different from the value for the original distribution. A comparison
between the value of the variance for the discretized distribution σ′ and the value for the
original distribution σ as a quality measure 100σ
′−σ
σ , for a given number of scenarios equal
for the three strategies. The three strategies have been tested for values of q ∈ [0.04, 0.65]
that is a realistic range for large scale wind generation, and the results are:
• The strategy based on segments of equal probability gives better results than the strat-
egy based on a combination of probability and segment length and this last approach
is better than the uniform partition.
• For twelve scenarios the relative errors in variance (discretized distribution versus orig-
inal distribution) are: Less than 1% for the segments with equal probability, less than
3% for the uniform partition, and a value between 1% and 3% (close to 1%) for the
strategy that combines probability and an upper bound for segment lengths. Only the
bounds are given for the errors because the particular values depend on the value of
the expected power output pF .
One of the advantages of using the normal distribution for wind power forecast error is
that the load forecast error is also normal, and both random variables can be considered
together using the jointly probability distribution, that is also normal. On the other hand
the main disadvantage is that the range of the normal distribution is infinite while the error
is bounded.
2.2.3 Wind Power Scenarios with Case Error Distribution Beta(α, β)
This is the approach we use in the case studies. In [54] a beta distribution is proposed
to represent the error distribution for wind power output. The proposal is supported by
experimental data from wind farms in Northern Germany. Another conclusion based on the
experimental analysis is that the dispersion of the error distribution depends strongly on
the forecast value of the load factor for wind generators. As described in [54], the main
advantages of the beta distribution to model wind power error distribution are:
1. It seems to fit quite well the experimental data.
2. The distribution is defined by only two parameters that can be calculated using explicit
expressions based on the average and the variance of the error.
3. The range of the distribution is [0, 1], that is the same that the range for the load factor.
Let be q load factor forecast, then according to [54] and [57] the load factor taking into
account the error is a random variable that fits a Beta distribution with probability density
function:
fq(x) =
Γ(α+ β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
xα−1(1− x)β−1 (2.2.2)
where the parameters α and β depend on q, and Γ(α+β)Γ(α)Γ(β) is a scale factor such as
∫ 1
0 fq(x)dx =
1.
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The parameters α and β in the beta distribution for the load factor can be calculated
given the values of the expectation µ and the standard deviation σ of the beta distribution.
The method is described in [57] and [59], and it is summarized here.
The values of mean µ and variance σ of the Beta(α, β) distribution can be expressed in
terms of the parameters α and β:
µ =
α
α+ β
(2.2.3)
σ =
αβ
(α+ β)2(α+ β + 1)
(2.2.4)
The value of µ is the forecasted value for the load factor q, and the standard deviation
σ is estimated usually from historical data for a given prediction horizon. According to
[54, 57, 60] σ depends on q, the prediction horizon and the installed wind power P . Values
for σN depending on these parameters are given graphically in [54, 57], and a linear fit for a
prediction horizon of 24 hours given in [60] is reproduced here (normalized by the installed
power):
σ =
1
5
q +
1
50
(2.2.5)
The values of the parameters α and β can be expressed in terms of the mean µ and
variance σ of the Beta(α, β) distribution:
α =µ2
1− µ
σ2
− µ = q2 1− q
σ2
− q (2.2.6)
β =α
(
1
µ
− 1
)
= α
(
1
q
− 1
)
(2.2.7)
To build the scenarios we divide the range [0, 1] into segments and associate each scenario
with a segment. Let be n the number of scenarios, k the index for scenario and zk ∈ [0, 1],
then the range [0, 1] is discretized using n + 1 points, 0 = z1 < z2 < . . . zn+1 = 1. the value
and the probability of scenario k are:
a) Value of scenario k: x(k) =
∫ zk+1
zk
Γ(α+β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)x
α(1 − x)β−1dx, that is the expected value on
the segment that defines the scenario.
b) Probability of scenario k, pr(k) =
∫ zk+1
zk
Γ(α+β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)x
α−1(1−x)β−1dx, value of the probability
density function integral of the beta distribution on the segment associated with the
scenario.
Three strategies have been tested to build the points 0 = z1 < z2 < . . . < zn+1 = 1:
a) Uniform partition: All the segments of equal length, l = zk+1 − zk, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
b) Segments with equal probability: pr =
∫ zk+1
zk
Γ(α+β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)x
α−1(1− x)β−1dx, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
c) Segments with equal probability and an upper bound for the segment length. Minimizing
the number of points with the following constraints:
• Probability: ∫ zk+1zk Γ(α+β)Γ(α)Γ(β)xα−1(1− x)β−1dx ≤ pr, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
• Length of the segment: zk+1 − zk ≤ lmax, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
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For the three strategies the mean of the discretized distribution is equal to the mean of the
original distribution because each segment is represented by its expected value. However
the variance could be different from the value for the original distribution. A comparison
between the value of the variance for the discretized distribution σ′ and the value for the
original distribution σ as a quality measure 100σ
′−σ
σ , for a given number of scenarios equal
for the three strategies. The three strategies have been tested for values of q ∈ [0.04, 0.65]
that is a realistic range for large scale wind generation, and the results are:
• The strategy based on segments of equal probability gives better results than the strat-
egy based on a combination of probability and segment length and this last approach
is better than the uniform partition.
• For twelve scenarios the relative errors in variance (discretized distribution versus orig-
inal distribution) are: Less than 2% for the segments with equal probability, less than
5% for the uniform partition, and a value between 2% and 5% (close to 2%) for the
strategy that combines probability and an upper bound for segment lengths. Only the
bounds are given for the errors because the particular values depend on the value of
the expected load factor q.
2.3 Parametric Ramping
Here we describe the ramping constraints used in the single period setting. In what follows
we first recall the ramping constraints commonly used in the unit commitment problem,
following [62], second the adaptation from multi-period to single period is described, and
finally the “parametric ramping” model implemented in the single period setting is defined.
The parametric ramping comes from the introduction of a parameter Λ in the ramping
constraints adapted to single period, with the objective to model different levels of ramping
capability.
Ramping constraints in the unit commitment problem
The commonly used ramping constraints in the unit commitment problem involves multi-
period and usually are defined as follows [62]:
1) The ramping capacity of a particular generator g is a fixed quantity that does not depend
on the generation level at each time. In our model, the upward ramping capacity for
generator g is Rg ·Xg, and the downward ramping capacity is Rg ·Xg.
2) The available ramping capacity at some time period is constrained by the total genera-
tion capacity, hence high levels of scheduled generation can reduce the available ramping
capacity. The ramping constraints for a generator g are then:
xg,t − xg,t−1 ≤ Rg ·Xg (in case of increasing generation) (2.3.1)
xg,t−1 − xg,t ≤ Rg ·Xg (in case of decreasing generation) (2.3.2)
where xg,t is the scheduled power output of generator g at period t.
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Adaptation to single period setting
In the single period models we do not have the information on the ramp capability used
in scheduled dispatchable generation (xg,t+1 − xg,t). To take this into account in the single
period model we consider that its value is proportional to the current scheduled generation
xg, that is an endogenous variable in the model. In particular, we approximated the value of
the ramping capacity used to change the scheduled generation by:
• Rg ·xg in the case of the upward ramp capability.
• Rg ·xg in the case of the downward ramp capability.
Thus, in the case of a single period model the ramping constraints are:
rug ≤ Rg ·(Xg − xg) (2.3.3)
rdg ≤ Rg ·(Xg − xg) (2.3.4)
On the other hand, the available ramping capacity is also subject to the generator’s capacity
bounds:
rug ≤ Xg − xg (2.3.5)
rdg ≤ xg −Xg (2.3.6)
To summarize, the remaining available ramping capabilities adapted to single period are:
rug ≤ min
{
Xg − xg, Rg ·
(
Xg − xg
)}
(2.3.7)
rdg ≤ min
{
xg −Xg, Rg ·
(
Xg − xg
)}
(2.3.8)
Parametric ramping constraints
Finally we introduce a parameter Λ ∈ [0, 1] in the previous ramping constraints for single pe-
riod, (2.3.3) and (2.3.4), to consider the variability of ramping capacity used in the scheduled
generation, (xg,t+1 − xg,t). The following parametric ramping constraints are the ramping
constraints we use in the single period models:
rug ≤ Rg ·
(
Xg − Λ·xg
)
(2.3.9)
rdg ≤ Rg ·
(
Xg − Λ·xg
)
(2.3.10)
In the simulations we consider only two values for the parameter Λ: i) Λ = 1 that models a
low ramping capability because it assumes that a significant amount of ramping capability is
already used in scheduled generation, and ii) Λ = 0 that models a high ramping capability,
because it assumes the extreme case in which no ramping capability is used in scheduled
generation.
To summarize, the ramping constraint used in the single period models is taken from a
model commonly used in the unit commitment but after adaptation to the available infor-
mation. In order to illustrate the importance of ramping, we conduct variations of the case
studies by also adopting this parametric formulation of ramping and comparing the result
for low and high ramping in Section 4.5.
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2.4 The Multi-Firm Equilibrium Problem with Price Respon-
sive Demand
2.4.1 Introduction
Electricity markets around the world show a wide range of organizations for handling wind
integration. The model presented in this section is inspired by the Spanish case but may also
be of interest to other countries in view of current European plans for supporting renewable
energy [15].
We consider a two settlements system with a day ahead energy market and a real time
balancing mechanism. The Power eXchange (PX) clears the energy market in day-ahead
under imperfect wind forecast. The TSO deals with reserves; these appear in two markets
namely the “market for reserve” and “balancing”. The “market for reserves” takes place in
day ahead and results in committed upward and downward capacity reserves rug and rdg.
Balancing uses the capacities committed for reserve in real time2. Here we focus on the
operation mechanism in an hour, and simplify the treatment by not explicitly considering
any intra-day market.
Reserve and balancing deal with deviations with respect to scheduled quantities in day
ahead. We focus on deviations due to wind. Deviations, up and down, are cleared by
dispatchable generators within the reserve capacities committed in day ahead. Deviations
are modeled through a scenario tree with each scenario representing the wind power output
realization in one hour3. The model is set up for a day ahead time horizon with an hourly time
granularity. All these assumptions give our model a standard two stage structure. The reader
can easily convince himself that many of these simplifications can be technically removed in
order to scale up the model.
Generators, consumers, and the TSO are the agents in the model. Generators operate
dispatchable (conventional) generators with linear cost (without fixed operating cost) and
wind turbines with zero generation cost. Generators are risk averse, with their behavior
described by a CV aR function computed on the correction cost. Consumers are represented
by a linear inverse demand function in the day ahead energy market. They are charged
a fraction of the socialized cost of the reserve capacity through an ex-post network charge
that, for the sake of simplicity, is not taken into account in the model. The government
subsidizes scheduled wind generation through a premium that is financed by the general
budget. Premium can be related to the spot price but it is here taken as an exogenous
parameter in order to both simplify the presentation and allow for sensitivity analysis.
Agents are price takers in the day ahead energy and reserve market and in the real time
balancing market. The energy market is typically modeled by a technology driven supply
curve (marginal cost) and a linear demand function (marginal willingness to pay). The need
for reserves is represented by a set of upper and lower bound constraints, that equate the
supply and demand of that energy in balancing (see (2.4.9) and (2.4.10) in Section 2.4.4).
This version of the model relies on a complementarity representation of the pricing mecha-
nism for balancing energy from reserve (see (2.4.8)-(2.4.12) in Section 2.4.4). Finally, network
constraints are not considered; in this model the TSO is involved only in the organization of
2In some electricity markets, like the Spanish market, there exists an intra-day market with intermediate
auctions in the time between day ahead and real time; these auctions contribute to reduce the cost associated
with the wind forecast error [48, 63].
3Deviations of demand and generation contingencies can be included in the scenario tree at the cost of
additional technical developments. We simplify the presentation by considering wind deviations as the only
stochastic elements.
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the reserve market and the balancing mechanism.
2.4.2 Day Ahead Market and Premium
The PX clears the energy and the TSO clears the market for reserves committed, both on an
hourly basis in day ahead. We assume imperfect wind forecast. Day ahead outcomes depend
on an imperfect wind forecast but not on real time wind realization.
The energy market is modeled by a standard technology driven supply curve (marginal
cost) and a linear demand function (marginal willingness to pay) represented by the inverse
demand function
ρ = ρ0 − α0 ·dT (2.4.1)
where ρ is the price for energy in day ahead and dT is the total demand. The clearing of the
day ahead energy market determines sales dh, scheduled wind yl and dispatchable generation
xg.
Scheduled wind generation yl receives a feed-in premium ρ
+ (exogenous parameter), that
adds to the equilibrium price in the generators’ revenue. It is not directly paid by customers
but charged to the general budget. Only the scheduled wind generation that is actually
generated in real time receives the feed-in premium; the wind that was scheduled, but finally
not generated, loses the feed-in premium in the balancing mechanism. No feed-in premium
is paid to the wind energy that is generated in real time but was not scheduled.
In the Spanish market this premium was given until 12th July 2013, by a piecewise linear
function with a floor and a cap, as described in [64]. We simplify the mechanism and assume
a fixed premium ρ+.
The contribution of the day ahead energy market to the revenue of firm f is:∑
l∈Gf
yl ·(ρ+ + ρ∗) +
∑
g∈Gf
xg ·(ρ∗ − cgg) (2.4.2)
where ρ∗ is the value of the price ρ, cleared by the energy market.
∑
l∈Gf yl ·(ρ+ + ρ∗) is the
revenue accruing to scheduled wind (feed-in premium and equilibrium price) and
∑
g∈Gf xg ·
(ρ∗−cgg) is the revenue collected by the scheduled dispatchable generation (equilibrium price
minus generation cost).
2.4.3 Reserve Model
The TSO clears the market for committed flexible reserves on an hourly basis in day ahead.
Different types of reserves are used in real power systems. It is convenient to classify them in
two groups: i) those intervening for load-frequency control are usually very fast (seconds) and
automatically operated; ii) those devoted to load-following operate on longer times (hours)
and are part of the market [65]. This model concentrates on a load-following requirements
due to wind that we call flexibility reserve; these imply ramping requirements and balancing
for accommodating deviations from wind forecast. Flexibility reserve is procured by the
TSO from dispatchable generators in day ahead and results in two products: capacities of
committed upward (rug) and downward (rdg) reserves in the day ahead.
In real power systems the requirement of flexibility reserves is usually based on deter-
ministic and/or simple probabilistic approaches [66] with more than one criteria commonly
used for sizing the load-following reserves. We here follow [67] and dynamically determine
the required flexibility reserve on the basis of the generation scheduled from different units.
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We use the linear function Ru = my
∑
l∈G yl + mx
∑
g∈G xg of the scheduled generation to
determine the upward reserve requirement Ru by the TSO. The committed upward reserve
must meet A·Ru ≤
∑
g rug ≤ A·Ru. On the other hand, the amount of committed downward
reserve rdg is set by the amount of committed upward reserve and several constraints inspired
by the operation of real power systems, in particular the Spanish system. The coefficients my
and mx appearing in this relation, called balancing reserve factors, are exogenous and reflect
the uncertain need for reserve associated with each technology. The whole set of constraints
for reserve in the model is as follows (2.4.3)-(2.4.6):
∑
g∈G
rug ≥ A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg +my·
∑
l∈G
yl
 , (κ), (2.4.3)
∑
g∈G
rdg ≥ B ·
∑
g∈G
rug, (κ), (2.4.4)
∑
g∈G
rug ≤ A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg +my·
∑
l∈G
yl
 , (γ), (2.4.5)
∑
g∈G
rdg ≤
∑
g∈G
rug, (γ). (2.4.6)
where (2.4.3) and (2.4.4) are the upper bound constraints for the upward and the downward
reserve capacities respectively, and (2.4.5), (2.4.6) are the corresponding lower bound con-
straints. These constraints are inspired by the operation of real power systems, in particular
the Spanish system.
The revenue accruing to firm f from committing flexibility reserve in the TSO day ahead
reserve market is:∑
g∈Gf
(rug · (κ+ γ) + rdg · (κ+ γ)) (2.4.7)
where κ + γ (e/MW) is the shadow price of capacity for committed upward reserve, and
κ+ γ (e/MW) is the shadow price of capacity for committed downward reserve.
2.4.4 Balancing Mechanism Model
The balancing of real power systems must accommodate demand prediction errors, system
contingencies, uncertainty of non dispatchable generation and forecast errors. We simplify
the discussion by considering only wind power forecast errors, which are usually the largest
demand for load following in the short term in system with high wind penetration [45]. The
standard economic paradigm is that these services should be charged at marginal reserve cost
to those that demand them, and paid at the same value to those that produce them. Other
pricing mechanisms such as penalization factors on the market prices [38], [32] can be also
applied.
Here, we consider a simplified and economically standard approach where the price and
the amount of balancing energy from committed reserve result from a perfectly competitive
market. The market is modeled as an optimization problem that minimizes the generation
cost of balancing energy. This problem represents an auction organized by the TSO. From
a modeling point of view, the result of this auction is integrated in the equilibrium through
its KKT conditions. Let skg and u
k
g be respectively the energy deployed from upward and
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downward flexible reserve rug and rdg in real time. Let also z
k
l and v
k
l be the energy bought
or sold by wind turbines in real time to compensate the discrepancy between what had
been scheduled in day head and what could be delivered in real time. The energy that can
be deployed from reserves is limited by the amount of reserves committed. The auction is
modeled, for each scenario k, as the following optimization problem:
minimize
skg ,u
k
g
∑
g∈G
(
skg ·cgg − ukg ·cgg
)
(2.4.8)
subject to:
∑
g∈G
skg =
∑
l∈G
zkl , (pi
k) (2.4.9)
∑
g∈G
ukg =
∑
l∈G
vkl , (pi
k) (2.4.10)
skg ≤ rug, (ηkg) (2.4.11)
ukg ≤ rdg, (ηkg) (2.4.12)
where the variables are skg and u
k
g , and the fixed input data are the committed upward rug and
downward rdg reserve determined in real time, as well as the real time demand and supply of
energy zkl and v
k
l by wind units. The constraints are the balancing between the energy used by
wind turbines and energy provided by dispatchable generators for downward reserve (2.4.9),
and upward reserve (2.4.10). Each unit can provide balancing energy only from the capacity
that has been previously committed in the reserve market (2.4.11), (2.4.12). The objective
function (2.4.8) minimizes the generation cost from reserves using the committed generators
with the minimum generation cost for upward reserve and those with the maximum cost for
the downward reserve to supply the energy from reserves.
The effect of balancing on revenue and cost differs depending on whether wind realization
is short or in excess. This is taken into account by the balancing cost for firm f at scenario
k given by the recourse function Qkf :
Qkf =
∑
g∈Gf
[
skg · (cgg − pik) + ukg · (ρ∗ − cgg − pik)
]
+
+
∑
l∈Gf
[
zkl · (ρ+ + pik) + vkl · (pik − ρ∗)
] (2.4.13)
where ρ∗ is the energy price on the day ahead market and pik and pik are the energy prices
from committed upward and downward reserve respectively from (2.4.9) and (2.4.10).
In case of wind shortage, the cost incurred by wind turbine l that is short by zkl in scenario
k is zkl · (pik + ρ+): The plant loses the premium for the energy committed in the day ahead
market and has to substitute it by conventional energy in balancing at the equilibrium price
of committed upward reserve. On the other hand, the cost of a dispatchable generator g for
providing the upward reserve energy skg is s
k
g · (cgg−pik), which is the unitary generation cost
cgg minus the price of the committed upward reserve pi
k.
In case of wind in excess, a wind turbine can sell an amount vkl in excess on its scheduled
generation (ranging from zero to the available excess). Its revenue is vkl · (ρ∗ − pik), which
involves the unitary cost of downward reserve energy pik and the revenue from selling the
energy at the equilibrium price ρ∗. Alternatively, the cost incurred by the dispatchable
generator g in scenario k to down ukg from its committed downward reserve to incorporate
the additional wind is ukg · (ρ∗− cgg−pik). The unitary cost is the equilibrium price ρ∗, which
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was already incorporated in the day ahead revenue, from which one subtracts the generation
cost cgg, minus the non generated energy and the price of downward balancing energy pi
k.
Summing up the balancing model uses a two-price settlement with one price for the
upward energy and other price for the downward energy. The wind turbines do not lose
the equilibrium price in balancing but they do not get the premium for quantities that they
scheduled in day ahead and do not deliver in real time.
2.4.5 Scenario Tree
The output of wind turbines is the only uncertainty considered in the model. It is represented
by a scenario tree where each branch stands for a realization of the wind power output for
one hour.
We use a Beta distribution to model the wind power forecast error [54, 57]. Let the load
factor for wind generation be q = Power outputRated power ∈ [0, 1] , then according to [54, 57] this load
factor fits a Beta distribution:
f(q) =
Γ(α+ β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
qα−1(1− q)β−1, q ∈ [0, 1] (2.4.14)
where Γ(α+β)Γ(α)Γ(β) is a scale factor such as
∫ 1
0 f(x)dx = 1, and the parameters α and β are
directly related with the mean (µ) and the standard deviation (σ) of the distribution:
α =µ2
1− µ
σ2
− µ, β =α
(
1
µ
− 1
)
(2.4.15)
The analysis of empirical data shows that σ properly fits a linear function of µ, σ = k1·µ+k2,
[54, 57, 60], where the coefficients k1 and k2 depend mainly on the time horizon and the
geographic dispersion of the wind turbines. Here we use the expression given in [60] for a
time horizon of 24 h and large scale generation (normalized by the wind capacity installed):
σ =
1
5
µ+
1
50
(in per unit) (2.4.16)
To build the scenarios, we divide the range [0, 1] for the load factor into segments and
associate each scenario with a segment. Let n be the number of scenarios, k the index for
scenario and zk ∈ [0, 1], then the range [0, 1] is discretized using n+ 1 points, 0 = z1 < z2 <
. . . zn+1 = 1. the value and the probability of scenario k are:
a) Value of scenario k: µ(k) =
∫ zk+1
zk
Γ(α+β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)x
α(1 − x)β−1dx, that is the expected value on
the segment that defines the scenario.
b) Probability of scenario k, pr(k) =
∫ zk+1
zk
Γ(α+β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)x
α−1(1 − x)β−1dx, integral value of the
probability density function of the Beta distribution on the segment associated with the
scenario.
The rule to select the points 0 = z1 < z2 < . . . < zn+1 = 1 is to get segments of equal
probability: 1n =
∫ zk+1
zk
Γ(α+β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)x
α−1(1− x)β−1dx, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
2.4.6 Model Equations
The multi-firm equilibrium problem with responsive demand is described by equations (2.4.17)-
(2.4.38). The model is cast as a complementarity problem [18, 28, 29, 31, 68] defined by the
KKT conditions (2.4.42)-(2.4.60) described in Section 2.4.7, and it consists of three groups
of equations:
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1. Global constraints (2.4.3)-(2.4.6): They are the reserve constraints described in Section
2.4.3. They represent the reserve capacity constraints of the market cleared by the TSO.
Generators trade in this market at the prevailing clearing prices. These constraints
are not included in the firms’ KKT conditions but their dual variables appear in the
objective functions of the firms.
2. The KKT conditions (2.4.46)-(2.4.51) for the minimization of generation cost for energy
from reserve associated with the clearing of the balancing energy market (2.4.8)-(2.4.12)
are described in Section 2.4.4.
3. The KKT conditions (2.4.52)-(2.4.60) for the problem of each firm, that is represented
by (2.4.17)-(2.4.29) and next described. The optimization problem for each firm in-
cludes only the conditions for which the firm can make explicit decisions, taking market
prices (energy, committed reserve capacity, ramping contracts and balancing energy)
as given.
Each firm f poses a two stage stochastic programming with E−CV aR[Profitkf ] = (1 −
λf )·E[Profitkf ] + λf ·CV aR[Profitkf ] as the objective function to maximize, where E[] =∑
k Pr
k · is the expectation on the scenarios, λf ∈ [0, 1] is the level of risk aversion (λf = 0
is risk neutral) and Profitkf is the net profit for firm f at scenario k. Profit
k
f = Pf − Qkf
where Pf is the net profit of firm f in the first stage, that does not depend on the scenarios,
and Qkf is the value of the recourse function (2.4.13) described in Section 2.4.4 Taking into
account the previous definitions we can write the objective function (2.4.17) as Pf − (1−λf )·
E[Qkf ]− λf ·CV aR[Qkf ].
The net profit in the first stage Pf includes the incomes from energy sales (ρ0−α0·
∑
h∈F dh)·
df , from committed reserve
∑
g∈Gf (rug ·(κ+ γ) + rdg ·(κ+ γ)), from the feed-in premium to
wind generation
∑
l∈Gf yl ·ρ+, and the cost of dispatchable generation
∑
g∈Gf xg ·cgg. The
optimization problem for each firm f is:
max
d,x,y,z,rd,
ru,v,ζ,Q−
{
(ρ0 − α0 ·
∑
h∈F
dh)·df +
∑
l∈Gf
yl ·ρ+ +
∑
g∈Gf
(rug ·(κ+ γ) + rdg ·(κ+ γ))
−
∑
g∈Gf
xg ·cgg − (1− λf )·
∑
k
PrkQkf − λf ·
(
ζf +
1
1− θf
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Qk,−f
)} (2.4.17)
subject to: xg + rug ≤ Xg, (φg) (2.4.18)
xg + s
k
g − rdg ≥ Xg, (φkg) (2.4.19)
yl ≤ Y maxl , (ψl) (2.4.20)
yl − zkl ≥ Y kl , (ψkl ) (2.4.21)∑
g∈Gf
xg +
∑
l∈Gf
yl = df , (νf ) (2.4.22)
zkl ≤ Y maxl − Y kl , (ιkl ) (2.4.23)
yl − zkl ≤ Y kl , (ιkl ) (2.4.24)
vkl ≤ Y kl , (ξkl ) (2.4.25)
vkl + yl − zkl ≤ Y kl , (τkl ) (2.4.26)
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rug ≤ R · (Xg − xg), (δg) (2.4.27)
rdg ≤ R · (Xg − xg), (δg) (2.4.28)
ζf +Q
k,−
f ≥ Qkf (σkf ) (2.4.29)
where d, x, y, z, rd, ru, s, u, v,Qk,−f are positive variables.
Equations (2.4.18)-(2.4.29) comprise upper and lower bounds for dispatchable plants
(2.4.18), (2.4.19), and wind turbines (2.4.20), (2.4.21), energy sales in day ahead (2.4.22),
upper and lower bounds for the purchases of wind turbines due to shortage of wind (2.4.23),
(2.4.24). Wind in excess cannot be greater than available wind (2.4.25). Energy balance for
wind turbines (2.4.26). Ramping for upward (2.4.27) and downward (2.4.28) reserve, with A,
A, B, R and R being exogenous parameters. Constraint (2.4.29) is an auxiliary constraint
for the CVaR calculation.The model is implemented and solved using the software PATH in
GAMS [69]. To summarize, the rest of equations that complete the definition of the multi-firm
equilibrium model are:
• Global constraints (described in detail in Section 2.4.3):
A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg +my·
∑
l∈G
yl
 ≤∑
g∈G
rug, (κ), (2.4.30)
B ·
∑
g∈G
rug −
∑
g∈G
rdg ≤ 0, (κ), (2.4.31)
A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg +my·
∑
l∈G
yl
 ≥∑
g∈G
rug, (γ), (2.4.32)∑
g∈G
rdg −
∑
g∈G
rug ≤ 0, (γ) (2.4.33)
• Optimization problem, one problem for each scenario k, for minimization of generation
cost from reserves (described in detail in Section 2.4.4):
minimize
skg ,u
k
g
∑
g∈G
(
skg ·cgg − ukg ·cgg
)
(2.4.34)
subject to:
∑
g∈G
skg =
∑
l∈G
zkl , (pi
k) (2.4.35)
∑
g∈G
ukg =
∑
l∈G
vkl , (pi
k) (2.4.36)
skg ≤ rug, (ηkg) (2.4.37)
ukg ≤ rdg, (ηkg) (2.4.38)
One can note that the formulation of the profit of the firm in this model
Profitf =ρ
∗ ·df +
∑
l∈Gf
yl ·ρ+ +
∑
g∈Gf
(rug ·(κ+ γ) + rdg ·(κ+ γ))
−
∑
g∈Gf
xg ·cgg −
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Qkf
(2.4.39)
26 2.4. Multi-Firm Equilibrium with Price Responsive Demand
involves an equilibrium price ρ∗ intervening both in day ahead and balancing (see definition
of Qkf in (2.4.13)). This differs from standard stochastic optimization that relies on a strict
backward recursive formulation. It implies this first model cannot therefore be restated as an
optimization problem. This mathematically unattractive formulation is justified by the need
to represent features of the market design that are true market distortions but motivated by
compromises among stakeholders. Allowing for these features is thus necessary in order to
accommodate real markets.
The model presents another difficulty in the sense that it involves different firms, each
driven by its own CVaR criterion. In [70] is argued that this leads to a incomplete market (in
economic parlance) and to non convexities in mathematical programming terms. This fact
in itself would also prevent the problem to be formulated as an optimization problem. It also
creates numerical difficulties, a discussion of techniques for overcoming them are presented
in Chapter 2.8.
2.4.7 KKT Conditions
This section summarizes the whole set of equations of the equilibrium problem. Let be Lf the
Lagrangian function for firm f , LB the Lagrangian function for the problem of minimization
of generation cost from reserve.
Taking into account the equations (2.4.17)-(2.4.29) in the previous section, the Lagrangian
function Lf for a firm f is:
Lf (df , rdg, rug, vkl , xg, yl, zkl , Qk,−f , ζf ,
δg, δg, ι
k
l , ι
k
l , νf , ξ
k
l , σ
k
f , τ
k
l , φg, φ
k
g
, ψl, ψ
k
l
) =
−
[
(ρ0 − α0 ·
∑
h∈F
dh)·df +
∑
g∈Gf
(−xg ·cgg + rug ·(κ+ γ) + rdg ·(κ+ γ))
+
∑
l∈Gf
yl ·ρ+
]
+
[
λf ·(ζf + 1
1− θf
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Qk,−f ) + (1− λf )·
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Qkf
]
+
∑
g∈Gf
(
φg ·(xg + rug −Xg) + δg ·(rug −R·(Xg − xg)) + δg(rdg −R·(Xg − xg))
)
+
∑
l∈Gf
ψl ·(yl − Y maxl ) +
∑
l∈Gf
∑
k∈Ω
ψk
l
·(−yl + zkl + Y kl ) + νf ·(
∑
g∈Gf
xg +
∑
l∈Gf
yl − df )
+
∑
l∈Gf
∑
k∈Ω
(
ιkl ·(zkl − Y maxl + Y kl ) + ιkl ·(yl − zkl − Y¯ kl )
)
+
+
∑
l∈Gf
∑
k∈Ω
(
ξkl ·(vkl − Y¯ kl ) + τkl ·(vkl − Y¯ kl + yl − zkl )
)
+
∑
g∈Gf
∑
k∈Ω
φk
g
·(Xg − xg − skg + rdg) +
∑
k∈Ω
σkf ·(Qkf − ζf −Qk,−f ).
(2.4.40)
where the primal variables are df , rdg, rug, v
k
l , xg, yl, z
k
l , Q
k,−
f , ζf , and the dual variables are
δg, δg, ι
k
l , ι
k
l , νf , ξ
k
l , σ
k
f , τ
k
l , φg, φ
k
g
, ψl, ψ
k
l
.
The Lagrangian function LB for the problem, (2.4.8)-(2.4.12), of minimization cost of
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generation from reserves is:
LB(skg , ukg ; pik, pik, ηkg , ηkg) =
∑
g∈G
(
skg ·cgg − ukg ·cgg
)
+
+ pik ·
∑
l∈G
zkl −
∑
g∈G
skg
+ pik ·
∑
l∈G
vkl −
∑
g∈G
ukg

+
∑
g∈G
[
ηkg ·
(
skg − rug
)
+ ηk
g
·
(
ukg − rdg
)]
(2.4.41)
where the primal variables are skg , u
k
g , and the dual variables are: pi
k, pik, ηkg , η
k
g
.
The whole equilibrium problem consists of three groups of equations: 1) The global
constraints, 2) The KKT conditions for the minimization of generation cost from reserves,
and 3) The KKT conditions for each firm f .
1) The global constraints are:
∑
g∈G
rug ≥ A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg +my·
∑
l∈G
yl
 , (κ), (2.4.42)
∑
g∈G
rdg ≥ B ·
∑
g∈G
rug, (κ), (2.4.43)
∑
g∈G
rug ≤ A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg +my·
∑
l∈G
yl
 , (γ), (2.4.44)
∑
g∈G
rdg ≤
∑
g∈G
rug, (γ). (2.4.45)
2) The KKT conditions for the minimization of generation cost from reserves are:
∂LB
∂skg
= cgg − pik + ηkg ≥ 0, ⊥ skg ≥ 0 (2.4.46)
∂LB
∂ukg
= −cgg − pik + ηkg ≥ 0, ⊥ ukg ≥ 0 (2.4.47)
∂LB
∂pik
=
∑
l∈G
zkl −
∑
g∈G
skg = 0, pi
k free (2.4.48)
∂LB
∂pik
=
∑
l∈G
vkl −
∑
g∈G
ukg = 0, pi
k free (2.4.49)
∂LB
∂ηkg
= skg − rug ≤ 0, ⊥ ηkg ≥ 0 (2.4.50)
∂LB
∂ηk
g
= ukg − rdg ≤ 0, ⊥ ηkg ≥ 0 (2.4.51)
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3) The KKT conditions for the primal variables of each firm f are:
∂Lf
∂df
= −(ρ0 − α0
∑
h∈F
dh)− νf ≥ 0 ⊥ df ≥ 0 (2.4.52)
∂Lf
∂rdg
= −(κ+ γ) +
∑
k∈Ω
φk
g
+ δg ≥ 0 ⊥ rdg ≥ 0 (2.4.53)
∂Lf
∂rug
= −(κ+ γ) + φg + δg ≥ 0 ⊥ rug ≥ 0 (2.4.54)
∂Lf
∂vkl
=
(
(1− λf ) · Prk + σkf
)
·(pik − ρ∗) + ξkl + τkl ≥ 0 ⊥ vkl ≥ 0 (2.4.55)
∂Lf
∂xg
= cgg + φg −
∑
k∈Ω
φk
g
+ νf +R·δg +R·δg ≥ 0 ⊥ xg ≥ 0 (2.4.56)
∂Lf
∂yl
= −ρ+ + ψl +
∑
k∈Ω
(τkl + ι
k
l − ψkl ) + νf ≥ 0 ⊥ yl ≥ 0 (2.4.57)
∂Lf
∂zkl
=
(
(1− λf ) · Prk + σkf
)
·(pik + ρ+) + ψk
l
+
+ ιkl − ιkl − τkl ≥ 0 ⊥ zkl ≥ 0 (2.4.58)
∂Lf
∂Qk,−f
=
λf
1− θf Pr
k − σkf ≥ 0 ⊥ Qk,−f ≥ 0 (2.4.59)
∂Lf
∂ζf
= λf −
∑
k∈Ω
σkf = 0; ζf free (2.4.60)
2.4.8 Discussion on Firms’ Profit and Energy Price in Day Ahead
The energy price in the model described in this section is discussed following two approaches,
first a sensitivity analysis on the firms’ optimization problem for certain relevant parameters,
and second we look at the KKT conditions that include explicitly the energy price in day
ahead.
Sensitivity analysis for firm’s profit
The sensitivity analysis is performed on the firm’s optimization problem, for the parameters:
Wind forecast Y
k
l , feed-in premium to wind generation ρ
+, and the level of risk aversion
λ. We apply the extension of the envelope theorem to non-convex optimization problems
described in [71]. This way we can get the derivatives of the result of firm’s optimization
problem from the derivatives of its Lagrangian function Lf .
The objective function in the firm’s optimization problem is the E-CVaR of the firm’s
profit, this magnitude is directly related with the firm’s profit. We consider the sensitivity
analysis for the E-CVaR[Profit] instead of the profit, to simplify the analysis. The opti-
mization problem of each firm is posed as a minimization problem, hence a negative value
of the derivative means that an increase of the parameter value tends to increase the E-
CVaR[Profit] of the firm. The discussion for the three parameters, Y
k
l , ρ
+ and λ, is described
in what follows:
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a) The sensitivity of the Lagrangian function respect to the expected wind Y
k
l is:
∂Lf
∂Y
k
l
= −ikl − ξkl − τkl ≤ 0 (2.4.61)
We observe two opposite effects, on one hand a reduction of the generation cost because
generation from wind replaces the generation from the most expensive dispatchable gen-
erators, and on the other hand a reduction on the energy price that reduces the incomes,
so that the net effect is an increase of the E-CVaR[Profit].
b) The sensitivity of the firm’s Lagrangian function respect to the feed-in premium ρ+ is:
∂Lf
∂ρ+
= −
∑
l∈G
yl +
∑
k∈Ω
[
(1− λf ) · Prk + λf · Prikf
]
zkl (2.4.62)
where λ is the level of risk aversion, Prk is the probability of scenarios and Prikf is the
probability of the scenarios in the CVaR.
The sign of this derivative depends on the balance between the incomes from the feed-in
premium to the scheduled wind and the cost to buy energy due to a shortage of wind. The
cost depends on the risk position and the scenarios in the CVaR (confidence level of the
CVaR), in practical terms it depends on the relation between the value of the scheduled
wind generation and the wind forecast. The ρ+ increases the CVaR[Profit] when the
derivate is negative, what in turn requires values of scheduled wind not far above the
wind forecast (low risk positions).
c) The sensitivity of the Lagrangian function respect to the level of risk aversion λ is:
∂Lf
∂λf
=
∑
k∈Ω
(Prikf − Prk)Qkf = CV aR[Qf ]− E[Qf ] ≥ 0 (2.4.63)
This derivative is always greater or equal to zero, that means that increasing the risk
aversion leads to a reduction of the CVaR[Profit]. We have observed in the results from
the simulations that increasing the risk aversion reduces the total generation and, in
particular, the scheduled wind. Because the risk aversion λ is the weight of the CV aR[Q]
in the objective function, and the firm’s reaction to an increase in λ is to reduce the
balancing cost, what in turn strongly depends on the scheduled wind.
Discussion of the KKT conditions with energy price
We look now at the KKT conditions in which the equilibrium price, ρ∗ = ρ0 − α0 ·
∑
f df ,
appears explicitly, that are the KKT conditions for: i) demand (2.4.52), ii) dispatchable
generation (2.4.56), and iii) wind generation (2.4.57). With this analysis we can infer how
certain market features affect the equilibrium price of energy in day ahead.
The KKT condition for demand (2.4.52) sets that the equilibrium price is equal to minus
the value of the dual variable for the generation-demand balancing constraint (2.4.22), −ν,
whenever demand is different from zero. The generation-demand balancing constraint in this
case stands for the equality constraint that states generation equals demand, and it involves
three groups of variables: 1) the demand df , 2) the scheduled dispatchable generation xg,
and 3) the scheduled wind generation yl. Therefore we look at those equations:
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a) The KKT condition for the scheduled dispatchable generation (2.4.56) relates the dual
variable −ν, and therefore the equilibrium price (ρ∗ = −ν if d 6= 0), with:
1) the generation cost (fuel cost for each dispatchable generator),
2) the dual variable for the lower bound constraint for upward reserve (κ),
3) minus the value of the dual variable for the upper bound constraint for downward
reserve (γ),
4) the dual variable for the upper bound constraint of dispatchable generation capacity,
5) minus the value of the dual variable for the lower bound constraint of dispatchable
generation (the must-run generation constraint).
The positive values (a.1, a.2, a.4) contribute to increase the energy price in day ahead, and
the negative values (a.3, a.5) contribute to reduce that price. Thus the generation cost
and the activation of the upper bound of the dispatchable generation capacity constraint,
contribute to increase the energy price in day ahead, on the other hand to have as much
downward reserve as possible and to keep the must-run generation contributes to reduce
the equilibrium price.
b) The KKT condition for the scheduled wind generation (2.4.57) relates the dual variable
−ν (energy price in day ahead) with:
1) minus the value of the premium to wind generation ρ+,
2) the dual variable of the upper bound constraint for the wind availability, (potential
wind generation)
3) the dual variable for the lower bound constraint for upward reserve (κ),
4) the dual variable for the scheduled-excess balancing for wind generation, this constraint
is active when the wind generator has to buy energy to fulfill its delivery or it sells the
wind excess until reach the total available wind generation.
5) the dual variable for the constraint of wind balancing in case of wind shortage, this
constraint is active if the wind generator has to buy energy to fulfill its delivery.
6) minus the value of the dual variable for the upper bound constraint for downward
reserve (γ),
7) minus the value of the dual variable for the lower bound constraint for wind generation,
The positive values (b.2. b.3. b.4, b.5) contribute to increase the equilibrium price, while
the negative values (b.1, b.6, b.7) contribute to reduce the equilibrium price.
In general the sensitivities respect to the values of the dual variables in (a) and (b) are
different because these dual variables are multiplied by different coefficients in each case. To
summarize, the energy price in day ahead is:
• Reduced by: The premium, the availability of downward reserve (the more the down-
ward reserve the better), and the lower bound for wind generation, that is the must-run
capacity, in our simulations it is fixed to zero, but it could be greater to zero for technical
reasons.
• Increased by: Shortage of wind respect to the system capacity to integrate wind, the
lack of downward reserve, shortage of wind respect to the scheduled wind generation,
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upper capacity bound of wind turbines if it limits the real wind generation (available
wind power that can not be converted to electrical power), the dispatchable generation
cost, not enough upward reserve, not enough dispatchable generation capacity.
The equilibrium price is also affected by the downward reserve energy price through
the KKT conditions for energy deployed from upward reserve and for energy deployed from
downward reserve.
2.5 The Single Firm Equilibrium Problem with Price Respon-
sive Demand
We get the single firm equilibrium model with price responsive demand from the previous
model (2.4.17)-(2.4.38) by fixing the index f for firms to a value of 1. In this case we can
remove the index f in the model equations, and the recourse function Qk is simplified to the
following expression, due to the fact that all generators belong to the same firm:
Qk =
∑
g∈G
cgg ·
(
skg − ukg
)
+
∑
g∈G
zkl ·ρ+ (2.5.1)
A single firm model does not necessarily represent a monopoly exercising market power.
Our formulation of the model supposes that firms continues to sell at marginal cost, an as-
sumption that goes back to the early days of the regulated monopoly in the power economic
literature. Besides being easier to interpret in terms of result, the formulation also assume
that wind and conventional generators internalize wind risk. Preliminary numerical experi-
ments conducted but not thoroughly analyzed with the single and multi versions of the model
show that single and multiform models indeed do not behave in the same way. The results
reported in this thesis are all obtained with single firm models.
2.6 Single Firm Equilibrium Problem with Fixed Demand
The use of a demand curve in a short term model such as balancing reflects a price responsive
demand. This is today more a project than a reality as all the activity on smart grid shows.
The use of a demand curve also makes it easy to introduce some special features on the use
of price mechanisms that differ from the standard perfect competition assumption paradigm.
We already observed before (see equation (2.4.39)) that this is the case with the appearance
of the day ahead equilibrium price in both day ahead and balancing profits. It thus makes
sense to consider a version of the single firm model with fixed demand that corresponds to the
standard assumption of a perfect competition. The formulation implies that energy prices
are no longer obtained from a demand function but from the dual variables of energy balance
equations. The model is described by modifying the equations of the multi-firm equilibrium
model with responsive demand (2.4.17)-(2.4.38) as follows:
1) The index for firms, f is fixed to a value of 1, and it can be removed from the equations.
2) Due to the fact that all the generators belong to the same firm, the recourse function Qk
is simplified to:
Qk =
∑
g∈G
cgg ·
(
skg − ukg
)
+
∑
g∈G
zkl ·ρ+ (2.6.1)
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3) The term of the inverse demand function (2.4.17) in the objective function of the firm’s
optimization problem is removed, resulting the following objective function for the firm’s
problem:
max
d,x,y,z,rd,
ru,v,ζ,Q−
{ ∑
l∈Gf
yl ·ρ+ +
∑
g∈Gf
(rug ·(κ+ γ) + rdg ·(κ+ γ))−
∑
g∈Gf
xg ·cgg
− (1− λf )·
∑
k
PrkQkf − λf ·
(
ζf +
1
1− θf
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Qk,−f
)} (2.6.2)
4) The balancing equation (2.4.22) that relates generation and demand in the firm’s opti-
mization problem is changed by replacing the responsive demand d by the fixed demand
D: ∑
g∈G
xg +
∑
l∈G
yl = D (2.6.3)
2.7 Discussion on Operating Regions regarding Reserve and
Wind
Forecast error is a subject of considerable attention in wind studies. The question must be
put in perspective with the flexibility of the machines and the horizon necessary to commit
them for adapting to the error. We here recall that for instance in the Spanish system reserve
is committed between 32 h and 4 h in advance, [55], with respect to the time in which they
could be deployed (see Section 2.2.1). We here briefly discuss two main assumptions and
their implications in modeling. From a practical point of view we can refer to two extreme
approaches:
a) For a time horizon of 6 hours or less, typically in operations of committing energy for
balancing, the uncertainty is low and to take into account the wind power forecast error
it is sufficient to consider the value of the expected error. In practical terms the standard
deviation σ of the wind power forecast error for the time horizon considered can be used.
This defines a range for the possible wind power output values that is relatively narrow,
[µ− σ, µ+ σ], where µ is the expected value for wind and usually σ < 15µ.
b) For a time horizon in which an unit commitment has to be done, it is typically about 24
hours, the variability of the error distribution must be considered. This means considering
values of the wind generation with a non negligible probability and not only the expected
value of the error. In the case of the typical Beta distribution for wind power forecast error
with mean µ and standard deviation σ = 15µ +
1
50W , being W the installed wind power
capacity, the interval for variability is typically [0.5µ, 1.5µ]. Therefore, considering the
variability implies to take into account a range of approximately ±60% over the expected
value µ.
Depending on the amount of available reserve, the committed reserve, the expected wind
and the variability of wind, a number of configurations have been observed in the model.
These configurations are summarized in what follows:
1) Scheduled wind limited by committed reserve: (scheduled wind) - (lowest wind scenario)
≤ (committed upward reserve), in this case the premium ρ+ to wind generation has not
effect on the value of scheduled wind.
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2) Committed reserve is not limiting the amount of scheduled wind. In this case the premium
ρ+ to wind generation has an strong impact on the valued of scheduled wind. Example:
Configuration with the lowest wind µ = 4%, m1 = 0.6, and m2 = 0.02, in this case an
increase in the premium leads to a significant increase in the value of scheduled wind and
also to what is counterintuitive, an increase in the value of the equilibrium price ρ∗.
3) Dispatchable generators have not enough capacity to satisfy simultaneously the require-
ment for energy demand and reserve commitment. Firms have to make a decision about
using the generation capacity of dispatchable generators for reserve or for generation of
energy in day ahead, they do not have enough capacity to fulfill completely both things
simultaneously, but only partially.
4) Committed reserve hits the technical limit.
5) Committed reserve exceeds the maximum value of the wind forecast, even taking into
account the error distribution. In this case, for the single firm configuration, the wind
turbines schedule a value of wind higher than the maxim value of the expected wind
production, just to get revenues from the dispatchable generators for the commitment of
additional reserve.
This discussion is expanded later in Section 4.5 where the effect of wind forecast is discussed
jointly with other factors like the risk aversion λ, the feed-in premium to wind generation ρ+
and the requirement of reserve from wind generation my.
2.8 Solving Strategy
2.8.1 Introduction
This section is focused on the model for single period, multi-firm and price responsive demand
posed as a complementarity problem, that is described in Section 2.4. This problem is non-
linear and some terms in the KKT conditions are non-convex, these terms come from the
recourse function Qkf and the CVaR constraint that includes the recourse function. All the
non-convex terms are bilinear and, in particular, they come:
• From the recourse function Qkf : skg ·pik, ukg ·pik, ukg ·df , zkl ·pik, vkl ·pik, vkl ·df .
• From the CVaR constraint (2.4.29):
– KKT condition for vkl : σ
k
f ·pik, σkf ·dh, with f, h ∈ F (both stand for the same set).
– KKT condition for zkl : σ
k
f ·pik.
We have used the solver PATH under the software GAMS [69] to solve the complemen-
tarity problem. We encountered some problems of convergence with the initial formulation
described in Section 2.4. To overcome these convergence difficulties we have used an itera-
tive approach that we describe here. The iterative approach consists of simplify the CVaR
constraints and linearize the non-convex terms in the KKT conditions to get a sequence of
linear complementarity problems that approaches the initial problem iteratively.
The key points of this approach are described in detail in the next three sections, first the
simplification of the CVaR constraint is described, second the linearization of the non-convex
terms in the recourse function, and finally, is discussed how those previous approaches are
used to solve the problem iteratively, with a particular focus on the convergence criteria and
how the linearized terms are updated.
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2.8.2 Iterative Approach for CVaR Calculation
The objective of the iterative approach for the CVaR calculation is to simplify the CVaR
constraint (2.4.29) and to remove the non-convex terms in the KKT conditions associated
with this constraint. In the following sections we describe the complete process, first the
changes in the initial model and the corresponding KKT conditions are described, second
how the iterative algorithm for the CVaR calculation works is described and discussed.
Changes in the initial approach
The changes are illustrated for the complementarity problem of multi-firm, single period
and price responsive demand described in Section 2.4. A similar scheme can be applied
to the complementarity problem for multi-firm, multi-period and price responsive demand
described in Section 3.3. The changes in the initial model, in particular in the firms’ problem
(2.4.17)-(2.4.29), are:
1) The term of the CVaR in the objective function (2.4.17) for each firm f :
λf ·
(
ζf +
1
1− θf
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Qk,−f
)
(2.8.1)
is replaced by
λf ·
∑
k∈Ω
Prikf ·Qkf (2.8.2)
Where Prikf is an exogenous parameter calculated iteratively as is described in this section.
This parameter is interpreted as a recalculated probability that takes into account which
scenarios are included in the CVaR.
2) The initial constraint for CVaR calculation (2.4.29) is no longer necessary. Therefore it is
removed from the model, what in turn removes the non-convex terms associate with this
constraint, that are: σkf ·pik, σkf ·pik, and σkf ·dh, with f, h ∈ F .
The KKT conditions (2.4.59) and (2.4.60) in the initial problem also disappear.
3) The primal variables Qk,−f , and ζf , and the dual variable σ
k
f are no longer necessary. The
relation between the initial problem and the iterative approach gives σkf = λf ·Prikf .
This modification allows to move the non convexities (essentially the recourse function)
from the constraints to the objective function. This is remarkable because the new feasible
region for the problem of each firm becomes a convex set with this change, and this feasible
region does not depend on the iteration to calculate the CVaR.
New KKT conditions with iterative CVaR calculation
Only the KKT for the firms’ variables in the recourse function, zkl and v
k
l , are affected by the
simplification of the CVaR constraints, and their new expressions are:
∂Lf
∂vkl
=
(
(1− λf ) · Prk + λf ·Prikf
)
·(pik − ρ∗) + ξkl + τkl ≥ 0 ⊥ vkl ≥ 0 (2.8.3)
∂Lf
∂zkl
=
(
(1− λf ) · Prk + λf ·Prikf
)
·(pik + ρ+) + ψk
l
+
+ ιkl − ιkl − τkl ≥ 0 ⊥ zkl ≥ 0 (2.8.4)
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These new expressions for the KKT conditions result from the initial equations where σkf is
replaced by λf ·Prikf . The other primal variables in the recourse function, ukg and skg , are not
decision variables for the firms, hence their KKT conditions are not affected.
Iterative Calculation of the CVaR
The iterative CVaR calculation consist of the calculation of the probabilities Prikf , that is
made iteratively until a stationary value for these probabilities is reached. The blocks in the
iterative scheme are the Master Problem and the Subproblem, that are described in what
follows:
• Master Problem is the whole model with the simplification for the CVaR constraints
previously described.
• Subproblem is the following linear optimization program in which the values of Prikf
are calculated:
minimize
Prikf
∑
k∈Ω
Prikf ·Qkf (2.8.5)
subject to:
∑
k∈Ω
Prikf = 1 (2.8.6)
Prikf ≤
Prk
1− θf (2.8.7)
Prikf ≥ 0 (2.8.8)
In this problem the Prikf are the variables and the rest are data (fixed values). In
particular are data: The initial probability of the scenarios, Prk, the confidence level
θf for the CV aR, and the values of the recourse function Q
k
f .
To simplify the algorithmic description of the complete iterative CVaR calculation, that
is given in Table 2.1, we define the following functions:
• [Q] = MasterProblem(Pri): function that takes as argument the probability distribu-
tion for scenarios, Pri or Pr, and gives as result the values of the recourse function, Q,
∀f ∈ F , ∀k ∈ Ω.
• [Prif ] = SubProblem(Qf ): function that takes as argument the values of the recourse
function for a particular firm f , for all the scenarios, k ∈ Ω, and gives as result the
probability of the scenarios included in the CVaR for firm f . For the scenarios not
included in the CV aRθ, Pri
k
f = 0.
2.8.3 Linearization of the Non-Convex Terms in the KKT Conditions
After the simplification of the CVaR constraints previously described, all the remaining non-
convex terms in the KKT conditions come from the recourse function. We have linearized
these terms in order to have a linear complementarity problem, because the available solving
algorithms for linear complementarity problems are more robust than those for non-linear
complementarity problems with non-convexities.
The remaining non-convex terms in the complementarity problem are the bilinear expres-
sions: skg ·pik, ukg ·pik, ukg ·df , zkl ·pik, vkl ·pik, vkl ·df . All these terms are in the recourse function
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Table 2.1: Iterative CV aR algorithm
Data: tolerance; //Tolerance for convergence
For f ∈ F Do
| Prif = Pr; //initialization
| Pri0f = 0 · Pr; //for checking convergence
| ∆Prif = ||Prif − Pri0f ||∞;
End
While ||∆Pri||∞ ≥ tolerance Do
| [Q] = MasterProblem(Pri); // update Qkf
| For f ∈ F Do
| | [Prif ] = SubProblem(Qf ); // update Prikf
| | ∆Prif = ||Prif − Pri0f ||∞;
| | Pri0f = Prif; // update for checking convergence
| End
End
Qkf . The linearization strategy implemented consists of fixing the value of df , pi
k and pik, just
inside the recourse function, to the values in the previous iteration. Thus the non-convex
terms linearized at iteration (i+ 1) are: skg ·pik,(i), ukg ·pik,(i), ukg ·d(i)f , zkl ·pik,(i), vkl ·pik,(i), vkl ·d(i)f ,
and the new values d
(i+1)
f , pi
k,(i+1) and pik,(i+1) are obtained after solving for iteration (i+ 1).
The variables df , pi
k and pik are fixed only in the bilinear terms, but not when they appear
alone.
2.8.4 Convergence Criteria and Iterative Scheme to Update the Linearized
Terms
The proposed strategy consists of the simplification of the CVaR constraint and the lineariza-
tion of the remaining non-convex terms, and it leads to a sequence of linear complementarity
problems which solution is a solution of the initial problem. The question, that remains as
a future work, is whether one can develop a method to find all the solutions of the problem.
The problem is non convex and there thus maybe several equilibria (as in EPEC or MPEC
problems), and the interesting questions are obviously (i) to find them and (ii) to character-
ized them in economic terms. The strategy is robust for the simulations reported in the case
study, but we have indeed found several equilibria for some configurations, see Section 4.5.3
and Figs. 4.8 and 4.9.
The convergence criteria are based on tolerance values for consecutive iterations, in
particular the iterative calculation of the CVaR stops when
∑
f∈F
∑
k∈Ω,Pri
k
f ≤ 10−6,
and the iterations to update the linearized values stops when |d(i+1)f − df (i)| ≤ 10−6 and
|pik,(i+1) − pik,(i)| ≤ 10−6 and |pik,(i+1) − pik,(i)| ≤ 10−6. There is also a limit in the total
number of iterations.
In each iteration all the values, Prikf , df , pi
k and pik are updated simultaneously. The
algorithmic description of the complete iterative scheme is listed in Table 2.2 using the the
definitions of Master Problem and Subproblem in the previous Section 2.2. In this case the
Master Problem includes the linearization of the bilinear terms, and therefore it is a linear
complementarity problem.
The solutions found with the iterative approach are solutions of the initial problem because
of the following facts:
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Table 2.2: Complete algorithm
Data: tolCV aR, tolLinear, MaxItera; //Tolerance for convergence
i = 1; // Initial iteration
Pri
(i)
f = Pr; //initialization
d
(i)
f =
ρ0
2·α0 ; //Only in bilinear terms
pik,(i) = 0; //Only in bilinear terms
pik,(i) = 0; //Only in bilinear terms
While ((
∑
f∈F
∑
k∈Ω,Pri
k
f ≥ tolCV aR or max{||d(i+1)f − d(i)f ||∞,
||pik,(i+1) − pik,(i)||∞, ||pik,(i+1) − pik,(i)||∞} ≥ tolLinear) and i ≤ MaxItera)
Do
| [Q(i), df , pik, pik] = MasterProblem(Pri(i), d(i)f , pik,(i), pik,(i));
| d(i+1)f = df ; //Update fixed value of df in bilinear terms
| pik,(i+1) = pik; //Update fixed value of pik in bilinear terms
| pik,(i+1) = pik; //Update fixed value of pik in bilinear terms
| For f ∈ F Do
| | [Pri(i+1)f ] = SubProblem(Q(i)f ); // update Prikf
| End
| i = i + 1; //Iteration count
End
• The value of σkf in the initial problem is given in the iterative approach by σkf = λf·Prikf .
• The KKT conditions in the initial problem and in the iterative approach are essentially
the same except for the two KKT associated with the CVaR calculation in the original
problem that are not present in the iterative approach. These KKT conditions are:
∂Lf
∂Qk,−f
=
λf
1− θf Pr
k − σkf ≥ 0 ⊥ Qk,−f ≥ 0 (2.8.9)
∂Lf
∂ζf
= λf −
∑
k∈Ω
σkf = 0; ζf free (2.8.10)
If this KKT conditions are met for the solution found with the iterative approach then
that solution is also a solution of the initial problem.
• In fact the conditions (2.8.9) and (2.8.10) in the initial problem are met with the values
from the iterative approach, because if we replace σkf in these equations by λf ·Prikf we
get:
– From (2.8.9):
λf
1−θf Pr
k − σkf = λf1−θf Pr
k − λf ·Prikf ≥ 0, that is met when λf = 0
and it is the constraint (2.8.7) in the iterative approach when λf > 0.
– From (2.8.10): λf −
∑
k∈Ω σ
k
f = λf −
∑
k∈Ω λf ·Prikf = 0, that is met when λf = 0
and it is the constraint (2.8.6) in the iterative approach when λf > 0.
To summarize, every solution of the iterative approach is a solution of the initial problem.
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Chapter 3
Multi-Period Models
3.1 Introduction
Case studies conducted with the single period model (see Section 4.5 reveal the importance of
the formulation of ramping constraints. Because ramping is typically a multi-period problem,
it maybe relevant to extend the preceding model to include a daily representation of the
market. This is the objective of this section. We again formulate three versions of the model
of which we use only two in the case studies.
The proposed multi-period models are described in detail in the next sections, here we
summarized the main changes with respect to the previous single-period multi-firm equili-
brium model with price responsive demand (2.4.17)-(2.4.38):
• A new index t representing the time period is added to all the primal and dual variables,
except to those related to the CVaR, ζf , Q
k,−
f and σ
k
f , because they do not depend on
the time period.
• The value of the objective function is calculated as a sum on the set of periods, both in
the optimization problem for each firm and in the problem for minimizing the generation
cost from reserves (for each scenario k).
• The ramping constraints include explicitly the ramp capability used to change the
scheduled dispatchable generation, that is an information available from endogenous
variables in the model.
• New ramping products that take into account operational flexibility between periods,
like those proposed at MISO [14, 72], can be included in the model.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows, first the ramping constraints for multi-
period and the MISO ramping products are described in the next section. The model for
multi-period, multi-firm and price responsive demand is presented in Section 3.3. The model
for multi-period, single firm and price responsive demand is described in Section 3.4. And
finally the description of the model for multi-period, single firm and fixed demand in Section
3.5 closes the chapter. We consider two versions, one with ramping products and the other
without ramping products, for each one these three models.
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3.2 Modeling Ramping
3.2.1 Ramping Products
A new kind of ramping products has been proposed at MISO, [13, 14, 72]. These new ramping
products include the up ramp capability urcg,t (from dispatchable generator g, at period t),
and the down ramp capability drcg,t. They involve more than one period (t), therefore they
can be properly implemented only in the multi-period setting (here they are implemented only
in some multi-period models). The overall idea is to commit ramp capability well in advance
to increase the scheduled operational flexibility of the system, with the intent of avoiding
the use of the expensive fast units to provide that flexibility. There is a cost associated with
these new ramping products, that are committed in day ahead, but this cost is smaller, on
average, than the cost from the sporadic use of the fast units for ramping.
Variability is a key concept in the definition of the new ramping products; we define it
with some detail in the following:
• In the context of new ramping products, the concept of variability in real power systems
stands for the range of possible values that the net demand can take in the system.
Because there is some uncertainty on the net demand for future periods at the time it
is forecast in the current period.
• We have a range of possible values for the net demand in future periods. This range
can be defined by a confidence interval for a given value of confidence level. It can
alternatively be defined as [µ − Kd ·σ, µ + Ku ·σ], as suggested by MISO, where µ is
the expected value of the net demand, σ is the standard deviation of the probability
distribution for net demand at the forecast horizon, and Ku and Kd are exogenous
constants for upward and downward ramping respectively that implicitly define the
confidence level. The proposal at MISO suggests a value Ku = Kd = 2.5.
• The variability is the difference between the extreme value of the interval and the
expected value, hence we have two values for variability, the upward variability Ku ·σ
and the downward variability Kd ·σ. In the case of MISO the proposed values are 2.5σ
for the upward and for the downward variability.
In our case study the uncertainty is only in the wind generation, therefore we consider
the wind power forecast error distribution to estimate the value in future periods,
particularly we use a beta distribution (a different one for each period) and a confidence
level of about 90%, this results in a variability range of approximately [0.5µ, 1.5µ].
• The requirement for the new ramping products for each period t is defined as the dif-
ference between the expected value of net demand plus the variability, both at period
t + 2, (the extreme value of the range considered for period t + 2) and the expected
value of net demand at period t.
In MISO’s proposal this requirement is satisfied only by the new ramping products, in
the current implementation of our model we assume that previous reserve products can
also contribute to satisfy this requirement, because in our model the different kinds of
reserve are mixed in only one type, while MISO relies on a clear separation of reserves.
We could separate the previous reserve and the new ramping products in the require-
ments leaving only the variables for the new ramping products in equations (3.3.76)
and (3.3.77). We simplify the implementation of these constraints by considering just
the wind variability at each period.
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We thus summarize MISO’s proposal for the new ramping products [72] through the
following points:
1) Motivation: To reduce the operation cost in the short-run (one day) by (quoted from
[72])“keeping enough rampable capacity in the system to go after the net load variability
and uncertainty”.
The scarcity of ramp capability can lead to very high costs, because of the use of fast
generators to supply the energy in case of something unforeseen happens and a fast re-
sponse is needed, hence these scarcity conditions only happen for a few hours intervals.
The stochastic nature of this scarcity and its short duration makes that firms do not plan
for that demand. Therefore the current configuration is not given an actionable market
signal. The proposed ramping products solve this issue because they create a stable de-
mand for this service with a value well known in advance. The disadvantage is that we
are paying for something we will use only with low probability.
2) These new ramp products are intended for operational flexibility and not to solve contin-
gencies, because the traditional reserve products cover that purpose.
3) The new products will be supplied by dispatchable generators under market incentives.
The market incentives are that firms can get profit by providing these services in an,
almost deterministic environment without no risk instead of waiting for an unforeseen
scarcity event.
4) These ramp products are co-optimized with energy and ancillary services.
5) The price of these products is determined by (time varying) resource opportunity cost.
6) Existing energy and ancillary services products are not changed.
7) Ramp products in real time “act as a buffer to absorb forecasted and unexpected opera-
tional variability”. These ramp products are intended for energy dispatch.
8) “Demand curve pricing allows automatic trade off between reserving ramp capacity for a
future interval and using the ramp to meet current system needs.” A flat curve pricing is
proposed.
9) Deployed ramp capability is paid to product clearing price (for instance the energy price
in day ahead).
10) “Load charges are increased to compensate for ramp capability payments to resources,
however reduced scarcity pricing decreases load payments, causing an overall production
cost saving.”
11) Ramp capability products are committed in day ahead and deployed in real time.
In the adaptation of the MISO proposal for new ramping products to our model we
assume:
a) The ramp capability products are committed in day ahead and deployed in real time,
exactly as proposed at MISO.
b) The cost of committing ramp capability products is charged to loads in a post-market
process, and therefore this cost is not taken into account explicitly in the model.
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c) Only dispatchable generators can supply ramp capability products, as proposed at MISO.
d) Committed ramp capability products are remunerated according to a flat demand function
(fixed price), as proposed at MISO.
e) Energy deployed from these products in real time is remunerated at the day-ahead market
price, as proposed at MISO.
f) The requirement of ramp capability products is calculated based on a confidence range for
the variability of wind generation in real time. This interval is estimated in day-ahead.
This is a simplification of MISO’s proposal, that takes into account the variability of the
net demand and suggests to use a value for the variability of 2.5 times the standard devi-
ation of the net demand distribution for the period considered.
On the other hand, the ramping constraints in the model take into account the ramp
capability needed due to the change in the scheduled dispatchable generation. This re-
quirement of ramp capability due to scheduled dispatchable generation is low in the case
of price responsive demand, because in that situation the only condition that changes from
period to period is the wind forecast, and that usually has a small impact on the scheduled
generation, except for cases with very high wind forecast. On the contrary, in the case
of fixed demand the changes in demand of ramp capability due to changes in scheduled
dispatchable generation can be quite remarkable because of the changes of energy demand
in day ahead.
In order to include the ramping products in the models, we have to add some new vari-
ables, some new constraints and some terms in the objective function and previous related
to these products, we describe these elements in what follows:
• Two new primal variables are needed to define the ramping products:
– urcg,t: Up ramp capability provided by generator g at period t.
– drcg,t: Down ramp capability provided by generator g at period t.
• Also two new constraints, and the corresponding two new dual variables, are added in
relation with the ramping products:∑
g∈G
(rug,t + urcg,t) = ∆
u
t+2 (3.2.1)∑
g∈G
(rdg,t + drcg,t) = ∆
d
t+2 (3.2.2)
where ∆ut+2 and ∆
d
t+2 account for the uncertainty in the variability of demand at period
t+ 2 estimated at period t. The values ∆ut+2 and ∆
d
t+2 do not depend on the scenarios
because they correspond to the extremes of the variability range in which the system is
expected to operate with a high confidence level (extreme values in the set of scenarios).
The description of the particular expressions adopted for ∆ut+2 and ∆
d
t+2, is included in
the description of the models in which the ramping products are integrated.
• The additional terms in the objective function are related to the remuneration of these
ramping products. The expressions for this additional terms in the objective function,
and the constraints that are modified by the introduction of ramping products are
described in detail for each model in which the ramping products are integrated (in the
next sections in this chapter).
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In our models, the up ramp capability and the down ramp capability are remunerated
with the same mechanism that the upward ramp capacity and the downward reserve capacity,
what is in accordance with the principle 5) previously defined, price determined by resource
opportunity cost. There exist other proposals that consider a fixed price for the ramping
products, but we do not implement these proposals in our models.
3.2.2 Ramping Constraints
Here we adopt the model for ramping constraints commonly used in the literature for the unit
commitment problem, and add the ramping products to that model. We introduce two new
variables for the ramping products proposed at MISO, as described in Section 3.2.1, we recall
that the new variables are: urcg,t for up ramp capability provided by generator g at period
t, and drcg,t for down ramp capability. The model used here for the ramping constraints in
multi-period has the following features, following [62]:
1) The ramping capacity of a particular generator g is a fixed quantity; therefore it does not
depend on the generation level at each time. In our model, the upward ramping capacity
for generator g is Rg ·Xg, and the downward ramping capacity is Rg ·Xg.
2) The ramping constraints for a generator g are:
xg,t − xg,t−1 ≤ Rg ·Xg (in case of increasing generation) (3.2.3)
xg,t−1 − xg,t ≤ Rg ·Xg (in case of decreasing generation) (3.2.4)
where xg,t is the scheduled power output of generator g at period t.
We use the previous expressions to set the bounds for the remaining ramp capability
of each dispatchable generator after discounting the ramp capability used in scheduled
generation (xg,t+1 − xg,t).
rug,t + urcg,t ≤ Rg ·Xg − (xg,t+1 − xg,t), (3.2.5)
rug,t + urcg,t ≤ Rg ·Xg, (3.2.6)
rdg,t + drcg,t ≤ Rg ·Xg, (3.2.7)
rdg,t + drcg,t ≤ Rg ·Xg + (xg,t+1 − xg,t) (3.2.8)
3) The available ramp capacity is subject to the generator’s capacity bounds:
rug,t + urcg,t ≤ Xg − xg,t (3.2.9)
rdg,t + drcg,t ≤ xg,t −Xg (3.2.10)
To summarize we have:
rug,t + urcg,t ≤ min
{
Xg − xg,t, Rg ·Xg, Rg ·Xg − (xg,t+1 − xg,t)
}
(3.2.11)
rdg,t + drcg,t ≤ min
{
xg,t −Xg, Rg ·Xg, Rg ·Xg + (xg,t+1 − xg,t)
}
(3.2.12)
3.3 Multi-Firm Multi-Period Equilibrium Model with Price
Responsive Demand
In this section are described two extensions of the single period model of Section 2.4 (Sub-
section 2.4.6) that are made in turn; the first extension introduces an horizon of several
successive hours (multi-period), and the second extension adds ramping products in that
horizon.
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3.3.1 Extension to Multi-Period without Ramping Products
In this subsection we describe the extension of the model in Section 2.4, to a multi-period
setting. The result is a multi-period, multi-firm model with price responsive demand, and
posed as a complementarity problem. Because of some bilinear terms in the KKT conditions.
the complementarity problem is non-linear. One of the main reasons to extend the model to
multi-period is to study the effect of the ramping constraints over several hours.
For the sake of simplicity, we divide the whole equilibrium problem in three groups of
equations: 1) The global constraints, 2) The KKT conditions for the minimization of gen-
eration cost from reserves, and 3) The KKT conditions for each firm f . We keep the same
notation as in other parts of the text, and call Lf to the Lagrangian function for firm f ,
and LB to the Lagrangian function for the problem of minimization of generation cost from
reserve.
The extension to multi-period can be done under different assumptions that lead to differ-
ent modeling alternatives. We describe the assumptions and the corresponding alternatives
by successively referring to each one of the three groups of equations in what follows.
1) Global constraints
The global constraints are those that are not associated with any particular agent in the
system, in this model they are the reserve constraints. Two reasonable approaches for the
value of the committed reserve capacity are:
a) a fixed value (the same value) for a number of hours in a time horizon;
b) a different value for each hour.
Here we consider that the committed reserve capacity can be different for each hour, but it
is subject to the ramping constraints, that limit its change from hour to hour. The equations
for the reserve constraints extended to multi-period are:
∑
g∈G
rug,t ≥ A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg,t +my·
∑
l∈G
yl,t
 , (κt), (3.3.1)∑
g∈G
rdg,t ≥ B ·
∑
g∈G
rug,t, (κt), (3.3.2)
∑
g∈G
rug,t ≤ A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg,t +my·
∑
l∈G
yl,t
 , (γt), (3.3.3)∑
g∈G
rdg,t ≤
∑
g∈G
rug,t, (γt). (3.3.4)
2) TSO’s problem for minimizing the generation cost from reserves
In the TSO’s problem for minimizing the generation cost from reserves we have, at least, two
apparently different alternatives regarding the number of periods on which the optimization
is performed:
a) Optimize for each hour. In this case the objective function is
minimize
skg,t,u
k
g,t
∑
g∈G cgg ·(skg,t − ukg,t).
We have an optimization problem for each hour t and scenario k.
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b) Optimize for all the hours t in a set of periods T . In this case the objective function is
minimize
skg,t,u
k
g,t
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G cgg ·(skg,t − ukg,t).
We have an optimization problem for each scenario k.
Both alternatives lead to the same KKT conditions. Then we write the problem as an
optimization for the whole set of hours, because that is the objective of the TSO (minimize
the total cost for the whole set of hours). The TSO’s problem of minimizing the generation
cost from reserve is modeled, for each scenario k, as the following optimization problem:
minimize
skg,t,u
k
g,t
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G
(
skg,t ·cgg − ukg,t ·cgg
)
(3.3.5)
subject to:
∑
g∈G
skg,t =
∑
l∈G
zkl,t, (pi
k
t ) (3.3.6)∑
g∈G
ukg,t =
∑
l∈G
vkl,t, (pi
k
t ) (3.3.7)
skg,t ≤ rug,t, (ηkg,t) (3.3.8)
ukg,t ≤ rdg,t, (ηkg,t) (3.3.9)
where the variables are skg,t and u
k
g,t, and the fixed input data are: The committed upward
rug,t and downward rdg,t reserve as well as the demand of energy from the upward z
k
l,t and
downward vkl,t reserve.
The interpretation of this problem is straightforward: Minimizing the cost (3.3.5) implies
using the generators with the minimum generation cost for upward reserve and the generators
with the maximum cost for the downward reserve. The KKT conditions for TSO’s problem
of minimizing the generation cost from reserves are:
∂LB
∂skg,t
= cgg − pikt + ηkg,t ≥ 0, ⊥ skg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.10)
∂LB
∂ukg,t
= −cgg − pikt + ηkg,t ≥ 0, ⊥ ukg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.11)
∂LB
∂pikt
=
∑
l∈G
zkl,t −
∑
g∈G
skg,t = 0, pi
k
t free (3.3.12)
∂LB
∂pikt
=
∑
l∈G
vkl,t −
∑
g∈G
ukg,t = 0, pi
k
t free (3.3.13)
∂LB
∂ηkg,t
= skg,t − rug,t ≤ 0, ⊥ ηkg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.14)
∂LB
∂ηk
g,t
= ukg,t − rdg,t ≤ 0, ⊥ ηkg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.15)
3) Firms’ problems
In the multi-period setting, the change of scheduled dispatchable generation has to meet
also the ramping constraints. That means that the ramping constraints affect directly the
scheduled dispatchable generation and the energy deployed from reserve. In the individual
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firm’s problem, the main modification occurs in the ramping constraints that change from
rug ≤ R · (Xg − xg), (δg) (3.3.16)
rdg ≤ R · (Xg − xg), (δg) (3.3.17)
to
rug,t ≤ R·Xg − (xg,t+1 − xg,t), (δg,t) (3.3.18)
rug,t ≤ R·Xg, (δg,t) (3.3.19)
rdg,t ≤ R·Xg, (g,t) (3.3.20)
rdg,t ≤ R·Xg + (xg,t+1 − xg,t), (g,t) (3.3.21)
The rationale behind these ramping constraints is that the reserve for each hour is limited by
the technical ramping capacity (R·Xg or R·Xg) and also by the ramping capacity that is used
to change the scheduled dispatchable generation (xg,t+1 − xg,t). Four constraints cover the
four cases that come from the combination of upward and downward reserve and increasing
or decreasing the scheduled dispatchable generation.
For the first and the last hour, the previous ramping constraints contain references to
terms outside the range, these terms are are xg,0 for the first hour (t = 1) and xg,T+1 for the
last hour (t = T ). The common approaches to deal with these terms are:
• Circular configuration, xg,T+1 = xg,1 and xg,0 = xg,T .
• Include additional fixed values for the points outside the range, a usual condition is to
consider the value of the point outside the range equal to the value of the closest point
inside the range, in this case xg,0 = xg,1 and xg,T+1 = xg,T .
In our models we consider the second approach, xg,0 = xg,1 and xg,T+1 = xg,T , because
the circular approach can lead to artificial constraints. Also the same criteria applies to the
dual variables for the ramping constraints, δg,t, δg,t, g,t and g,t. And, in general, to all the
primal and dual variables that depend on the index t if they are referenced outside the range
{1, 2, ...T}.
Continuing with the adaptation, the expression of the recourse function for firm f at
scenario k in the multi-period setting is:
Qkf =
∑
t∈T
[ ∑
g∈Gf
[
skg,t · (cgg − pikt ) + ukg,t · (ρ∗t − cgg − pikt )
]
+
+
∑
l∈Gf
[
zkl,t · (ρ+ + pikt ) + vkl,t · (pikt − ρ∗t )
]] (3.3.22)
Finally, the optimization problem for each firm f extended to multi-period is:
max
d,x,y,z,rd,
ru,s,u,v,ζ,Q−
∑
t∈T
{
(ρ0,t − α0,t ·
∑
h∈F
dh,t)·df,t +
∑
g∈Gf
(rug,t ·(κt + γt) + rdg,t ·(κt + γt))+
+
∑
l∈Gf
yl,t ·ρ+ −
∑
g∈Gf
xg,t ·cgg
− (1− λf )·
∑
k
PrkQkf − λf ·
(
ζf +
1
1− θf
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Qk,−f
)}
(3.3.23)
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subject to: xg,t + rug,t ≤ Xg, (φg,t) (3.3.24)
xg,t + s
k
g,t − rdg,t ≥ Xg, (φkg,t) (3.3.25)
yl,t ≤ Y maxl , (ψl,t) (3.3.26)
yl,t − zkl,t ≥ Y kl , (ψkl,t) (3.3.27)∑
g∈Gf
xg,t +
∑
l∈Gf
yl,t = df,t, (νf,t) (3.3.28)
zkl,t ≤ Y maxl − Y kl,t, (ιkl,t) (3.3.29)
yl,t − zkl,t ≤ Y kl,t, (ιkl,t) (3.3.30)
vkl,t ≤ Y kl,t, (ξkl,t) (3.3.31)
vkl,t + yl,t − zkl,t ≤ Y kl,t, (τkl,t) (3.3.32)
rug,t ≤ R·Xg − (xg,t+1 − xg,t), (δg,t) (3.3.33)
rug,t ≤ R·Xg, (δg,t) (3.3.34)
rdg,t ≤ R·Xg, (g,t) (3.3.35)
rdg,t ≤ R·Xg + (xg,t+1 − xg,t), (g,t) (3.3.36)
ζf +Q
k,−
f ≥ Qkf (σkf ) (3.3.37)
where d, x, y, z, rd, ru, s, u, v,Qk,−f are positive variables.
Equations (3.3.24)-(3.3.37) comprise the constraints for the firms problem. These con-
straints are: The upper and lower bounds for dispatchable plants (3.3.24), (3.3.25), and wind
turbines (3.3.26), (3.3.27), the balancing for energy sales in day ahead (3.3.28), the upper and
lower bounds for the purchases of wind turbines due to shortage of wind (3.3.29), (3.3.30), the
bound for the bids of wind in excess (they cannot be greater than available wind) (3.3.31), the
energy balance for wind turbines (3.3.32), the ramping constraints for reserve and scheduled
dispatchable generation (3.3.33)-(3.3.36), and, finally, the constraint (3.3.37) for the CVaR
calculation.
The KKT conditions for the primal variables in the the firm’s problem in the multi-period
setting are:
∂Lf
∂df,t
= −(ρ0 − α0
∑
h∈F
dh,t)− νf,t ≥ 0 ⊥ df,t ≥ 0 (3.3.38)
∂Lf
∂rdg,t
= −(κt + γt) +
∑
k∈Ω
φk
g,t
+ g,t + g,t ≥ 0 ⊥ rdg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.39)
∂Lf
∂rukg,t
= −(κt + γt) + φg,t + δg,t + δg,t ≥ 0 ⊥ rug,t ≥ 0 (3.3.40)
∂Lf
∂vkl,t
=
(
(1− λf ) · Prk + σkf
)
·(pikt − ρ∗t ) + ξkl,t + τkl,t ≥ 0 ⊥ vkl,t ≥ 0 (3.3.41)
∂Lf
∂xg,t
= cgg + φg,t −
∑
k∈Ω
φk
g,t
+ νf,t + δg,t−1 − δg,t
− δg,t−1 + δg,t + g,t−1 − g,t − g,t−1 + g,t ≥ 0 ⊥ xg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.42)
∂Lf
∂yl,t
= −ρ+ + ψl,t +
∑
k∈Ω
(τkl,t + ι
k
l,t − ψkl,t) + νf,t ≥ 0 ⊥ yl,t ≥ 0 (3.3.43)
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∂Lf
∂zkl,t
=
(
(1− λf ) · Prk + σkf
)
·(pikt + ρ+) + ψkl,t+
+ ιkl,t − ιkl,t − τkl,t ≥ 0 ⊥ zkl,t ≥ 0 (3.3.44)
∂Lf
∂Qk,−f
=
λf
1− θf Pr
k − σkf ≥ 0 ⊥ Qk,−f ≥ 0 (3.3.45)
∂Lf
∂ζf
= λf −
∑
k∈Ω
σkf = 0; ζf free (3.3.46)
3.3.2 Extension to Multi-Period with Ramping Products
In this subsection is described the model that results to add the ramping products to the
previous multi-period model. As in the previous subsection, we consider the model divided in
three groups of equations, and focus the description in the differences respect to the previous
model.
1) Global constraints
The global are not affected by the introduction of the ramping products, then we have the
same global constraints than in the previous model:
∑
g∈G
rug,t ≥ A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg,t +my·
∑
l∈G
yl,t
 , (κt), (3.3.47)∑
g∈G
rdg,t ≥ B ·
∑
g∈G
rug,t, (κt), (3.3.48)
∑
g∈G
rug,t ≤ A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg,t +my·
∑
l∈G
yl,t
 , (γt), (3.3.49)∑
g∈G
rdg,t ≤
∑
g∈G
rug,t, (γt). (3.3.50)
2) TSO’s problem for minimizing the generation cost from reserves
In the TSO’s problem for minimizing the generation cost from reserves there are changes
in some constraints, because the energy that can be deployed for operational flexibility is
now the energy from the committed reserves and the committed ramping products. The
optimization problem for each scenario k is:
minimize
skg,t,u
k
g,t
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G
(
skg,t ·cgg − ukg,t ·cgg
)
(3.3.51)
subject to:
∑
g∈G
skg,t =
∑
l∈G
zkl,t, (pi
k
t ) (3.3.52)∑
g∈G
ukg,t =
∑
l∈G
vkl,t, (pi
k
t ) (3.3.53)
skg,t ≤ rug,t + urcg,t, (ηkg,t) (3.3.54)
ukg,t ≤ rdg,t + drcg,t, (ηkg,t) (3.3.55)
Chapter 3. Multi-Period Models 49
where the variables are skg,t and u
k
g,t, and the fixed input data are: The committed upward
rug,t and downward rdg,t reserve, the up ramp capability urcg,t, the down ramp capability
drcg,t, as well as the demand of energy from the upward z
k
l,t and downward v
k
l,t reserve.
As in the previous model, minimizing the cost (3.3.51) implies using the generators with
the minimum generation cost for upward energy and the generators with the maximum cost
for downward energy. The KKT conditions for this problem are:
∂LB
∂skg,t
= cgg − pikt + ηkg,t ≥ 0, ⊥ skg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.56)
∂LB
∂ukg,t
= −cgg − pikt + ηkg,t ≥ 0, ⊥ ukg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.57)
∂LB
∂pikt
=
∑
l∈G
zkl,t −
∑
g∈G
skg,t = 0, pi
k
t free (3.3.58)
∂LB
∂pikt
=
∑
l∈G
vkl,t −
∑
g∈G
ukg,t = 0, pi
k
t free (3.3.59)
∂LB
∂ηkg,t
= skg,t − rug,t − urcg,t ≤ 0, ⊥ ηkg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.60)
∂LB
∂ηk
g,t
= ukg,t − rdg,t − drcg,t ≤ 0, ⊥ ηkg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.61)
3) Firms’ problems
In the multi-period setting with ramping products, the changes in the firm’s problem are
in the objective function, the capacity constraints for dispatchable generators, the ramping
constraints, and two new constraints for the ramping products. The recourse function is
not affected by the introduction of ramping products, and remains the same expression as
before (3.3.22). The optimization problem for each firm f extended to multi-period and with
ramping products is:
max
d,x,y,z,rd,
ru,s,u,v,ζ,Q−
∑
t∈T
{(
ρ0,t − α0,t ·
∑
h∈F
dh,t
)
·df,t +
∑
g∈Gf
(rug,t + urcg,t)·(κt + γt)+
+
∑
g∈Gf
(rdg,t + drcg,t)·(κt + γt)+
+
∑
l∈Gf
yl,t ·ρ+ −
∑
g∈Gf
xg,t ·cgg+
− (1− λf )·
∑
k
PrkQkf − λf ·
(
ζf +
1
1− θf
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Qk,−f
)}
(3.3.62)
subject to: xg,t + rug,t + urcg,t ≤ Xg, (φg,t) (3.3.63)
xg,t + s
k
g,t − rdg,t − drcg,t ≥ Xg, (φkg,t) (3.3.64)
yl,t ≤ Y maxl , (ψl,t) (3.3.65)
yl,t − zkl,t ≥ Y kl , (ψkl,t) (3.3.66)
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∑
g∈Gf
xg,t +
∑
l∈Gf
yl,t = df,t, (νf,t) (3.3.67)
zkl,t ≤ Y maxl − Y kl,t, (ιkl,t) (3.3.68)
yl,t − zkl,t ≤ Y kl,t, (ιkl,t) (3.3.69)
vkl,t ≤ Y kl,t, (ξkl,t) (3.3.70)
vkl,t + yl,t − zkl,t ≤ Y kl,t, (τkl,t) (3.3.71)
rug,t + urcg,t ≤ R·Xg − (xg,t+1 − xg,t), (δg,t) (3.3.72)
rug,t + urcg,t ≤ R·Xg, (δg,t) (3.3.73)
rdg,t + drcg,t ≤ R·Xg, (g,t) (3.3.74)
rdg,t + drcg,t ≤ R·Xg + (xg,t+1 − xg,t), (g,t) (3.3.75)∑
g∈G
(rug,t + urcg,t) = ∆
u
t+2, (ωt) (3.3.76)∑
g∈G
(rdg,t + drcg,t) = ∆
d
t+2 (ωt) (3.3.77)
ζf +Q
k,−
f ≥ Qkf (σkf ) (3.3.78)
where d, drc, x, y, z, rd, ru, s, u, urc, v,Qk,−f are positive variables.
Equations (3.3.63)-(3.3.78) comprise the constraints for the firms problem. These con-
straints are: The upper and lower bounds for dispatchable plants (3.3.63), (3.3.64), and wind
turbines (3.3.65), (3.3.66), the balancing for energy sales in day ahead (3.3.67), the upper and
lower bounds for the purchases of wind turbines due to shortage of wind (3.3.68), (3.3.69), the
bound for the bids of wind in excess (they cannot be greater than available wind) (3.3.70), the
energy balance for wind turbines (3.3.71), the ramping constraints for reserve and scheduled
dispatchable generation (3.3.72)-(3.3.75), the requirement for the new ramping products and
reserve (new constraints) (3.3.76), (3.3.77), and, finally, the constraint (3.3.78) for the CVaR
calculation.
The values for ∆ut and ∆
d
t that we consider in the model come from a trade off between
the ramping capability technically available Rg ·Xg and the wind variability considered, the
particular expressions are:
∆ut = min
0.9·∑
g∈G
Rg ·Xg,
∑
l∈G
[
max
k
{Y kl,t} −
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Y kl,t
] (3.3.79)
∆dt = min
0.9·∑
g∈G
Rg ·Xg,
∑
l∈G
[∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Y kl,t −min
k
{Y kl,t}
] (3.3.80)
where Y
k
l,t is the available wind for wind turbine l at period t in scenario k.
The KKT conditions for the primal variables in the the firm’s problem in the multi-period
setting with ramping products are:
∂Lf
∂df,t
= −(ρ0 − α0
∑
h∈F
dh,t)− νf,t ≥ 0 ⊥ df,t ≥ 0 (3.3.81)
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∂Lf
∂drcg,t
= −(κt + γt) +
∑
k∈Ω
φk
g,t
+ g,t + g,t + ωt ≥ 0 ⊥ drcg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.82)
∂Lf
∂rdg,t
= −(κt + γt) +
∑
k∈Ω
φk
g,t
+ g,t + g,t + ωt ≥ 0 ⊥ rdg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.83)
∂Lf
∂rukg,t
= −(κt + γt) + φg,t + δg,t + δg,t + ωt ≥ 0 ⊥ rug,t ≥ 0 (3.3.84)
∂Lf
∂urcg,t
= −(κt + γt) + φg,t + δg,t + δg,t + ωt ≥ 0 ⊥ urcg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.85)
∂Lf
∂vkl,t
=
(
(1− λf ) · Prk + σkf
)
·(pikt − ρ∗t ) + ξkl,t + τkl,t ≥ 0 ⊥ vkl,t ≥ 0 (3.3.86)
∂Lf
∂xg,t
= cgg + φg,t −
∑
k∈Ω
φk
g,t
+ νf,t + δg,t−1 − δg,t
− δg,t−1 + δg,t + g,t−1 − g,t − g,t−1 + g,t ≥ 0 ⊥ xg,t ≥ 0 (3.3.87)
∂Lf
∂yl,t
= −ρ+ + ψl,t +
∑
k∈Ω
(τkl,t + ι
k
l,t − ψkl,t) + νf,t ≥ 0 ⊥ yl,t ≥ 0 (3.3.88)
∂Lf
∂zkl,t
=
(
(1− λf ) · Prk + σkf
)
·(pikt + ρ+) + ψkl,t+
+ ιkl,t − ιkl,t − τkl,t ≥ 0 ⊥ zkl,t ≥ 0 (3.3.89)
∂Lf
∂Qk,−f
=
λf
1− θf Pr
k − σkf ≥ 0 ⊥ Qk,−f ≥ 0 (3.3.90)
∂Lf
∂ζf
= λf −
∑
k∈Ω
σkf = 0; ζf free (3.3.91)
3.4 Multi-Period Single Firm Equilibrium Model with Price
Responsive Demand
The model described in this section is posed as a pure optimization problem, in contrast with
the complementarity formulation used in the previous sections and chapters. In this case
the model consists of only one optimization problem with an objective function and a set of
constraints that includes the market features described in the previous models. The resulting
problem is a quadratic program, because of the presence of quadratic terms in the objective
function, the constraints are linear. The recourse function Qk has a linear expression for a
single firm in this case:
Qk =
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G
cgg ·(skg,t − ukg,t) +
∑
t∈T
∑
l∈G
zkl,t ·ρ+ (3.4.1)
To summarize, the model is posed as a welfare maximization problem, a two stage stochastic
program, for a single firm f that is a price taking in a multi-period setting, with price
responsive demand. The firms are risk averse and use the CVaR of the recourse function as
a measure of risk. The main changes respect to the previous models are:
• Welfare maximization approach, that implies the inclusion of the term∑t∈T ∫ df,t0 (ρ0,t−
α0,t·
∑
h∈F wh,t)·dwf,t in the objective function, that replaces the term
∑
t∈T (ρ0,t−α0,t·∑
h∈F dh,t)·df,t in the previous models.
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• The terms that explicitly include dual variables are removed, in the objective function
and the constraints.
• The problems of the different agents, that were already described in the previous sec-
tions, are all included together in the set of constraints, in particular: 1) The firm’s
constraints (3.4.3)-(3.4.16), 2) the constraints for the TSO’s minimization problem
for the generation cost from reserves (3.4.17)-(3.4.20), and 3) the global constraints
(3.4.21)-(3.4.24).
We consider two variants of this model, the model without ramping products and the
model with ramping products.
1) Model without ramping product:
max
d,x,y,z,rd,
ru,s,u,v,ζ,Q−
{∑
t∈T
[∫ df,t
0
(ρ0,t − α0,t ·
∑
h∈F
wh,t)·dwf,t +
∑
l∈Gf
yl,t ·ρ+ −
∑
g∈Gf
xg,t
]
− (1− λf )·
∑
k
PrkQkf − λf ·
(
ζf +
1
1− θf
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Qk,−f
)} (3.4.2)
subject to: xg,t + rug,t ≤ Xg, (φg,t) (3.4.3)
xg,t − rdg,t ≥ Xg, (φg,t) (3.4.4)
yl,t ≤ Y maxl , (ψl,t) (3.4.5)
yl,t − zkl,t ≥ Y kl , (ψkl,t) (3.4.6)∑
g∈Gf
xg,t +
∑
l∈Gf
yl,t = df,t, (νf,t) (3.4.7)
zkl,t ≤ Y maxl − Y kl,t, (ιkl,t) (3.4.8)
yl,t − zkl,t ≤ Y kl,t, (ιkl,t) (3.4.9)
vkl,t ≤ Y kl,t, (ξkl,t) (3.4.10)
vkl,t + yl,t − zkl,t ≤ Y kl,t, (τkl,t) (3.4.11)
rug,t ≤ R·Xg − (xg,t+1 − xg,t), (δg,t) (3.4.12)
rug,t ≤ R·Xg, (δg,t) (3.4.13)
rdg,t ≤ R·Xg, (g,t) (3.4.14)
rdg,t ≤ R·Xg + (xg,t+1 − xg,t), (g,t) (3.4.15)
ζf +Q
k,−
f ≥ Qkf , (σkf ) (3.4.16)∑
g∈G
skg,t =
∑
l∈G
zkl,t, (pi
k
t ) (3.4.17)∑
g∈G
ukg,t =
∑
l∈G
vkl,t, (pi
k
t ) (3.4.18)
skg,t ≤ rug,t, (ηkg,t) (3.4.19)
ukg,t ≤ rdg,t, (ηkg,t) (3.4.20)
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∑
g∈G
rug,t ≥ A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg,t +my·
∑
l∈G
yl,t
 , (κt) (3.4.21)∑
g∈G
rdg,t ≥ B ·
∑
g∈G
rug,t, (κt) (3.4.22)
∑
g∈G
rug,t ≤ A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg,t +my·
∑
l∈G
yl,t
 , (γt) (3.4.23)∑
g∈G
rdg,t ≤
∑
g∈G
rug,t, (γt) (3.4.24)
where d, x, y, z, rd, ru, s, u, v,Qk,−f are positive variables.
2) Model with ramping products:
This model has the same objective function and recourse function Qk than the model with-
out ramping products, but some constraints change, and new variables (urcg,t, drcg,t) and
constraints (3.4.48) and (3.4.49) are included in the problem.
max
d,x,y,z,rd,
ru,s,u,v,ζ,Q−
{∑
t∈T
[∫ df,t
0
(ρ0,t − α0,t ·
∑
h∈F
wh,t)·dwf,t +
∑
l∈Gf
yl,t ·ρ+ −
∑
g∈Gf
xg,t
]
− (1− λf )·
∑
k
PrkQkf − λf ·
(
ζf +
1
1− θf
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Qk,−f
)} (3.4.25)
subject to: xg,t + rug,t + urcg,t ≤ Xg, (φg,t) (3.4.26)
xg,t − rdg,t − drcg,t ≥ Xg, (φg,t) (3.4.27)
yl,t ≤ Y maxl , (ψl,t) (3.4.28)
yl,t − zkl,t ≥ Y kl , (ψkl,t) (3.4.29)∑
g∈Gf
xg,t +
∑
l∈Gf
yl,t = df,t, (νf,t) (3.4.30)
zkl,t ≤ Y maxl − Y kl,t, (ιkl,t) (3.4.31)
yl,t − zkl,t ≤ Y kl,t, (ιkl,t) (3.4.32)
vkl,t ≤ Y kl,t, (ξkl,t) (3.4.33)
vkl,t + yl,t − zkl,t ≤ Y kl,t, (τkl,t) (3.4.34)
rug,t + urcg,t ≤ R·Xg − (xg,t+1 − xg,t), (δg,t) (3.4.35)
rug,t + urcg,t ≤ R·Xg, (δg,t) (3.4.36)
rdg,t + drcg,t ≤ R·Xg, (g,t) (3.4.37)
rdg,t + drcg,t ≤ R·Xg + (xg,t+1 − xg,t), (g,t) (3.4.38)
ζf +Q
k,−
f ≥ Qkf , (σkf ) (3.4.39)
54 3.5. Multi-Period Single Firm Equilibrium Model with Fixed Demand
∑
g∈G
skg,t =
∑
l∈G
zkl,t, (pi
k
t ) (3.4.40)∑
g∈G
ukg,t =
∑
l∈G
vkl,t, (pi
k
t ) (3.4.41)
skg,t ≤ rug,t + urcg,t, (ηkg,t) (3.4.42)
ukg,t ≤ rdg,t + drcg,t, (ηkg,t) (3.4.43)∑
g∈G
rug,t ≥ A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg,t +my·
∑
l∈G
yl,t
 , (κt) (3.4.44)∑
g∈G
rdg,t ≥ B ·
∑
g∈G
rug,t, (κt) (3.4.45)
∑
g∈G
rug,t ≤ A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg,t +my·
∑
l∈G
yl,t
 , (γt) (3.4.46)∑
g∈G
rdg,t ≤
∑
g∈G
rug,t, (γt) (3.4.47)∑
g∈G
(rug,t + urcg,t) = ∆
u
t+2, (ωt) (3.4.48)∑
g∈G
(rdg,t + drcg,t) = ∆
d
t+2 (ωt) (3.4.49)
where d, x, y, z, rd, ru, s, u, v,Qk,−f are positive variables.
The values for ∆ut and ∆
d
t considered are a trade off between the technical capacity for
ramping Rg ·Xg and the variability of wind taking into account. The expressions for these
values are:
∆ut = min
0.9·∑
g∈G
Rg ·Xg,
∑
l∈G
[
max
k
{Y kl,t} −
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Y kl,t
] (3.4.50)
∆dt = min
0.9·∑
g∈G
Rg ·Xg,
∑
l∈G
[∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Y kl,t −min
k
{Y kl,t}
] (3.4.51)
where Y
k
l,t is the available wind for wind turbine l at period t in scenario k.
3.5 Multi-Period Single Firm Equilibrium Model with Fixed
Demand
In this section we adapt the model of the previous section by changing the demand model from
price responsive demand to fixed demand, the resulting model is a linear program. Thus, the
inverse demand function is replaced by a curve for total demand Dt based on historical data.
In this section firs the adaptation process from price responsive demand to fixed demand is
described, and then two variants of the model, one without ramping products and the other
with ramping products are described (as in the previous sections).
In the adaptation process from price responsive demand to fixed demand, we remove the
endogenous variable for demand df,t that represents the demand that is supplied by each
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firm, because in the case of single firm df,t = Dt. One advantage of the fixed demand model
is that we can set a variability pattern for demand taking into account exogenous factors not
included in the model. Most of the equations in the previous model remain unchanged, the
changes concentrate in:
1) The term with the inverse demand function in the objective function (3.4.2) is removed,
thus the new objective function is:
min
d,x,y,z,rd,
ru,s,u,v,ζ,Q−
{∑
t∈T
[
−
∑
l∈Gf
yl,t ·ρ+ +
∑
g∈Gf
xg,t ·cgg
]
+
+ (1− λf )·
∑
k
PrkQkf + λf ·
(
ζf +
1
1− θf
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Qk,−f
)} (3.5.1)
2) The energy balance constraint is changed to:∑
g∈G
xg,t +
∑
l∈G
yl = Dt (3.5.2)
We include here only the equations of the model because the description of the equations
has been included in the previous Section 3.3:
• Equations for the model without ramping products: Equations (3.4.2)-(3.4.24), replac-
ing equation (3.4.2) by (3.5.1) and equation (3.4.7) by (3.5.2).
• Equations for the model with ramping products: Equations (3.4.25)-(3.4.49), replacing
equation (3.4.25) by (3.5.1) and equation (3.4.30) by (3.5.2).
For illustrative purposes we include in what follows a description of the Lagrangian func-
tion and the KKT conditions for the model with ramping products.
3.5.1 Lagrange Function for the Model with Ramping Products
Lagrange function for the model described by equations (3.4.2)-(3.4.24), replacing equation
(3.4.2) by (3.5.1) and equation (3.4.7) by (3.5.2).
Lf (drcg,t, rdg,t, rug,t, skg,t, ukg,t, urcg,t, vkl,t, xg,t, yl,t, zkl,t, Qk,−f , ζf ; γt, γt, δg,t, δg,t, g,t,
g,t, η
k
g,t, η
k
g,t
, ιkl,t, ι
k
l,t, κt, κt, νf,t, ξ
k
l,t, pi
k
t , pi
k
t , σ
k
f , τ
k
l,t, φg,t, φg,t, ψl,t, ψ
k
l,t
, ωt, ωt) =∑
t∈T
[
−
∑
l∈Gf
yl,t ·ρ+ +
∑
g∈Gf
xg,t ·cgg
]
+
+ (1− λf )·
∑
k
PrkQkf + λf ·
(
ζf +
1
1− θf
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·Qk,−f
)
+
+
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈Gf
[
φg,t ·(xg,t + rug,t + urcg,t −Xg) + φg,t ·(Xg − xg,t + rdg,t + drcg,t)
]
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+
∑
t∈T
∑
l∈Gf
[
ψl,t ·(yl,t − Y maxl ) +
∑
k∈Ω
ψk
l,t
·(Y kl − yl,t + zkl,t)
]
+
∑
t∈T
νf,t ·
∑
g∈Gf
xg,t +
∑
l∈Gf
yl,t −Dt

+
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈Ω
∑
l∈Gf
[
ιkl,t ·(zkl,t − Y maxl + Y kl,t) + ιkl,t ·(yl,t − zkl,t − Y kl,t)
]
+
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈Ω
∑
l∈Gf
[
ξkl,t ·(vkl,t − Y kl,t) + τkl,t ·(vkl,t + yl,t − zkl,t − Y kl,t)
]
+
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈Gf
[
δg,t ·(rug,t + urcg,t −Rg ·Xg + (xg,t+1 − xg,t))
]
+
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈Gf
[
δg,t ·(rug,t + urcg,t −Rg ·Xg) + g,t ·(rdg,t + drcg,t −Rg ·Xg)
]
+
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈Gf
[
g,t ·(rdg,t + drcg,t −Rg ·Xg − (xg,t+1 − xg,t)
]
+
∑
k∈Ω
σkf ·(Qkf − ζf −Qk,−f )
+
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈Ω
pikt ·
∑
l∈G
zkl,t −
∑
g∈G
skg,t
+ pikt ·
∑
l∈G
vkl,t −
∑
g∈G
ukg,t

+
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈Ω
∑
g∈Gf
[
ηkg,t ·(skg,t − rug,t − urcg,t) + ηkg,t ·(ukg,t − rdg,t − drcg,t)
]
+
∑
t∈T
κt ·
A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg,t +my·
∑
l∈G
yl,t
−∑
g∈G
rug,t

+
∑
t∈T
κt ·
B ·∑
g∈G
rug,t −
∑
g∈G
rdg,t

+
∑
t∈T
γt ·
∑
g∈G
rug,t −A·
mx·∑
g∈G
xg,t +my·
∑
l∈G
yl,t

+
∑
t∈T
γ
t
·
∑
g∈G
rdg,t −
∑
g∈G
rug,t

+
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈Gf
ωt ·
∑
g∈G
(rug,t + urcg,t)−∆ut+2

+
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈Gf
ωt ·
∑
g∈G
(rdg,t + drcg,t)−∆dt+2

(3.5.3)
The variables in this Lagrangian function are:
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• Primal variables: drcg,t, rdg,t, rug,t, skg,t, ukg,t, urcg,t, vkl,t, xg,t, yl,t, zkl,t, Qk,−f , ζf .
• Dual variables: γt, γt, δg,t, δg,t, g,t, g,t, ηkg,t, ηkg,t, ιkl,t, ιkl,t, κt, κt, νf,t, ξkl,t, pikt , pikt , σkf ,
τkl,t, φg,t, φg,t, ψl,t, ψ
k
l,t
, ωt, ωt.
3.5.2 KKT Conditions for the Model with Ramping Products
The KKT conditions for the multi-period single-firm equilibrium model with fixed demand
and ramping product come from the Lagrangian function (3.5.3), and they are:
Primal Variables
∂Lf
∂drcg,t
= φ
g,t
+ g,t + g,t −
∑
k∈Ω
ηk
g,t
+ ωt ≥ 0 ⊥drcg,t ≥ 0 (3.5.4)
∂Lf
∂rdg,t
= φ
g,t
+ g,t + g,t −
∑
k∈Ω
ηk
g,t
− κt + γt + ωt ≥ 0 ⊥ rdg,t ≥ 0 (3.5.5)
∂Lf
∂rug,t
= φg,t + δg,t + δg,t −
∑
k∈Ω
ηkg,t − κt +B ·κt
+ γt − γt + ωt ≥ 0 ⊥ rug,t ≥ 0 (3.5.6)
∂Lf
∂skg,t
= ((1− λf )·Prk + σkf )·cgg − pikt + ηkg,t ≥ 0 ⊥ skg,t ≥ 0 (3.5.7)
∂Lf
∂ukg,t
= −((1− λf )·Prk + σkf )·cgg − pikt + ηkg,t ≥ 0 ⊥ ukg,t ≥ 0 (3.5.8)
∂Lf
∂urcg,t
= φg,t + δg,t + δg,t −
∑
k∈Ω
ηkg,t + ωt ≥ 0 ⊥urcg,t ≥ 0 (3.5.9)
∂Lf
∂vkl,t
= ξkl,t + τ
k
l,t + pi
k
t ≥ 0 ⊥ vkl,t ≥ 0 (3.5.10)
∂Lf
∂xg,t
= cgg + φg,t − φg,t + νf,t + (δg,t−1 − δg,t)
− (g,t−1 − g,t) +A·mx ·κt −A·mx ·γt ≥ 0 ⊥ xg,t ≥ 0 (3.5.11)
∂Lf
∂yl,t
= −ρ+ + ψl,t −
∑
k∈Ω
(−ψk
l,t
+ ιkl,t + τ
k
l,t)+
+A·my ·κt −A·my ·γt ≥ 0 ⊥ yl,t ≥ 0 (3.5.12)
∂Lf
∂zkl,t
= ((1− λf )·Prk + σkf )·ρ+ + ψkl,t + ιkl,t − ιkl,t + pikt ≥ 0 ⊥ zkl,t ≥ 0 (3.5.13)
∂Lf
∂Qk,−f
=
λf ·Pr
1− θf − σ
k
f ≥ 0 ⊥ Qk,−f ≥ 0 (3.5.14)
∂Lf
∂ζf
= λf −
∑
k∈Ω
σkf = 0 ζf free (3.5.15)
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Chapter 4
Case Studies
4.1 Introduction
This chapter illustrates the use of single period and multi-period models through two stylized
case studies. A first analysis examines the impact of various policy, economic and physical
characteristics of the market on global and particular market outcomes. The analysis is driven
by the attempt to assess the role of plants and flexibility reserves. It is conducted with the
single period model operated in single firm mode and with price responsive demand. The
analysis is conducted with different assumptions on the generation system in preparation for
the second case study.
The second analysis elaborates on the above and is inspired by the current movement in
the European Union that sees the decommissioning of new and efficient gas plants because
of low electricity prices (partially) induced by energy policy. The question addressed here is
whether the services provided by conventional plants might eventually stop this anticipated
decommissioning. The analysis is driven by the goal of better understanding the role of
ramping capability that emerged as important in the first study. It is conducted with a
multi-period model operated in optimization mode; results with fixed demand and price
responsive demand are studied and compared.
The rest of the chapter consists of five sections. First the expressions that relate the
variables in the models and the results reported on the tables are listed. The following
section describes the dismantling process used to construct the various assumptions of gen-
eration capacities. The data used in the case studies are given next. The last two sections
are respectively devoted to the analysis of the impact of policy and market characteristics
using single period models and to the impact of the anticipated dismantling of conventional
capacities using multi-period models. All these discussions are conducted in a single firm
configuration.
4.2 Market Performance Metrics
In this section we describe the expressions used to calculate the results reported from the
simulations. These expressions are refereed with a label in the tables reporting results. A
given label can correspond to different expressions depending on the model used (e.g. final
demand is given by a different expression depending on whether the model is with fixed
or price responsible demand). The expressions and their correspondence with the labels in
tables are presented in three successive subsections.
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4.2.1 General System Characteristics
In this section the different expressions for the labels in tables are listed. Usually the same
label corresponds to different expressions depending on the model used to generate the re-
sults. In what follows only the labels with the shortest expressions are listed, the rest of the
expressions (information on profits) are described in detail in the next sections.
Labels in Tables 1 Variables and parameters in the models
Demand day ahead (MWh)
s-p d (price responsive)
s-p D (fixed demand)
m-p 1|T |
∑
t∈T dt (price responsive)
m-p 1|T |
∑
t∈T Dt (fixed demand)
Schedu. win. gen. (MWh)
s-p
∑
l∈G yl
m-p 1|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
l∈G yl,t
Schedu. dispat. gen. (MWh)
s-p
∑
g∈G xg
m-p 1|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G xg,t
Equilibrium price (e/MWh)
ρ∗ or −νf or −ν
s-p (ρ0 − α0 ·
∑
h∈F dh)·df
m-p 1∑
t∈T
∑
f∈F df,t
∑
t∈T
∑
f∈F (ρ0,t − α0,t ·
∑
h∈F dh,t)·df,t
Reserve requirement (MW)
s-p mx·
∑
g∈G xg +my·
∑
l∈G yl
m-p 1|T |
∑
t∈T
(
mx·
∑
g∈G xg,t +my·
∑
l∈G yl,t
)
Up. reserve commit. (MW)
s-p
∑
g∈G rug
m-p 1|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G rug,t
Down. reser. commit. (MW)
s-p
∑
g∈G rdg
m-p 1|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G rdg,t
Up ramp cap. commit. (MW) m-p 1|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G urcg,t
Down ramp cap. com. (MW) m-p 1|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G drcg,t
Max. available reserve
(MW)2
s-p
∑
g∈G min{Rg ·(Xg − Λ·xg), Rg ·(Xg − Λ·xg),
Xg − xg}
m-p
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G min{Rg ·Xg − (xg,t+1 − xg,t),
Rg ·Xg + (xg,t+1 − xg,t), Xg − xg,t}
4.2.2 Agents’ Profits in the Single Period Setting
Policies, physical and economic characteristics have an impact on the different agents of the
economy. Besides global indicators such as electricity prices and total energy demand, it
is also important to assess this impact on agents’ positions. We therefore compute various
profit information, as listed below for the model described in Section 2.5, that is single period,
single firm, with price responsive demand and posed as a complementarity problem. This
model does not include MISO ramping products because they can be defined only in a multi-
period context. Only the information for the single period models used in the simulations
are described in what follows. These values are hourly average:
1) The profit of wind turbines in day ahead is (−ν is the equilibrium price for energy in day
1The meaning of “s-p” is single period, and “m-p” means multi-period.
2When the model includes a backup generator, its contribution to the available reserve is not taken into
account to calculate the values reported in the tables. Thus when the committed reserve is greater than the
available reserve means that the backup generator is providing the additional reserve.
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ahead):∑
l∈G
yl ·(ρ+ − ν) (4.2.1)
2) The profit of wind turbines in balancing is:∑
k∈Ω
∑
l∈G
Prk ·
[
vkl ·(−ν − χk) + zkl ·(−ρ+ − χk)
]
(4.2.2)
3) The profit accruing to dispatchable generators from energy in day ahead is:∑
g∈G
xg ·(−ν − cgg) (4.2.3)
4) The profit accruing to dispatchable generators from ancillary services is:
∑
g∈G
[
rug ·(κ+ γ) + rdg(κ+ γ)+
+
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·
[
skg ·(χk − cgg) + ukg ·(χk + cgg + ν)
] ] (4.2.4)
5) The total profit of dispatchable generators in day ahead (first stage) is:∑
g∈G
[
xg ·(−ν − cgg) + rug ·(κ+ γ) + rdg ·(κ+ γ)
]
(4.2.5)
6) The profit of dispatchable generators at the second stage is:∑
g∈G
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·
[
skg ·(χk − cgg) + ukg ·(χk + cgg + ν)
]
(4.2.6)
7) The total (first and second stage) profit of dispatchable generators, in a system without
MISO ramping products (see section 3.2.1), is:
∑
g∈G
[
xg ·(−ν − cgg) + rug ·(κ+ γ) + rdg(κ+ γ)+
+
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·
[
skg ·(χk − cgg) + ukg ·(χk + cgg + ν)
] ] (4.2.7)
8) The total profit (first and second stage) of wind generators is:
∑
l∈G
[
yl ·(ρ+ − ν) +
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·
[
vkl ·(−ν − χk) + zkl ·(−ρ+ − χk)
] ]
(4.2.8)
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4.2.3 Agents’ Profit in the Multi-Period Setting
The following expressions give the firm’s agents profit for the multi-period models used in the
simulations, that are the model presented in Section 3.4 and the model in Section 3.5. The
model in Section 3.4 is a multi-period, single firm facing a price responsive demand and posed
as a stochastic program that maximizes social welfare. The model in Section 3.5 is a multi-
period, single firm facing fixed demand, and posed as a stochastic program that minimizes
the firm’s operation cost. The same expressions of profits apply in both models, but the
interpretations of some variables are slightly different. In particular the dual variable νt, that
in the case of model with price responsive demand is the equilibrium price (the energy price
in day ahead) −νt = ρ0,t − α0,t ·dt, in the case of the model with fixed demand it becomes
the shadow price of the energy in day ahead (the dual variable of the balance between total
demand and generation). We consider the hourly average of the values, which are directly
comparable with the results from the single period models. The expressions for the firm’s
agents profit are as follows:
1) The profit for wind turbines at the first stage (day ahead) is:
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
l∈G
yl,t ·(−νt) (4.2.9)
Where −νt is the equilibrium price (the energy price in day ahead).
2) The profit of wind turbines at the second stage (balancing) is:
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈Ω
∑
l∈G
Prk ·
[
vkl,t ·(−νt) + zkl,t ·ρ+
]
(4.2.10)
3) The profit of dispatchable generators at the first stage (day ahead), in a system with
MISO ramping products (see section 3.2.1), is:
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G
[
xg,t ·(−νt − cgg) + (urcg,t + rug,t)·φg,t − (drcg,t + rdg,t)·φg,t
]
(4.2.11)
4) The profit of dispatchable generators at the first stage (day ahead), in a system without
MISO ramping products (see section 3.2.1), is:
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G
[
xg,t ·(−νt − cgg) + rug,t ·φg,t − rdg,t ·φg,t
]
(4.2.12)
5) The profit of dispatchable generators at the second stage (balancing) is:
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
g∈G
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·
[
ukg,t ·(−νt − cgg)− skg,t ·cgg
]
(4.2.13)
4.3 The Dismantling Process
The European power market is current undergoing a large dismantling process. This takes
place in an “energy only” market; we simulate this process by distinguishing between the
models with fixed demand and the models with price responsive demand.
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In the case of fixed demand we model this market by introducing a price cap for energy:
we represent this price cap by a virtual generator, hereafter the “backup generator”. The
backup generator is needed in the case of fixed demand to avoid infeasibilities due to the fact
that generation capacity becomes lower than the fixed demand because of the dismantling
process. In theoretical terms, the backup generator has infinite generation capacity, zero fixed
cost and a high generation cost equal to the value of the price cap. In our models the backup
generator has a finite capacity of 30 GW, that is very high in comparison to the demand in
the system, only a small fraction of this capacity is used in practice. It is assumed that this
generator is never dismantled.
In the price responsive case the demand adapts to the available generation capacity and
we never have infeasibility problems due to a low generation capacity. The introduction of a
price cap for energy (a backup generator) still makes sense in this case, but here we do not
study that situation and leave it for future work.
The dismantling process consists of the progressive retirement of the conventional plants
with profit lower than their fixed operation and maintenance cost. It stops when all plants
cover their fixed operating costs. The process consists of the following sequence of actions:
1) The process starts with all the capacity in the system available for generation and the
backup generator.
2) In each iteration the model is run with the plants that have not been dismantled and the
backup generator (if it is included in the system).
3) The operation cost of conventional units takes into account only the fuel cost. The profit
of each conventional plant is calculated as the difference between its revenues and its
operation cost during a whole year. This profit is compared with the plant’s fixed operation
and maintenance cost. The Fixed Operation and Maintenance cost (FOM) is taken from
[73] and it is a fixed value for each technology. The mathematical expressions for this
calculation are described in detail in the next Section 4.3.1.
4) In each iteration the difference between the plant’s profit and its FOM is calculated for a
period of one year, and depending on the value of this difference we have two cases:
a) It has a negative value for at least one conventional unit: Then among these units with
negative value the one with the lower value is dismantled, and the process continues
with other iteration.
b) The value is positive for all the active conventional plants: In this case the dismantling
process ends in this iteration.
4.3.1 Calculation of Profitability for Dismantling Decisions
The dismantling decisions are based on the profitability of the dispatchable units. This
profitability is calculated as the difference between the profit of the dispatchable unit and its
FOM in a period of one year. The wind in one year is represented here by a set of four wind
patterns described in Table 4.1. This patterns come from the clustering of historical data for
wind in the Spanish System in 2012 [74].
3Percentage over the wind capacity installed.
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Table 4.1: Data for wind patterns
Index (w) 1 2 3 4
Expected wind (µw %
3) 5.86 22.20 47.09 61.17
Probability (Pr(µw)) 0.13321 0.73160 0.06840 0.06678
The dispatchable units with negative profitability are dismantled. The mathematical
expression for the profitability depends on the model used, but the general expression is:
ProfitabilityDispatchableg =
∑
w∈Ξ
ProfitDispatchableg(µw)− FOMCg (4.3.1)
where w is the index for the wind pattern, ProfitDispatchableg(µw) is the profit of the dis-
patchable unit g when the wind pattern has a wind expectation of µw, and FOMCg is the
fixed operation and maintenance cost in the period. The expressions of each term for each
model are described in what follows:
• FOMCg:
– Single period: In this case the terms in the profitability expression are normalized
to an hourly base.
FOMCg =
1
24
Xg ·FOMg (4.3.2)
FOMg is the fixed operation and maintenance cost of the dispatchable unit g per
day.
– Multi-period: In this case the terms in the profitability expression are normalized
to a daily base.
FOMCg = Xg ·FOMg (4.3.3)
• ProfitDispatchableg(µw):
– Single period (there is not ramping products in single period):
x(µw)g ·(−ν(µw) − cgg) + ru(µw)g ·(κ(µw) + γ(µw)) + rd(µw)g (κ(µw) + γ(µw))+
+
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·
[
s(µw),kg ·(χ(µw),k − cgg) + u(µw),kg ·(χ(µw),k + cgg + ν(µw))
]
(4.3.4)
– Multi-period with ramping products:
∑
t∈T
[
x
(µw)
g,t ·(−ν(µw)t − cgg) + (urc(µw)g,t + ru(µw)g,t )·φ
(µw)
g,t
− (drc(µw)g,t + rd(µw)g,t )·φ(µw)g,t
+
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·
[
u
(µw),k
g,t ·(−ν(µw)t − cgg)− s(µw),kg,t ·cgg
]] (4.3.5)
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– Multi-period without ramping products:∑
t∈T
[
x
(µw)
g,t ·(−ν(µw)t − cgg) + ru(µw)g,t ·φ
(µw)
g,t − rd(µw)g,t ·φ(µw)g,t
+
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈Ω
Prk ·
[
u
(µw),k
g,t ·(−ν(µw)t − cgg)− s(µw),kg,t ·cgg
]] (4.3.6)
The superscript “(µw)” indicates the values that have been calculated with the wind pattern
with wind expectation µw.
4.4 Data for Case Studies
In this section we describe the data used for the case studies. For the sake of simplicity the
data are grouped in the following blocks: Common Data, Demand Data, Generators Data,
Wind Scenarios Data, Cases and Structural Assumptions. In some of the previous blocks the
data are different for the single period and the multi-period setting.
4.4.1 Common Data
We refer to Common Data as the data common to all case studies (single period or multi-
period), these data are:
• The parameters that set the bounds for committed upward reserve in between 90% −
110% of the TSO requirement: A = 0.9 and A = 1.1.
• The parameter that set the lower bound for the committed downward reserve to at
least 40% of committed upward reserve, B = 0.4.
• The balancing reserve factor for dispatchable generation mx = 0.02 (2%).
• The confidence level for CV aRθ to θf = 0.95.
• The price elasticity of −0.3, data from [75], for the energy demand in day ahead, for
a reference value for the energy price ρ and demand d, thus −0.3 = ρ
d
∂d
∂ρ =
ρ
d
(
−1
α0
)
⇒
α0 =
10
3
ρ
d
.
4.4.2 Demand Data
Single period
The parameters ρ0 and α0 in the inverse demand function for the single period setting have
been calculated considering two conditions:
• Average price ρ for average demand d, ρ = ρ0 − α0 ·d.
• An elasticity price of −0.3 (data from [75]) for the average price ρ and average demand
d, −0.3 = ρ
d
∂d
∂ρ =
ρ
d
(
−1
α0
)
⇒ α0 = 103 ρd .
We have used the hourly average values for the Spanish system in 2012 [74], ρ = 48.42
e/MWh and d = 28753.32 MWh, to calculate the parameters of the inverse demand function
for the simulations in the single period case. The parameters of the inverse demand function
for these values are ρ0 = 209.82 e/MWh and α0 = 0.0056133 e/(MWh)2.
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Multi-period
Two models for demand, fixed demand and price responsive demand, are considered in the
multi-period setting:
a) In the case of fixed demand, for each period t (hour) we use in the simulations the cor-
responding hourly average value for that hour in the Spanish System in 2012, [74], these
values are listed on Table 4.2.
b) Price responsive demand: in this case the inverse demand function is recalculated for each
hour, with the result that the parameters ρ0,t and α0,t, can have a different value for each
time period t. The values of ρ0,t used in the simulations are listed on Table 4.3, and the
values of α0,t are listed on Table 4.4. The value of α0,t is calculated as α0,t = −103 νtdt ,
where −νt is the energy price in day ahead (equilibrium price) for the model with multi-
period, single firm, fixed demand and posed as a cost minimization stochastic program (see
Section 3.5) for the four wind patterns (5.86%, 22.20%, 47.09% and 61.17%) considered
in the simulations, see Table 4.11. And the demand dt is the corresponding fixed value of
demand listed in Table 4.2 and used to calculate νt. Finally, the value of ρ0,t is calculated
as ρ0,t = −νt + α0,t ·dt.
Thus there are four patterns for the values of ρ0,t and α0,t, one for each pattern of wind.
Table 4.2: Value of the fixed demand curve for energy in day ahead
Hour (h) Demand Hour (h) Demand Hour (h) Demand
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh)
1 23639.34 9 29623.35 17 32049.07
2 21979.99 10 30823.20 18 32347.67
3 21143.71 11 32321.24 19 32485.98
4 20832.60 12 33108.09 20 31875.76
5 20747.97 13 33751.60 21 31816.75
6 21351.82 14 33897.57 22 31988.14
7 23235.53 15 32587.76 23 31364.21
8 26203.37 16 32324.67 24 28580.27
4.4.3 Generators Data
Different configurations for the generation park are studied for the single period and the
multi-period settings. We only consider conventional non hydro technologies and wind, in
particular: Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT), Nuclear, Coal, and Wind. Only conven-
tional technologies (CCGT, Nuclear and Coal) are assumed dispatchable. The CCGT blocks
differ by configuration (dismantling and mothballing has concentrated on CCGT), leading to
the following configurations for dispatchable generators:
• B2.0 and B2.1: They are described in Table 4.7. B2 should be interpreted as two blocks
of CCGT units, “.0” refers to the initial configuration without dismantling, while “.1” is
a configuration where the more expensive CCGT block are dismantled, and the capacity
of the other CCGT block reduced to the half of its initial capacity.
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Table 4.3: Value of ρ0,t (e/MWh) for multi-period case.
Hour µ Hour µ
(t) 5.86% 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% (t) 5.86% 22.20% 47.09% 61.17%
1 188.27 175.27 173.66 115.09 13 188.27 188.27 187.19 173.65
2 188.27 165.79 142.78 80.56 14 188.27 188.27 187.19 170.12
3 187.19 150.67 112.13 74.50 15 188.27 188.27 182.16 167.81
4 187.19 166.74 119.38 73.27 16 188.27 188.27 182.16 167.20
5 187.19 161.34 109.98 73.28 17 188.27 188.27 186.11 156.78
6 188.27 162.26 113.42 77.51 18 188.27 188.27 187.19 171.80
7 188.27 169.54 139.02 105.58 19 188.27 188.27 188.27 169.74
8 188.27 187.19 151.47 137.73 20 188.27 188.27 187.19 168.16
9 188.27 188.27 182.16 170.64 21 188.27 188.27 187.19 159.22
10 188.27 188.27 182.16 166.59 22 188.27 188.27 187.19 170.53
11 188.27 188.27 187.19 169.81 23 188.27 188.27 184.48 168.56
12 188.27 188.27 187.19 180.70 24 188.27 188.27 175.87 143.14
Table 4.4: Value of α0,t (e/(MWh)2) for multi-period case.
Hour µ Hour µ
(t) 5.86% 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% (t) 5.86% 22.20% 47.09% 61.17%
1 0.00613 0.00570 0.00565 0.00375 13 0.00429 0.00429 0.00427 0.00396
2 0.00659 0.00580 0.00500 0.00282 14 0.00427 0.00427 0.00425 0.00386
3 0.00681 0.00548 0.00408 0.00271 15 0.00444 0.00444 0.00430 0.00396
4 0.00691 0.00616 0.00441 0.00271 16 0.00448 0.00448 0.00433 0.00398
5 0.00694 0.00598 0.00408 0.00272 17 0.00452 0.00452 0.00447 0.00376
6 0.00678 0.00585 0.00409 0.00279 18 0.00448 0.00448 0.00445 0.00409
7 0.00623 0.00561 0.00460 0.00350 19 0.00446 0.00446 0.00446 0.00402
8 0.00553 0.00550 0.00445 0.00404 20 0.00454 0.00454 0.00452 0.00406
9 0.00489 0.00489 0.00473 0.00443 21 0.00455 0.00455 0.00453 0.00385
10 0.00470 0.00470 0.00455 0.00416 22 0.00453 0.00453 0.00450 0.00410
11 0.00448 0.00448 0.00446 0.00404 23 0.00462 0.00462 0.00452 0.00413
12 0.00437 0.00437 0.00435 0.00420 24 0.00507 0.00507 0.00473 0.00385
• B9.0, B9.4, B9.5, B9.6, B9.7: They are summarized in Table 4.6, B9 should be inter-
preted as 9 blocks of CCGT units. Configuration B9.0 is described in detail in Table
4.5, configurations B9.6 and B9.7 are described in Table 4.8 and used in single period
simulations, and finally configurations B9.4 and B9.5 are described in Table 4.9 and
used in multi-period simulations. The “.6” in B9.6 indicates that the 6 blocks of CCGT
units with the highest cost are dismantled, and the meaning is similar for the rest of
configurations.
The initial total capacity has the same value (43597.49 MW) for both configurations B2.0
and B9.0, and also both configurations have the same value of capacities for each technology
(CCGT, Nuclear and Coal). The only difference is in the number of blocks for the CCGT
technology; it is divided in two blocs in configuration B2 and in 9 blocs in B9. These reflect
different stages of the dismantling process due to assumptions (e.g. dismantling ends on
different generation systems depending on ramping capabilities). The blocks for the other
technologies, Coal and Nuclear, are identical in all configurations (B2.0, B2.1, B9.0, B9.4,
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B9.5, B9.6, and B9.7)
Single period
Table 4.5: Summary of generators’ data, configuration B9.
Net Capa. Rg = Rg cgg FOM
4
N Technology Xg (MW) %/h of Xg (e/MWh) (e/(MW·day)
1 CCGT 2910.81 53.33 46.90 80.00
2 CCGT 1550.05 53.33 46.47 79.00
3 CCGT 1584.44 53.33 46.04 78.00
4 CCGT 3863.34 53.33 45.61 77.00
5 CCGT 5588.25 53.33 45.17 76.00
6 CCGT 2744.32 53.33 44.74 75.00
7 CCGT 3274.98 53.33 44.31 74.00
8 CCGT 2056.58 53.33 43.88 73.00
9 CCGT 2153.50 53.33 43.45 72.00
10 Nuclear 1519.23 2.08 10.91 269.95
11 Nuclear 6053.35 2.08 10.29 264.66
12 Coal 2035.89 20.00 37.50 100.00
13 Coal 5119.13 25.00 38.44 98.00
14 Coal 1198.12 25.00 19.77 97.00
15 Coal 1945.51 25.00 20.24 95.00
16 Backup gen. 30000.00 50.00 100.00 0.00
17 Wind 22573.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4.6: Summary of dismantling configurations for dispatchable generators with initial
configuration B9.0.
Capacity Xg (MW) cgg
g Tech. B9.0 B9.4 B9.5 B9.6 B9.7 e/MWh
1 CCGT 2910.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 46.90
2 CCGT 1550.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 46.47
3 CCGT 1584.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 46.04
4 CCGT 3863.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.61
5 CCGT 5588.25 5588.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.17
6 CCGT 2744.32 2744.32 2744.32 0.00 0.00 44.74
7 CCGT 3274.98 3274.98 3274.98 3274.98 0.00 44.31
8 CCGT 2056.58 2056.58 2056.58 2056.58 2056.58 43.88
9 CCGT 2153.50 2153.50 2153.50 2153.50 2153.50 43.45
10 Nuclear 1519.23 1519.23 1519.23 1519.23 1519.23 10.91
11 Nuclear 6053.35 6053.35 6053.35 6053.35 6053.35 10.29
12 Coal 2035.89 2035.89 2035.89 2035.89 2035.89 37.50
13 Coal 5119.13 5119.13 5119.13 5119.13 5119.13 38.44
14 Coal 1198.12 1198.12 1198.12 1198.12 1198.12 19.77
15 Coal 1945.51 1945.51 1945.51 1945.51 1945.51 20.24
Total (MW) 43597.49 33688.85 28100.60 25356.29 22081.31
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Table 4.7: Summary of generators’ data after dismantling, configuration B2.
Xg (MW) Rg = Rg cgg FOM
4
Tech. B2.0 B2.1 % of Xg e/MWh e/(MW·day)
CCGT 4395.86 0.00 53.33 45.82 79.65
CCGT 21265.40 10632.70 53.33 43.45 75.20
Nuclear 1519.23 1519.23 2.08 10.91 269.95
Nuclear 6053.35 6053.35 2.08 10.29 264.66
Coal 2035.89 2035.89 20.00 37.50 100.00
Coal 5119.13 5119.13 25.00 38.44 98.00
Coal 1198.12 1198.12 25.00 19.77 97.00
Coal 1945.51 1945.51 25.00 20.24 95.00
Wind 22573.00 22573.00 - - -
Total
Dispatch. 43597.49 28503.93
Table 4.8: Summary of generators’ data after dismantling, configurations B9 for single period.
Capacity Xg (MW) FOM
4
Initial Dismantled Dismantled cgg e/
g Tech. B9.0 B9.6 B9.7 e/MWh (MW·day)
1 CCGT 2910.81 0.00 0.00 46.90 80.00
2 CCGT 1550.05 0.00 0.00 46.47 79.00
3 CCGT 1584.44 0.00 0.00 46.04 78.00
4 CCGT 3863.34 0.00 0.00 45.61 77.00
5 CCGT 5588.25 0.00 0.00 45.17 76.00
6 CCGT 2744.32 0.00 0.00 44.74 75.00
7 CCGT 3274.98 3274.98 0.00 44.31 74.00
8 CCGT 2056.58 2056.58 2056.58 43.88 73.00
9 CCGT 2153.50 2153.50 2153.50 43.45 72.00
10 Nuclear 1519.23 1519.23 1519.23 10.91 269.95
11 Nuclear 6053.35 6053.35 6053.35 10.29 264.66
12 Coal 2035.89 2035.89 2035.89 37.50 100.00
13 Coal 5119.13 5119.13 5119.13 38.44 98.00
14 Coal 1198.12 1198.12 1198.12 19.77 97.00
15 Coal 1945.51 1945.51 1945.51 20.24 95.00
16 Backup gen. 30000.00 30000.00 30000.00 100.00 0.00
17 Wind 22573.00 22573.00 22573.00 0.00 0.00
Total dispat. (MW) 43597.49 25356.29 22081.31
Three compositions of the dispatchable generation park are considered in the simulations
for single period, B2.1 (Table 4.7), B9.6 and B9.7 (Table 4.8). Configuration B2.1 has been
previously described in this section. The other configurations B9.6 and B9.7 correspond
to the final state of dismantling (see Section 4.3) of configuration B9.0 under two different
assumptions for ramping. B9.6 is the end result of dismantling for the low ramping (Λ = 1),
and B9.7 for the high ramping assumption (Λ = 0).
4Fixed Operation and Maintenance Cost per day.
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Multi-period
Two compositions of the dispatchable generation park are considered in the simulations for
multi-period, B9.4 and B9.5 that are described in Table 4.9. These configurations correspond
to the final state of the dismantling process for different model assumptions: Fixed demand
or price responsive demand, with ramping products or without them, with backup generator
or without it.
Table 4.9: Summary of generators’ at the final state of dismantling, configurations B9 for
multi-period.
Capacity Xg (MW) FOM
4
Initial Dismantled Dismantled cgg e/
g Tech. B9.0 B9.4 B9.5 e/MWh (MW·day)
1 CCGT 2910.81 0.00 0.00 46.90 80.00
2 CCGT 1550.05 0.00 0.00 46.47 79.00
3 CCGT 1584.44 0.00 0.00 46.04 78.00
4 CCGT 3863.34 0.00 0.00 45.61 77.00
5 CCGT 5588.25 5588.25 0.00 45.17 76.00
6 CCGT 2744.32 2744.32 2744.32 44.74 75.00
7 CCGT 3274.98 3274.98 3274.98 44.31 74.00
8 CCGT 2056.58 2056.58 2056.58 43.88 73.00
9 CCGT 2153.50 2153.50 2153.50 43.45 72.00
10 Nuclear 1519.23 1519.23 1519.23 10.91 269.95
11 Nuclear 6053.35 6053.35 6053.35 10.29 264.66
12 Coal 2035.89 2035.89 2035.89 37.50 100.00
13 Coal 5119.13 5119.13 5119.13 38.44 98.00
14 Coal 1198.12 1198.12 1198.12 19.77 97.00
15 Coal 1945.51 1945.51 1945.51 20.24 95.00
16 Backup gen. 30000.00 30000.00 30000.00 100.00 0.00
17 Wind 22573.00 22573.00 22573.00 0.00 0.00
Total dispat. (MW) 43597.49 33688.85 28100.60
4.4.4 Wind Scenarios Data
Single period
In the single period case, uncertainty is modeled through a scenario tree with 12 branches
that represent the power output of wind turbines in one hour. The scenarios model the
uncertainty from the errors in wind power forecast; the expected wind is a given value µ
(exogenous parameter), and the probability distribution comes from the wind power fore-
cast error distribution; here we use a Beta distribution based on µ, see Section 2.2.3. The
methodology and assumptions to build the scenarios are described in detail in Section 2.4.5.
The scenarios used in the simulation for single period configurations are listed in Table 4.10,
these scenarios have representative values based on historical data from the Spanish System,
[74]. Each scenario in each tree has the same probability ( 112 ≈ 8.33%); this results from the
particular discretization of the original Beta distribution discussed in Section 2.4.5. Notice
that this does not assume an uniform error distribution, in fact the error distribution is as-
sumed to be a Beta distribution, according to [54, 57]. One shall note that the variability
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of wind generation is usually in the range [0.5µ, 1.5µ] except for very low values of expected
wind, see Table 4.10 and Fig. 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Bounds for wind variability in the single period case.
Table 4.10: Data of the scenario tree for wind in single period
Scenario Normalized power output (%)
1 0.59 12.64 26.42 35.55
2 1.20 16.13 33.34 46.56
3 1.69 18.12 37.13 52.44
4 2.15 19.76 40.16 56.99
5 2.62 21.24 42.83 60.89
6 3.12 22.66 45.34 64.44
7 3.66 24.09 47.82 67.81
8 4.27 25.60 50.35 71.13
9 5.00 27.27 53.08 74.52
10 5.93 29.24 56.19 78.18
11 7.27 31.86 60.16 82.46
12 10.57 37.34 67.60 89.05
µ (%)5 4.01 23.83 46.70 65.00
σ (%)5 2.73 6.66 11.20 14.83
max. (base µ) 2.64 1.57 1.45 1.37
min. (base µ) 0.15 0.53 0.57 0.55
The curves plotted in Fig. 4.1 correspond to the normalized values for the lowest scenario
(lower bound) and the highest scenario (upper bound) for the wind power output distribution
for values of wind forecast in the range 4% to 65%. The common base used to normalize
the values is the total wind power capacity installed. The probability of being in the interval
between the lower and the upper bound is greater than 1012 ≈ 0.833.
5Calculated over the wind capacity installed.
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Multi-period
The wind uncertainty is modeled in the multi-period case considering four wind patterns,
based on historical data for the Spanish system in 2012 [74], that are representative of the
patterns for the whole year. The wind patterns, profiles for 24 hours, are clustered to reduce
the total number of profiles from 365 to 4, each one of this four patterns has a probability
according to the number of profiles grouped on it. The values in each pattern are interpreted
as the expected value for each period, these values are listed on Table 4.11. The four patterns
are used in the simulations for the progressive dismantling process (Section 4.3). Each wind
pattern is identified by the wind forecast, 5.86%, 22.20%, 47.09% or 61.17% (percentage
over the total wind capacity installed). For each period and wind pattern, 12 scenarios are
generated following the same procedure that in the single period case (see Section 2.2.3) using
the value given by the wind pattern as the expected value. The total number of scenarios
is 4×24×12, 4 wind patterns, 24 periods per wind pattern and 12 scenarios per each period,
the values of these scenarios are reported on Tables A.30 and A.31 (Section A.4).
Table 4.11: Patterns for wind in multi-period, 24 hours (% on wind capacity installed)
Hour Low Average High Very High
(h) % % % %
1 0.1097 0.3967 0.4132 0.5531
2 0.1066 0.3550 0.4414 0.5640
3 0.0953 0.3340 0.4586 0.5438
4 0.0823 0.3137 0.4337 0.5420
5 0.0653 0.2953 0.4455 0.5271
6 0.0594 0.2797 0.4606 0.5529
7 0.0546 0.2907 0.4833 0.5654
8 0.0487 0.2940 0.5015 0.5878
9 0.0420 0.2836 0.4905 0.5854
10 0.0347 0.2688 0.4834 0.5836
11 0.0268 0.2498 0.4777 0.5880
12 0.0210 0.2263 0.4922 0.5939
13 0.0210 0.2030 0.5044 0.6270
14 0.0232 0.1763 0.5163 0.6468
15 0.0261 0.1577 0.5219 0.6590
16 0.0385 0.1314 0.5280 0.6645
17 0.0472 0.1307 0.5039 0.6646
18 0.0553 0.1330 0.4783 0.6604
19 0.0621 0.1377 0.4464 0.6539
20 0.0695 0.1421 0.4361 0.6553
21 0.0791 0.1351 0.4326 0.6642
22 0.0780 0.1304 0.4426 0.6678
23 0.0755 0.1356 0.4503 0.6694
24 0.0839 0.1272 0.4587 0.6610
Hourly average (%) 0.0586 0.2220 0.4709 0.6117
Probability 0.1332 0.7316 0.0684 0.0668
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4.4.5 Cases and Structural Assumptions
The values for the rest of the data, that are not included in the previous sections, are fixed
in what we call here “structural assumptions”, thus the structural assumptions assign a
particular value to one or more of the following parameters: The feed-in premium ρ+, the
level of risk aversion λ, the wind forecast µ, the ramping capability in the single period models
(that can be low or high in the parametric ramping model), the demand of ramp capability
due to scheduled wind generation my, and the price cap to energy in day ahead (in the case
of a fixed demand model that includes a price cap). We use these structural assumptions
through “Cases” to study the effect of a certain parameter on the results. Each Case consists
of two test studies, both with the same structural assumptions, except for the value of the
parameter under study, that is the only parameter that changes from one test study to the
other. We define four Cases that are focused on the following main factors: i) Case 1 in
the wind forecast µ, ii) Case 2 in the feed-in premium ρ+, iii) Case 3 in the risk aversion
λ, and iv) Case 4 in demand for flexibility from wind generation my. The Cases are tested
under different configurations that consist of the composition of the generation park and the
ramping possibilities. The values for the parameters in the Cases are listed in Table 4.12,
these cases are used for all the simulations, with the objective to have a common base to
compare the results.
Table 4.12: Summary of parameters for the configurations compared in each Case.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
mx 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
my 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.60 0.60
µ, (%) expected wind 4.01 65.00 23.83 23.83 23.83 23.83 23.83 23.83
ρ+ (e/MWh) 30.00 30.00 0.00 80.00 30.00 30.00 0.00 80.00
λ, risk aversion 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.40
4.5 Case Study 1: Impact of Policy and Market Characteris-
tics
4.5.1 Introduction to Case Study 1
Incentives to foster the penetration of renewable energies are currently discussed in the context
of the revision of EU energy and environmental policy [76]. The single period model is used to
illustrate the possible insight that could be gained on these questions by using the modeling
set up developed in this thesis. As indicated in the preceding sections, the model is inspired
by a stylized view of the Spanish electricity system and was designed to explore various
questions arising in real markets (see Section 1.1). We here focus on a sample of these issues
as later presented in the text. The analysis aims at assessing the potential contribution of
the valuation of flexibility reserves to overcome the drop of wholesale prices due to wind
generation and excess generation capacity. The model is designed for several firms operating
in the market but is only used here with a single company to simplify the discussion. The
models in this section use a price responsive demand in all cases, we are using the model
described in Section 2.5, that is single period, single firm and it is posed as a complementarity
problem.
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In the next sections we discuss results in four generation settings. A generation setting
is defined by the combination of the generation park composition and a ramping capability
assumption. The four generation settings considered here come from the combination of
three compositions for the generation park, B2.1 (Table 4.7), B9.6 and B9.7 (Table 4.8), and
two assumptions on the ramping capability, that are low ramping (Λ = 1) and high ramping
(Λ = 0), see Section 2.3. The generation settings considered with their abbreviated reference
in parenthesis are listed in what follows:
• (B2.1, 1): B2.1 generation system (high generation capacity) and parametric ramping
with Λ = 1. High generation capacity and low ramping capacity.
• (B2.1, 0): High generation capacity and high ramping capacity, parametric ramping
with Λ = 0.
• (B9.6, 1): B9.6 generation system (low generation capacity) and parametric ramping
with Λ = 1. Low generation capacity and low ramping capacity.
• (B9.7, 0): Low generation capacity and high ramping capacity, parametric ramping
with Λ = 0.
The generation configuration B2.1 corresponds to an intermediate state of dismantling. In
this configuration some of the firms still have a profit lower than their fixed operation and
maintenance cost, hence it does not correspond to a final state of dismantling. The con-
figuration B2.1 is set without performing a progressive dismantling process. On the other
hand, configurations (B9.6, 1) and (B9.7, 0) correspond to a final state of dismantling. In
configurations (B9.6, 1) and (B9.7, 0) every not dismantled unit get a profit greater or equal
to its fixed operation and maintenance cost. A summary of the values of energy price and
the profit margin6 at each round of the progressive dismantling process is reported on Tables
A.1 to A.4.
This part is organized as follows. In the following sections the results from the model in
Section 2.5 for the four Cases and each generation setting are presented and discussed, each
one of the four generation settings in one section. After that, the results of the previous four
sections are compared in a new section. And finally a section for the conclusions closes this
part.
4.5.2 High Generation Capacity (B2.1) and Low Ramping (Λ = 1)
The results reported in this section are obtained with the model described in Section 2.4 and
the data listed in Section 4.4, that consists of a total dispatchable generation capacity of
28503.93 MW (see Table 4.7 column 3). It shows results obtained for four characterizations
of the market (Cases described in Table 4.12) that differ by wind forecast, feed-in premium,
risk aversion and increased demand for flexibility due to wind generation (my).
It is useful at the outset to draw the attention to the wholesale electricity price (row
“Equilibrium price e/MWh” in Table 4.13) that is the flagship index of the market. One
observes that the wholesales price is equal to the fuel cost of the marginal CCGT in all
columns except in the columns 2, 8 and 9 in Table 4.13 where the price is higher than this
marginal cost. Referring to standard economic language this means that the system never
captures any scarcity rent on top of the fuel cost of the marginal plant except in the cases
6This margin is the difference between the profit of the unit minus its fixed operation and maintenance
cost. If this value is positive the firm covers its fixed operation and maintenance cost.
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described in columns 2, 8 and 9 in Table 4.13. Referring now to standard reasoning in
terms of missing money, this means that the system will not cover the fixed operation cost of
the marginal CCGT, except possibly in the case corresponding to column 2 (very low wind
availability) and columns 8 and 9 (high demand for flexibility) in Table 4.13. This observation
serves as background throughout the analysis.
The forecast wind level
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.13 report results with different wind forecast µ for average
feed-in premium and risk aversion. The unsurprising result is that wind power reduces the
equilibrium price. This directly results from wind replacing the most expensive dispatchable
generators, which affects the margins made by both conventional and wind plants. Also
expected, higher wind forecast increases scheduled wind and lower scheduled conventional
generation. The global effect is a significant decrease of the equilibrium price of 17% that
combines to the lower scheduled conventional generation in day ahead to decrease margins
on the energy market. The outcome is not better for the revenue from the flexibility reserve
market where the higher scheduled wind generation also increases the capacity available for
flexibility reserve, which reduces the revenue from reserve in day ahead. The end result is
that dispatchable generators loose on both the energy and reserve markets leading to a drastic
loss of profits (see row “1st stage dispatchable generators” in Table 4.13) in the day ahead
market. Revenue from balancing only very partially compensate for that loss (row “2nd stage
dispatchable generators” in Table 4.13). Overall, this drastic drop of revenue decreases the
incentive to invest in conventional plants and increases the incentive to mothball or even
decommission existing capacities.
The feed-in premium
The feed-in premium is analyzed with average wind condition and risk aversion. Columns
4 and 5 of Table 4.13 indicate that the premium does not significantly affect the day ahead
equilibrium even if it induces a small increase of scheduled wind. The high premium tends to
enhance wind scheduling in day ahead but the loss of this premium in balancing, when wind
generators are short, makes the payoff more risky, which has an impact on the risk adjusted
balancing profit. Increasing the feed-in premium to wind generation obviously increases
wind revenue, but this seems to take place without distorting the day ahead market. It is
well known however that this efficiency result only can hold when wind generation remains
sufficiently low compared to demand so that the electricity price remains positive (see [77]
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for an early study of the distortion in the short run of a market with premium and high wind
penetration).
The increased risk aversion
The increased risk aversion is examined with average wind condition and feed-in premium
to wind generation. One finds from columns 6 and 7 in Table 4.13 that an increase of the
level of risk aversion λ of the firms only has a low impact on the short run market. The
price in the day ahead market remains at 43.45 e/MWh that corresponds to the operating
cost of the marginal CCGT. In contrast with the higher premium that increased scheduled
wind, a higher risk aversion decreases scheduled wind, albeit not by a large amount. The
bad news is the decreasing margins of both types of plants. Conventional plants produce
more than in the case of high wind forecast, but collect the same revenue due to the fact that
this additional generation comes from the same CCGT that do not make any profit when at
the margin. Because risk aversion also reduces balancing activity, these plants also see their
profits reduced on that market. The overall conclusion is that risk aversion further reduces
gross margins and hence the incentive to keep conventional plants in the system.
Wind induced demand for flexibility reserve.
Except for column 2 with low wind and hence most conventional capacity committed for
generation, none of the above cases shows any tight constraint on flexibility reserve in day
ahead; the consequence is a lack of revenue from the day ahead reserve market. Wind in-
creases the demand for reserve but at the same time makes existing capacity available for
that reserve. The absence of revenue from flexibility reserve, combined with the lower energy
price due to wind generation eventually leads to mothballing and possibly decommissioning of
dispatchable capacities. The following explores this mechanism in more detail by considering
two situations that differ by the demand for reserve and its impact on flexibility reserve and
energy prices. We motivate the analysis by attributing an increased demand for reserve to
an increased error on wind forecast over different horizons (due to unit commitment consid-
erations). An alternative motivation, not discussed here, can be made by invoking ramping
requirement in more detail than our equations (2.4.27) and (2.4.28). This is done in the
second case study by resorting to a multi-period model.
i) Suppose first that a forecasting period of 6 hours or less is sufficient for committing
flexibility reserve and assume that we can move gate closure of the energy and reserve
markets to that horizon (through some intraday market that we do not characterize
otherwise). Assume that wind forecast is accurate over that horizon. The residual error
between the forecast and the realization can be characterized by a standard deviation σ.
This defines a range for the possible wind power output values that is relatively narrow,
[µ− σ, µ+ σ], where µ is the expected value for wind and usually σ < 15µ.
ii) Alternatively consider a forecasting period of 24 hours, typical of an unit commitment
problem, as necessary for committing flexibility reserve. We are then in our generic day
ahead/real time context and now need to work with the Beta distribution discussed in
section 2.4.5. In case of a forecast error with mean µ and standard deviation σ = 15µ+
1
50 ,
(normalized values respect to the wind capacity installed), the interval for variability
is typically [0.5µ, 1.5µ]. This implies taking a range of approximately ±60% over the
expected value µ to completely cover the variability.
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Depending on the amount of available reserve, the committed reserve, the expected wind
and the variability of wind, a number of different behaviors have been observed in the model.
We discuss two configurations in this section and list other situations in the following:
1) Consider first the case where demand for flexibility reserve is sufficiently small that it
never constraints scheduled wind: (scheduled wind) - (lowest wind scenario) ≤ (committed
upward reserve). This situation occurs when the uncertainty on wind generation is small,
something that occurs when one can move gate closure close to real time. Wind forecast
is then good and balancing can take advantage of a slack reserve market. Observation
shows that this is the situation where the premium ρ+ has little effect on the amount of
scheduled wind. This is what happens in the case depicted in columns 4 and 5 of Table
4.13.
2) Consider now the situation where the demand for flexibility reserve can constraint sched-
uled wind. This occurs in situations where a given value of the premium (that could be
zero) leads to an amount of the scheduled wind that hits, at least the constraint (sched-
uled wind) - (lowest wind scenario) ≤ (committed upward reserve). This occurs when the
uncertainty on wind generation is high, for instance because of the need to commit the
reserve well in advance. This can be due to a lack of intraday market or to the impossi-
bility to trade capacity in intraday (e.g. in a continuous intraday energy market without
intermediate auction). In this case the premium ρ+ to wind generation may have a strong
impact on the amount of scheduled wind.
We analyze this situation in columns 8 and 9 of Table 4.13. The two cases refer to
the average wind forecast (µ = 23.83%) and the average risk aversion (λ = 0.4); its
characteristic is to implicitly assume a longer forecast horizon for wind implying my = 0.6
(in contrast with my = 0.15 otherwise), while mx remains at the value 0.02 used in cases
1 to 3. In short the demand for reserve for load following due to wind is higher. We focus
on the impact of changing the feed-in premium to wind generation.
In contrast with case 2 the increase of the feed-in premium to wind generation now implies
a significant increase of the scheduled wind generation. But also in contrast with case 2,
the two feed-in premium to wind generation cases lead to an increase in the price of
electricity compared to those found in all other cases (from 1 to 3). This does not comply
with the common wisdom that explicitly sees wind increase as implying a decrease of the
electricity price. The justification is to be found in the higher demand for flexibility reserve
implied by the longer horizon necessary for forecasting wind production and committing
reserve (moving my from 0.15 to 0.6). One indeed observes higher upward and downward
committed reserves in case 4 compared to all other cases, and an increase of these reserve
inside case 4 when the feed-in premium to wind generation increases. The end result is a
revenue from committed reserve in the day ahead market that restores the profit accruing
to dispatchable generators in day ahead to value obtained in case of low wind as seen by
comparing the rows “1st stage dispatchable generators” in columns 8 and 9 to the same
information in column 2 (Table 4.13).
Other cases of high demand for reserves
The following circumstances, not further discussed here, can also lead to tight constraints on
reserve that, if properly priced, could restore the profits of conventional generators and hence
stop the incentive to mothball of dismantle.
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i) Dispatchable generators may not have enough capacity to satisfy simultaneously the
requirement for energy demand and reserve commitment. Firms arbitrage between using
the generation capacity of dispatchable generators for reserve or for generation of energy
in day ahead. This will happen at the end of a mothballing, dismantling or insufficient
investment process. It will induce capacity cycles.
ii) Committed reserve hits technical limits. This depends on the overall flexibility of the
remaining dispatchable plants.
iii) Suppose now a very cautious TSO and consider a case where the requirement for flex-
ibility reserve in day ahead requested by this TSO is sufficiently high to not constraint
wind generation over its whole range of variability (e.g. my = mx = 0.3). Suppose
also that generation capacity is tight with respect to demand (for instance as a result of
mothballing). A high enough feed-in premium (for instance ρ+ = 80 e/MWh) can make
it profitable to supply more demand by scheduling wind even in excess of the highest
scenario, at the same time as moving dispatchable generation into flexibility reserve.
The incentive for this strategy is twofold. It first results from the premium accruing
from total wind generation in day ahead compensating the cost of energy purchased on
balancing in case of wind shortage. It also results from the higher demand for reserve
flexibility by the TSO that also increases the price of energy. The strategy is only a
consequence of market design and does not involve any exercise of market power.
Some of these configurations with a high requirement of flexibility reserve show multiple
equilibria, as we have found for the case of single period, single firm, price responsive
demand, described in Section 2.5, applied to the configuration with low ramping (B2.1,
1). This case of two equilibria is illustrated in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 and discussed in
Section 4.5.8.
4.5.3 High Generation Capacity (B2.1) and High Ramping (Λ = 0)
The presentation of the models (both single period and multi-periods) has emphasized al-
ternative representations of ramping capabilities here modeled by the parametric ramping
constraints (see Section 2.3). As a reminder, the expressions of the parametric constraints
described in Section 2.3 are:
rug ≤ Rg ·
(
Xg − Λ·xg
)
(4.5.1)
rdg ≤ Rg ·
(
Xg − Λ·xg
)
(4.5.2)
To illustrate the impact of the representation of ramping possibilities, the results for the
model described in Section 3.3 (subsection 2.4.6) restricted to single period and single firm
with price responsive demand are compared in Table 4.17 for configurations (B2.1, 1) and
(B2.1, 0) with more detailed data reported for (B2.1, 1) in Table 4.13 and for (B2.1, 0) in
Table 4.14. They describe an increase of ramping capabilities of the conventional generation
system when Λ decreases.
A quick observation of the row “Equilibrium price e/MWh” in Table 4.14 (Λ = 0)
immediately points to the two major differences between these results and those obtained
with the low ramping configuration (Λ = 1). As in the preceding model, the equilibrium
price in column 2 (Table 4.14), that corresponds to a low value of wind forecast (µ = 4%
of the wind capacity installed), is the only one that contains a scarcity rent providing some
coverage of the fixed operating costs of the plants. In this case the scarcity rent is smaller
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than in the first model, but it is still positive. Second, there is no profit to expect from
flexibility reserve in day ahead whatever the case. Balancing activity is significant but not
to the extent of having an impact on global conventional plant revenues.
The forecast wind level
The impacts of increased wind forecast for average feed-in premium and risk aversion (columns
2 and 3, Case 1, in Table 4.14) are globally similar to those obtained with low ramping
(Λ = 1) but they now occur with less intensity. Recall that higher ramping possibilities
indeed increase flexibility reserves in day ahead. This frees generation capacity that reduces
the scarcity rent on the energy market in case of low wind (column 2 in Table 4.14). The
result is a lower energy price. This also reduces the price of flexibility reserve, the end result
(quantity of reserve times price of reserve) being a decrease of revenue from the day ahead
flexibility reserve market accruing to conventional plants in day ahead.
The results under high wind condition are similar to those found with the low ramping
model. High wind eliminates the scarcity rent on the energy market, resulting in an energy
price equal to the fuel cost of the marginal CCGT at the same time as it also decreases the
utilization of conventional plants. This releases conventional capacity in sufficient amount to
set the price of flexibility reserve to zero.
Because of the higher wind generation, there is more balancing activity but the end
result is that conventional plants are not in a better condition with these increased ramping
capabilities that lead to lower profits of dispatchable units in balancing.
The feed-in premium
The impact of the feed-in premium for average wind condition and risk aversion (columns
4 and 5, Case 2, of Table 4.14) is similar to the one of the low ramping model and does
not need much elaboration. The high ramping model enlarges flexibility reserves that were
already sufficient. It is thus not surprising to find that the revenue of conventional plants in
day ahead are identical to those found with the low ramping model. The balancing activity
differs a bit but not to an extent significant enough to make any difference in the position of
the conventional plants.
The increased risk aversion
The increased risk aversion is examined with average wind condition and feed-in premium
to wind generation in columns 6 and 7, Case 3, in Table 4.14. The comments are similar to
those made for the feed-in premium. Compared to the results of the low ramping model where
reserve flexibility was already sufficient, adding reserve flexibility does not change much. The
day ahead revenue of conventional generators is again identical to those obtained in columns
3 to 9 (Table 4.14) with this ramping model and to those of columns 3 to 7 (Table 4.13) with
the first ramping model (low ramping). Because risk aversion also reduces balancing activity,
these plants also see their profits reduced on that market. The overall conclusion is that risk
aversion further reduce gross margins in both ramping configurations and hence the incentive
to keep conventional plants in the system.
Wind induced demand for flexibility reserve
The most dramatic impact of the introduction of the high ramping model, results in Table
4.14, arises from commitment considerations becoming irrelevant. The restrictions imposed
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by the longer 24 hour horizon to commit flexible reserve are no longer binding as soon as the
flexibility reserve is increased as in the high ramping model (Λ = 0).
Summing up
The adoption of a more flexible ramping model suffices to set the value of flexibility reserve
to zero in day ahead for all cases in configuration (B2.1, 0) except for very low wind (µ = 4%)
in column 2. The explanation is that this is the only situation where the ramping constraints
are tight 7: wind is low and as a consequence conventional generation is allocated to energy
with little left for ramping (see rows “Up. reserve commit. (MW)” and “Max. available
reserve (MW)” in Table 4.14). Revenues to dispatchable generators in day ahead (first stage)
thus have the same low (dismantling inducing) value in all cases with the higher ramping
model whether flexible units need to be committed early or not (configurations (B2.1, 0) for
columns 3 to 9). This revenue is also identical to the one with low ramping possibilities when
flexibility units can be committed close to gate closure ((B2.1, 1) for columns 3 to 7, see rows
“B2.1, 0: 1st stage dispat. gen.” and “B2, 1: 1st stage dispat. gen.” in Table 4.17). The
ramping model (the capability to ramp) determines the revenue of the conventional plants
and significant higher profits of dispatchable generators in day ahead only arise when ramping
possibilities are low and flexible units need to be committed sufficiently early (Case 4, columns
8 and 9 in Tables 4.17). Profits are also higher when wind is limited and conventional capacity
is largely required for the energy market, as this again implied a tight ramping constraint.
Needless to say lower ramping possibilities imply higher profits for conventional generators.
7The ramping constraints are tight if and only if some of the values of the committed reserve, rows “Up.
reserve commit. (MW)” and “Down. reser. commit. (MW)”, are equal to the value of the maximum reserve
available, row “Max. available reserve (MW)”.
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4.5.4 An Alternative Presentation of the Results: Energy Price and Prof-
its, for the High Generation Capacity
In the previous Cases (Cases 1 to 4 defined in Table 4.12) we consider only two extreme
values of the parameter studied in each case, and keep the other parameters at their average
value. Detailed results for a number of output variables (energy price, energy quantity,
reserve price, reserve quantity, profit of each technology, cost of deviations, and other values)
are listed in the previous tables. To complete the picture we include curves for a few output
variables (energy price in day ahead, total profit, and profit of dispatchable generators) for the
generation settings (B2.1, 0) and (B2.1, 1) with the studied parameter in the range defined
by the extreme points listed in Table 4.12.
The values used in the figures in this section have been calculated using a version of
the PATH solver under GAMS that is different of the version used to calculate the values
on the tables. In the cases with multiple equilibria the results reported on the tables and
the results on the figures have, sometimes, different values, but we have checked that they
always correspond to equilibrium points. As will be explained in the following the existence
of several equilibria in case of high demand for reserve appears as an important result of the
model.
Case 1, wind forecast, (B2.1, 0) and (B2.1, 1)
Fig. 4.2 compares the impact of ramping in Case 1. It contains two curves for energy price
in day ahead with µ ∈ [4%, 65%], a curve for configuration (B2.1, 0) and other curve for
configuration (B2.1, 1) both in Case 1. We observe in Tables 4.13 and 4.14 (columns 2 and
3) that the dispatchable capacity is slightly lower than the potential demand of energy, thus
the energy price is high for low values of wind forecast µ, it decreases with µ, and it remains
constant when the sum of the wind forecast µ and the dispatchable capacity is enough to
satisfy the potential demand of energy. The value of wind forecast necessary to reach the
stationary energy price is higher in the case of low ramping (B2.1, 1) than in the case of
high ramping (B2.1, 0), because of the requirement of flexibility reserve. This requirement is
covered with dispatchable generation capacity, and therefore a higher demand of this service
is equivalent to a reduction of the available capacity of dispatchable generation.
The curves for the total profit and the profit of dispatchable units for configurations
(B2.1, 0) and (B2.1, 1) in Case 1 are sketched in Fig. 4.3. These curves show that all the
profits (total and profit of dispatchable units) decrease initially for low values of wind forecast
µ, this is because an increase of wind in this case leads to an increase of satisfied demand
that in turns reduces the energy price, and the reduction of incomes for energy sales due
to price reduction (see Fig. 4.2)is greater than the increase due to the increasing amount
of energy sold (recall that the firm is a price taker under perfect competition and without
market power). The second segment on the curves corresponds to the region with constant
energy price (see Fig. 4.2) this means that the total amount of energy traded in day ahead
is constant. In this case the profit of dispatchable units remains constant but the total profit
increases with the wind forecast, this is due to:
• The share of wind in total generation increases with the value of wind forecast.
• The incomes from the feed-in premium to scheduled wind increases with the value of
wind forecast.
• There is a reduction of the scheduled dispatchable generation, but this does not imply
a decrease of the profit of dispatchable units because the reduction is done on the
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Figure 4.2: Energy price (e/MWh) for Case 1, configurations (B2.1, 1) and (B2.1, 0).
production of the marginal unit. The marginal unit is a dispatchable CCGT unit with
a generation cost equal to the energy price in day ahead.
Regarding the effect of the ramping constraints, the effect is significant only for low values
of wind forecast, because in those cases the difference on the energy price in day ahead is
remarkable. This difference in price is because of total generation capacity is constraining the
demand, and this constraint is more restrictive in the case of low ramping than in the case
of high ramping, thus the energy prices and the total profit are higher for the low ramping
configuration (Λ = 1) than for the high ramping configuration (Λ = 0). In the case of low
ramping we need to use more dispatchable capacity than in the case of high ramping for a
given level of reserve capability.
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Figure 4.3: Total profit (e) and profit of dispatchable units (e) for Case 1, configurations
(B2.1, 1) and (B2.1, 0).
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Case 2, feed-in premium, (B2.1, 0) and (B2.1, 1)
Fig. 4.4 illustrates that energy price remains constant for both configurations (B2.1, 0) and
(B2.1, 1) when the feed-in premium to wind generation is in the range ρ+ ∈ [0, 80] (e/MWh)
in Case 2. In this case the amount of wind forecast (µ) plus the capacity of dispatchable
generation is enough to not constraint the demand, thus a change the feed-in premium to
wind generation does not change the total demand, but it changes the total profit as it is
shown in Fig. 4.5.
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Figure 4.4: Energy price (e/MWh) for Case 2, configurations (B2.1, 1) and (B2.1, 0).
Fig. 4.5 shows the curves of total profit and profit of dispatchable units for Case 2 in
configurations (B2.1, 0) and (B2.1, 1). The curves illustrate that the profit of dispatchable
units remains constant with the value of the feed-in premium to wind generation, but the
total profit increases linearly with that value. The explanation is that the shares of scheduled
dispatchable generation and wind generation remain almost constant with the value of the
feed-in premium to wind generation, an increase in the share of scheduled wind generation is
prevented by the risk averse behaviour of the firm, thus the profit of dispatchable unit does
not change (or the change is very small) in this case. Also the energy price in day ahead
remains constant with the feed-in premium to wind generation, see Fig. 4.4. To summarize,
the main change in the total profit comes from the linear increase of the feed-in premium to
wind generation, and the result is not influenced by the type of ramping constraint (low or
high) because none of them are constraining the solution in these cases.
Case 3, risk aversion, (B2.1, 0) and (B2.1, 1)
Fig. 4.6 shows that energy price for both configurations (B2.1, 0) and (B2.1, 1) does not
depend on the level of risk aversion in Case 3. This is because the amount of wind forecast (µ)
plus the capacity of dispatchable generation is enough to not constraint the demand (demand
and energy price are directly linked by the inverse demand function). A change in the level of
risk aversion change the relative share of wind and dispatchable generation but not the total
demand. It changes the profit of dispatchable units, as it is illustrated in Fig. 4.7, because
of the reduction in the demand for flexibility reserve.
Fig. 4.7 depicts the curves of total profit and profit of dispatchable units in Case 3 for
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Figure 4.5: Total profit (e) and profit of dispatchable units (e) for Case 2, configurations
(B2.1, 1) and (B2.1, 0).
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Figure 4.6: Energy price (e/MWh) for Case 3, configurations (B2.1, 1) and (B2.1, 0).
configurations (B2.1, 0) and (B2.1, 1). In theses cases the ramping constraints are not tight,
and therefore the result does not depend on the ramping model (low or high), we have the
same curves for both ramping models. The interesting information from this figure is that the
total profit remains almost constant8 with the level of risk aversion meanwhile the profit of
dispatchable units decreases with the level of risk aversion. The explanation is that we have
a single firm configuration and, in this case, the cost of wind turbines on the second stage
are almost compensate by the profits of dispatchable units at second stage, keeping the total
profit almost constant. The profits in the first stage both for dispatchable generators and
wind turbines are almost constant, the main changes are in the values at the second stage as
it is illustrated on Tables 4.13 and 4.14. The level of risk aversion leads to a reduction of the
scheduled wind generation and that to a reduction of the dispatchable generators incomes at
the second stage, while keeping the incomes at the first stage almost constant, this explains
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the observed reduction of the profit of dispatchable generators with the level of risk aversion.
In terms of the total profit the reduction of incomes of dispatchable generators at second
stage is compensated by the reduction of cost of wind turbines also at the second stage, thus
we observe an almost constant curve for the total profit.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 13.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5 x 10
5 Case 3, single firm, single period, configuration B2
Level of risk aversion, λ ∈ [0,1] (λ = 0 is risk neutral)
P r
o f
i t  
( E
U R
)
 
 
Dispatchable, high ramping, Λ = 0
Dispatchable, low ramping, Λ = 1
Total, high ramping, Λ = 0
Total, low ramping, Λ = 1
Figure 4.7: Total profit (e) and profit of dispatchable units (e) for Case 3, configurations
(B2.1, 1) and (B2.1, 0).
Case 4, demand for flexibility reserve (my), (B2.1, 0) and (B2.1, 1)
Fig. 4.8 depicts the curves for energy price for configurations (B2.1, 0) and (B2, 1) with
high demand of flexibility reserve due to wind (my = 0.60), Case 4. There are, at least, two
noticeable results on the figure:
• The energy price remains constant with the feed-in premium in the range ρ+ ∈ [0, 80]
(e/MWh). In this case is valid the same argument used in Case 2. The amount of wind
forecast (µ) plus the capacity of dispatchable generation is enough to not constraint
the demand; thus a change the feed-in premium to wind generation does not change
the total demand, but it changes the total profit as it is shown in Fig. 4.9.
• We have found two equilibria, an equilibrium with high price, that we call “high equili-
brium”, and other equilibrium of low price, that we call “low equilibrium”. The points
on the curves are calculated iteratively, and the results for one point are used as initial
values to calculate the next point. We get the high equilibrium when we made the
calculation with the parameter ρ+ going from zero to 80 e/MWh, and the low equili-
brium when we consider the parameter ρ+ going from 80 e/MWh to zero. Additional
information on the multiple equilibria found in the results is included at the end of
Section 4.5.8.
The curves for total profit and the profit of dispatchable generators in configurations
(B2.1, 0) and (B2.1, 1) for Case 4 are plotted in Fig. 4.9. Like for the cases in Fig. 4.4
8The total profit changes with the level of risk aversion, but the change is very small, it is less than 1%,
and it is not observable on the figure.
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Figure 4.8: Energy price (e/MWh) for Case 4, configurations (B2.1, 1) and (B2.1, 0).
we are studying the influence of the feed-in premium value on the results, but in this case
the difference is that the requirement of flexibility reserve for wind my is remarkably higher,
my = 0.60, than in the previous case, my = 0.15. This high value of reserve requirement for
wind can be justified on the basis of the expected variability of the wind forecast, that in
turn strongly depends on the time horizon for the forecast. Sometimes the time horizon is
fixed for the plants that need to be committed well in advance, for instance 24 to 48 hours
in advance.
The curves in Fig. 4.9 are similar to those in Fig. 4.4 with the profit of dispatchable
units almost constant and the total profit increasing linearly with the feed-in premium to
wind generation, the main differences in this case are:
• Despite the fact that the total demand in day ahead remains almost constant, in this
case the change in the share of scheduled wind generation and dispatchable generation
is remarkable. Scheduled wind generation increases significantly with the value of the
feed-in premium, as it is illustrated in Tables 4.13 and 4.14.
• Only in the case of low ramping (Λ = 1) the reserve constraints are tight, and this
leads to a higher energy price in day ahead in the case of low ramping (approximately
54 e/MWh) than in the case of high ramping (approximately 43.45 e/MWh).
• The profit of dispatchable units remains almost constant even with the reduction of their
scheduled generation, because the reduction of incomes from scheduled generation is
approximately compensated by the increase of incomes from committed reserve capacity
at the first stage. The additional reserve capacity is necessary to support the integration
of the scheduled wind generation.
• In addition and as mentioned before, in the case of low ramping, that is the most
constrained case, we have found two equilibria with similar qualitative behaviour in
terms of the shape of the curves for prices and profits, but with significant differences
in the values of those variables. We call “high equilibrium” to the equilibrium with the
highest prices (approximately 83 e/MWh) and profits and “low equilibrium” to the
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other (with an energy price of approximately 55 e/MWh). We get the high equilibrium
when we calculate the curves by moving on the domain from the lowest value of the
feed-in premium to the highest value, and the low equilibrium when we move on the
curve in the other sense.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 800
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5 x 10
6 Case 4, single firm, single period, configuration B2, my = 0.60
Feed−in premium to wind generation, ρ+ (EUR/MWh)
P r
o f
i t  
( E
U R
)
 
 
Dispatchable, high ramping, Λ = 0
Dispatchable, low ramping, Λ = 1, equilibrium high
Dispatchable, low ramping, Λ = 1, equilibrium low
Total, high ramping, Λ = 0
Total, low ramping, Λ = 1, equilibrium high
Total, low ramping, Λ = 1, equilibrium low
Figure 4.9: Total profit (e) and profit of dispatchable units (e) for Case 4, configurations
(B2.1, 1) and (B2.1, 0).
4.5.5 Low Generation Capacity (B9.6) and Low Ramping (Λ = 1)
The almost complete absence of scarcity rent in the preceding cases signals an excess of
capacity. It thus makes sense to examine the impact of a reduction of the existing conventional
capacity on the scarcity rent accruing from the energy markets and on the possibility to recoup
part of the coverage of the fixed operating cost of the system from ancillary services. The
following Table 4.15 adapts the previous analysis to a generation system where the CCGT
capacity has been reduced so as to lead to a positive scarcity rent in the average case (average
wind condition, average premium and average risk aversion). As described in Section 4.4.3,
this configuration is the final state of a process in which the units with fixed cost greater
than their profit are progressively dismantled9. The total dispatchable capacity of 28503.93
MW used so far could thus be seen as an intermediate step of a dismantling of capacity
that had become redundant as a result of weak demand and wind policy, with the new total
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capacity of 25356.288 MW being some equilibrium state where the remaining capacity is able
to recover its fixed operating cost under average conditions. The standard interpretation
is a situation where generators have “cleaned” their balance sheet by eliminating stranded
assets (the impairment process in accounting) so as to recoup their fixed costs. It is not a
situation where generators are ready to invest except in subsidized capacities. Note also that
this impairment process depends on the value of ramping and hence on the ramping model.
This subsection has been obtained with low ramping possibilities.
The remaining generators in the system are listed in Table 4.5 taking into account that
the first 6 CCGT blocks have been dismantled (the impact of dismantling on the generation
system is documented in Table 4.8). The obtained remaining total dispatchable capacity is
25356.288 MW, which is lower than the 28503.93 MW dispatchable capacity considered in the
first part of this case study (see Section 4.5.2). As before, results in Table 4.15 are obtained
with the single period, multi-firm model described in Section 2.4 used in single firm mode.
A quick observation of the rows “B2.1, 1: Energy price (e/MWh)” and “B9.6, 1: Energy
price (e/MWh)” in Table 4.18 immediately points to energy prices more sensitive to the
forecast wind level and premium configuration in this configuration (B9.6, 1) after dismantling
rather than with high capacity (B2.1, 1). The influence of these factors is discussed in more
detail below.
The forecast wind level
As in all cases encountered so far the higher wind forecast (column 3, Case 1, in Tables 4.17,
4.18, 4.19 and 4.15) for configuration (B9.6, 1) sets the energy price equal to the fuel cost
of the marginal CCGT, therefore eliminating the scarcity rent on the energy market, at the
same time as it also decreases the utilization of conventional plants. This nullifies the effect of
the dismantling in case of high wind. This again releases conventional capacity in sufficient
amount to set the price of flexibility reserve close to zero (see rows “Supply of up. reser.
capa.” and “Supply of down reser. capa.”, column 3, Table 4.15).
Because of the higher wind generation, there is more balancing activity but the end result
is that conventional plants are not able to recover their profits compared to the low wind
case.
The feed-in premium
The impact of the feed-in premium for average wind condition and risk aversion (columns
4 and 5, Case 2, in Tables 4.17, 4.18, 4.19 and 4.15) is to some extent similar to the one
observed for the higher capacity configuration (B2.1, 1). The energy price is indeed almost
the same for both values of premium to wind generation. One may be surprised to see
that this happen even though this price is not equal to fuel cost of the CCGT. The feed-in
premium has some effect on wind generation as it makes it profitable to assume a little bit
more risk increasing the amount of scheduled wind generation. In columns 4 and 5 in Table
4.15 of Case 2, the sum of the energy and reserve does not saturate the total dispatchable
capacity, but the ramping constraints are tight10 in both situations (see rows “Up. reserve
commit. (MW)” and “Max. available reserve (MW)” in Table 4.15). Ramping, and thus
9See Section 4.3 for a description of the dismantling process, and Appendix A.1 for the values of prices and
profits in the dismantling process for B9.6 and B9.7.
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neither reserve nor energy, is what increases the energy prices beyond the one of fuel cost of
the marginal generator.
The increased risk aversion
Except for the electricity price that is now slightly higher than the CCGT fuel cost, the
impact of the higher risk aversion (columns 6 and 7, Case 3, in Tables 4.17, 4.18, 4.19 and
4.15) is similar to the one observed before with higher capacity in the sense that it does
not significantly affect the equilibrium on the day head market. The effect of increased risk
aversion in configuration (B9.6, 1) is small but more significant than in the higher capacity
configuration (B2.1, 1). When changing from risk neutral (λ = 0) to complete risk aversion
(λ = 1) the amount of scheduled wind is reduced, see row “Schedu. win. gen. (MWh)”
and column 7 in Table 4.15. At the same time it is profitable to increase the dispatchable
generation to compensate part of the reduction in the scheduled wind generation. The sum
of the energy and reserve does not saturate the total dispatchable capacity, but the ramping
constraints are again tight10 in both situations (see rows “Up. reserve commit. (MW)” and
“Max. available reserve (MW)” in Table 4.15), and this implies that the energy prices are
higher than the fuel cost of the marginal generator in these situations (Case 3 columns 6
and 7 in Table 4.15). This increases the dispatchable generation in a greater amount than
what is released from reserve due to the reduction of scheduled wind generation. All in all
and as expected the total scheduled generation, row “Demand day ahead (MWh)”, and the
total profit, row “Total (wind + dispatch.)” in Table 4.15, are lower in the case of high risk
aversion (λ = 1, column 7), than in the risk neutral case (λ = 0, column 6), because of the
influence of risk aversion.
Wind induced demand for flexibility reserve
Results reported on columns 8 and 9, Case 4, in Tables 4.17, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19 and 4.15
document the strong impact of wind induced demand for flexibility reserve (my) in this low
capacity, low ramping flexibility configuration at the same time as they suggest multiple
equilibria. We discuss both in sequence.
Data on column 8 reveal a drastic increase in the price of energy even when the feeding
premium is zero. This high price results from a much higher demand for reserve as could be
expected from the higher value of my. Recall that we are now in a situation where there is no
excess capacity (in the sense of capacity not covering fixed operating charges), even though
one is still very far from covering both fixed operating and investment capacity charges.
Consider now increasing the feed-in premium. This increases the incentive for schedule
more wind in day ahead, which in this case has a higher impact on the demand for ancillary
services because of the higher my coefficient. Recall that wind does not pay for reserve in
this model: this market imperfection reflects the current market design which consists of
transferring the cost of ancillary services (implied by wind and received as as payment by
conventional generates) to the final consumer. Conventional generators receive that payment
and are induced to move more capacities from generation to reserve. This should further
increase the energy price that was already high, possibly moving to an equilibrium with
still less demand. Column 9 indicates that this is not what happens. For some reason
the equilibrium is different: wind has decreased together with the price of energy. This
10The ramping constraints are tight if and only if some of the values of the committed reserve, rows “Up.
reserve commit. (MW)” and “Down. reser. commit. (MW)”, are equal to the value of the maximum reserve
available, row “Max. available reserve (MW)”.
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suggests a multiplicity of equilibria. There are at least two possible reasons that make this
situation possible. One is general: the fact that some agents (wind generators) do not pay
for the cost that they imply introduces a non convexity and hence opens the possibility of
multiple equilibrium. The second reason is that resources that one does not pay for their cost
resembles the notion of counterproductive technologies found in Ricardian economics [78],
that are known to give rise to multiplicity of equilibrium.
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Figure 4.10: Energy price in day ahead (e/MWh) for configuration (B9.6, 1).
A rigorous analysis of this problem is left for further research, but the following test shows
the plausibility of this conjecture. Figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 show parametric analysis of the
electricity price for varying reserve factor my in the range [0.15, 0.60] and the feed-in premium
ρ+ ∈ [0, 80]e/MWh. Results in the figures correspond to the model for single period, single
firm, and price responsive demand posed as a complementarity problem described in Section
2.5, and the data in Case 4 (average wind forecast µ = 23%, average risk aversion λ = 0.4).
These figures reveal at least two patterns of prices with values of the order of the 110 e/MWh
found in Column 8 and lower price between 60 and 80 e/MWh found in Column 9 (see also
Figure 4.10). Similar patterns of two price levels are found for reserve prices, see Figures
4.11 and 4.12. The number of equilibrium seems to be equal to two, which some having
quite reasonable value (as in the other columns of the Table 4.15) and the other being with
very high prices, this is illustrated in Fig. 4.13 for the configuration B9.6 with low ramping
(Λ = 1), also the curves of profit for the same case are depicted in Fig. 4.14. A systematic
analysis of this pattern is left for further research but they economic interpretation is quite
intuitive: wind is a counterproductive technology when because of market design it does not
pay for all its costs. The multiplicity of equilibria is the very unintended effect of the policy.
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 illustrates the values for price and profits respectively for two
equilibria founds in Case 4 (my = 60%), configuration (B9.6, 1) model of single period, single
firm with price responsive demand and posed as a complementarity problem (see Section
2.5). We start at one end of the interval and go toward the other end. A warm starting has
been implemented, it consists of using the values of the previous point calculated as initial
values to calculate the current point. In the figures, the points in the curves are calculated
for values of the feed-in premium in the range 0 ≤ ρ+ ≤ 80 e/MWh. The equilibrium with
the lowest price results when we start with the highest feed-in premium (80 e/MWh) and we
reduce it progressively until reach the zero value. In the case reported in Figs.4.13 and 4.14
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Figure 4.11: Upward reserve capacity price (e/MW) for configuration (B9.6, 1).
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Figure 4.12: Downward reserve capacity price (e/MW) for configuration (B9.6, 1).
the equilibrium depends only on the starting value for the feed-in premium, but after this
point has been selected, the equilibrium has the same value for all the values of the feed-in
premium in the range.
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Figure 4.13: Energy price (e/MWh) in day ahead for Case 4 (my = 60%), configuration
(B9.6, 1), low generation (25 GW) and low ramping.
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Figure 4.14: Total profit (e) and profit of dispatchable units (e) for Case 4 (my = 60%),
configuration (B9.6, 1), low generation (25 GW) and low ramping.
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4.5.6 Low Generation Capacity (B9.7) and High Ramping (Λ = 0)
This last analysis adapts the preceding discussion to the low generation and high ramping
model (B9.7, 0). The model is described in Section 2.5, it is single period, single firm,
has price responsive demand and is posed as a complementarity problem. As described in
Section 4.4.3, the generation system is obtained by the same dismantling process as described
in the preceding (B9.6, 1) case but because of high ramping11 ends up with a different
capacity12, data for the prices and profits in the different stages of the dismantling process
that leads to configuration B9.7 are listed in Appendix A.1. Total capacity is effectively lower
because a high ramping reduces in principle the revenue from reserve and hence requires more
dismantling before remaining capacities can recoup their fixed operating costs. The total
dispatchable capacity in configuration B9.7 is 22081.31 MW, and this is the lowest value for
dispatchable capacity among the configurations considered in the case study.
Table 4.17 shows that the results for this configuration (B9.7, 0) are similar to those
for the model with higher capacity but similar ramping possibilities (B2.1, 0), in terms of
the impact of wind forecast, feed-in premium, risk aversion and the demand for flexibility
reserve. The main difference is that prices are higher in this configuration (B9.7, 0) because
the generation capacity is smaller. The influence of these factors is discussed in more detail
in what follows.
The forecast wind level
This effect is the now usual one. The impact of increased wind forecast for average feed-in
premium and risk aversion (columns 2 and 3, Case 1, in Table 4.16) for this high ramping
configuration (B9.7, 0) is very significant, even more than it is for the lower ramping (B9.6,
1), because the effect of the wind forecast level is amplified by the reduction in the total
dispatchable capacity.
A very high forecast wind level (column 3, Table 4.16) nullifies the effect of the dismantling
(wind replaces dispatchable generation) and some units do not cover their fixed operation
cost in that scenario. High wind eliminates the scarcity rent on the energy market, resulting
in an energy price equal to the fuel cost of the marginal CCGT at the same time as it
also decreases the utilization of conventional plants. This releases conventional capacity in
sufficient amount to set the price of flexibility reserve close to zero (see row “Supply of up.
reser. capa.”, column 3, Table 4.16).
Because of the higher wind generation there is more balancing activity, but the end result
is that conventional plants are not in a better condition with these increased ramping capa-
bilities that lead to similar profits of dispatchable units in balancing for both configurations
(B9.7, 0) and (B9.6, 1).
The feed-in premium
The impact of the feed-in premium in this configuration, with low generation capacity and
high ramping capacity (B9.7, 0), columns 4 and 5, Case 2 reported in Tables 4.17, 4.18, 4.19
and 4.16, is studied for average wind condition and risk aversion. The feed-in premium has
only a small effect on the results for this configuration, the values in columns 4 (ρ+ = 0)
and column 5 (ρ+ = 80 e/MWh) in Table 4.16 are almost the same except for the total
profit and the profit for wind turbines. Total demand, scheduled wind generation, scheduled
12See Table 4.8.
11See Section 2.3.
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dispatchable generation and committed upward reserve remain the same for low and high feed-
in premium. Only the profit for wind turbines in the first stage changes significantly, and
that is because of the incomes for the feed-in premium to the scheduled wind generation. To
explain the observed values we notice that this configuration has a relatively low dispatchable
capacity, which is completely used in both ρ+ = 0 and ρ+ = 80 e/MWh settings (columns 4
and 5). The reserve constraints are also tight, as observed from rows “Up. reserve commit.
(MW)” and “Max. available reserve (MW)” that have the same value. The energy price is
remarkably higher (69.86 e/MWh) in this configuration with low generation capacity and
high ramping capacity, in comparison to the 43.45 e/MWh found for the same case (low
and high feed-in premium) with high generation capacity and high (B2.1, 0) or low (B2.1, 1)
ramping capacity. The energy price for configuration (B9.6, 1), which also has low generation
capacity (but higher than for configuration (B9.7, 0)) and low ramping capacity, is 57 e/MWh
(see Table 4.17). This is a high value compared to the configurations with high generation
capacity (B2.1, 0) and (B2.1, 1). But it remains lower than the energy price in the more
constrained configuration (B9.7, 0), which has the lowest value of dispatchable generation
among all the configuration considered. The tight total dispatchable generation capacity is
the cause of this high price.
To summarize, the constraints for the total dispatchable capacity13 and the constraints
for reserve are tight even for ρ+ = 0. The common wisdom says that increasing the feed-
in premium should lead to an increase in the scheduled wind generation. But in this case,
an increase of the scheduled wind on top of the value for ρ+ = 0 implies a reduction of
the scheduled dispatchable generation (to provide the reserve for the additional wind), and
what is more important, a remarkable increment of the CVaR (of the correction cost) in the
objective function. The feed-in premium is not high enough to compensate the change of
the CVaR term in the objective function because the operation is constrained by the total
dispatchable generation capacity and the reserve constraints.
The increased risk aversion
The increased risk aversion is examined with average wind condition and feed-in premium to
wind generation for configuration (B9.7, 0). The study is based on the results reported in
columns 6 and 7, Case 3, in Tables 4.17, 4.18, 4.19 and 4.16. The analysis and conclusions
are similar to those discussed in the previous paragraph for the feed-in premium.
We observe almost the same values in column 6 (λ = 0, risk neutral) and in column 7
(λ = 1, full risk aversion); the main differences are in the scheduled wind and dispatch able
generation. The constraints for the total dispatchable capacity and the reserve constraints
are again tight for both simulations (columns 6 and 7) and the energy price in day ahead
(approximately 70 e/MWh) is remarkably higher than in other configurations and cases with
higher capacity where the constraints for the total dispatchable capacity are not tight, like
(B2.1, 0) and (B2.1, 1) with 43 e/MWh in the same case.
As expected, an increase in the level of risk aversion rises the weight of the CVaR of the
cost in the objective function and that leads to a reduction of the scheduled wind (recall
that wind generation is the only source of uncertainty considered here, and the scheduled
wind generation sets the value of the CVaR of the correction cost). At the same time, the
reduction in the scheduled wind generation frees some amount of dispatchable generation (it
13The constraint for the total dispatchable capacity is tight if and only if the sum of the terms in row
“Schedu. dispat. gen. (MWh)” and row “Up. reserve commit. (MW)” is equal to the total dispatchable
capacity.
98 4.5. Case Study 1: Impact of Policy and Market Characteristics
is just the 15% of the scheduled wind dropped, because my = 0.15), that previously was
committed as flexibility reserve associated with that scheduled wind. We observe in Table
4.16 row “ Schedu. dispat. gen. (MWh)”, columns 6 and 7, that the amount of dispatchable
generation freed from reserve is completely aggregated to the scheduled dispatchable gener-
ation in column 7 (λ = 1) because it is profitable and does not increase the risk exposure
(value of the CVaR in the objective function). Thus the total demand for λ = 1 is reduced
with respect to the value for λ = 0 because only the 15% of the wind reduction is recovered as
scheduled dispatchable generation, and it is not possible to increase this quantity of scheduled
dispatchable generation because the constraint of total dispatchable generation capacity is
already tight. This reduction of the total demand implies an increase of the energy price in
day ahead, as it is observed on Table 4.16, row “Equilibrium price (e/MWh)”, columns 6
and 7.
Other question is how the amount of scheduled wind reduction due to the increase varies
with the level of risk aversion. We should notice that the amount of scheduled wind in the
risk neutral case (λ = 0), row “Schedu. win. gen. (MWh)” and column 6 in Table 4.16,
is close to the lowest value of the scenario tree for wind generation in that case, thus the
absolute value of the CVaR of the cost is small. For λ ≥ 0 the value of the CVaR of the
cost contributes in the objective function, but as the CVaR was already small for λ = 0, a
small reduction of the scheduled wind generation would suffice to reach the point at which a
greater value of the scheduled costs more than it increases revenue.
Wind induced demand for flexibility reserve
The increased wind induced demand for flexibility reserve (my) is studied with average wind
and level of risk aversion for two extreme values of feed-in premium. The study is based on
the data reported in Case 4, columns 8 an 9 in Tables 4.17, 4.18, 4.19 and 4.16.
The increase of the demand for reserve in this case increases the opportunity cost of this
reserve. The firm gets more revenue for committing more flexibility reserve (the single firm
owns all the reserve in this case); it can also replace dispatchable generation by wind when
it is available and hence gets a reduction on its generation cost. The only significant risk
for the firm is the loss of the feed-in premium associated with the scheduled wind generation
due to the balancing operations. It is this loss, taking into account in the CVaR term in
the objective function, that jointly with the total dispatchable capacity generation drives the
total amount of scheduled wind generation, when the value of the feed-in premium increases
(column 9).This explain why in this case, with my = 0.60, the scheduled wind generation is
remarkably higher than in the other cases with my = 0.15, in particular in comparison with
Case 2 (columns 4 and 5 in Table 4.16) where the only difference is in the value of my.
In this case, as in the previous Cases 2 and 3, the constraint for total dispatchable gen-
eration capacity and reserve are tight as well as the ramping constraints on the dispatchable
units that provide reserve capacity. As a consequence the energy prices in day ahead, row
“Equilibrium price (e/MWh)”, are again higher than in other cases where the constraint
for the total dispatchable capacity is not tight. The energy price is even higher for ρ+ = 0
(column 8) than for ρ+ = 80 e/MWh (column 9), because for ρ+ = 0 the system has hit the
bound of total dispatchable capacity and it is not profitable to increase the amount of sched-
uled wind generation due to the CVaR term in the objective function (increase of the risk
exposure). On the other hand, for ρ+ = 80 e/MWh, the incomes from the feed-in premium
compensate the CVaR term in the objective function and allows for a greater integration of
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wind in the system, until the dispatchable generation capacity bound is again hit. To sum-
marize, the dispatchable generation capacity bound and the level of risk aversion are driven
the energy price in day ahead.
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Summing up for low generation capacity cases (B9.7 and B9.6)
The conclusions summarized here are based on the data reported on Tables 4.17, 4.18, and
4.19 comparing configurations with high generation capacity, (B2.1, 1) and (B2.1, 0), and
configurations with low generation capacity, (B9.6, 1) and (B9.7, 0), and on more detailed
data in Table 4.15 for configuration (B9.6, 1), and Table 4.16 for (B9.7, 0). On all these
configurations, (B2.1, 0), (B2.1, 1), (B9.6, 1) and (B9.7, 0), the model used corresponds to
single period, single firm, and price responsive demand, posed as a complementarity problem,
as described in Section 2.5.
We observe that in overall terms the energy price in day ahead is remarkably higher in
configurations with low generation capacity, (B9.7 and B9.6), than in configurations like B2.1
with more dispatchable capacity (see for example Table 4.17). Also the profits are greater in
the configurations with the lower dispatchable capacity. The main contribution that increases
the profits comes from dispatchable units at the first stage, namely the scheduled dispatchable
generation and the committed flexibility reserve. This is what can be expected from standard
economic reasoning.
In configuration (B9.6, 1), low generation (25356 MW of dispatchable generation) and
low ramping (Λ = 1), the reserve constraints are tight for all the cases considered, except for
Case 1 with very high wind forecast, µ = 65%. The energy price in day ahead for those cases
is approximately 57 e/MWh in contrast with the approximately 43 e/MWh for the most of
the cases in configurations (B2.1, 1) and (B2.1, 0) in which the reserve constraints are not
tight.
In configuration (B9.7, 0), low generation (22081 MW of dispatchable generation) and
high ramping (Λ = 1), the reserve constraints and the capacity bounds for dispatchable
generators are tight for all the cases considered, except for the Case 1 with very high wind
forecast, µ = 65%. The energy price in day ahead for those cases is approximately 70 e/MWh
in contrast with the approximately 43 e/MWh for the most of the cases in configurations
(B2.1, 1) and (B2.1, 0) in which the reserve constraints are not tight, and 57 e/MWh in the
most of the cases for (B9.6, 1), in which only the reserve constraints and not the capacity
bounds constraints for dispatchable generators are tight.
Behaviors are similar for most of the cases in both configurations (B9.6, 1) and (B9.7, 0).
Particular circumstances lead to deviations with respect to these common trends such as the
high wind forecast in case 1 (µ = 65%), and Case 4 (my = 0.60). And the additional factor
for these configurations is the risk exposure that is taking into account through the CVaR
term in the firm’s objective function.
The level of scheduled wind generation for the cases with low generation capacity is
similar to those for the cases with high generation capacity. The use of a single firm model
contributes to this similarity of values for scheduled wind, because the single firm confi-
guration reduces the risk exposure and remove some asymmetries that could happen in a
multi-firm configuration with separate wind turbines and dispatchable units. In particular
the risk and the asymmetry associated with the cost of energy deployed from reserve.
Remark on the relation between reserve constraints and the energy price
This subsection gives some analytical detail on the impact of the reserve and ramping con-
straint and the capacity bound constraints (see Sections 2.5, 2.4.6 and 2.4.7), on the energy
price in day ahead.
Consider a situation where the reserve constraints are tight and one or more of the cor-
responding dual variables (γ, κ, γ, κ) are greater than zero, we explain that this implies
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that the capacity bounds and/or the ramping constraints for the particular dispatchable unit
providing the reserve are tight. We illustrate this fact with the upward reserve:
• Assume that: rug > 0, the reserve constraints are tight and γ + κ > 0.
• Then from the equation for the KKT condition for rug (2.4.54) we have φg + δg =
γ + κ > 0.
• As φg ≥ 0 is the dual variable for the upper capacity bound of dispatchable unit g, and
δg ≥ 0 is the dual variable for the ramping constraint of dispatchable unit g, one or
both of them must be tight.
On the other hand, if the demand d > 0 (no trivial solution), from the KKT condition
for demand (2.4.52) we have that the equilibrium price ρ∗ = −ν. Finally the KKT condition
for the dispatchable generation (2.4.56) relates the equilibrium price with the dual variables
for capacity bounds (upper φg and lower φ
k
g
), and the ramping constraints (δg and δg), in
particular if xg > 0 we have: cgg + φg −
∑
k∈Ω φ
k
g
+R·δg +R·δg = −ν = ρ∗.
To summarize, when the capacity bounds and/or the ramping constraints for the dis-
patchable units that provide committed reserve get tight, that has a direct influence on the
energy price in day ahead.
4.5.7 Comparison Among Cases in Single Period
In this section we compare the results for the previous four configurations, each configuration
is compared with the rest. To facilitate the comparison, the results previously reported are
rearranged in Tables 4.17 to 4.19. Each table is focused on the effect of some feature of the
system, in particular:
• Table 4.17 highlights the effect of the ramping model in different configurations that
reflect the extent of dismantling of CCGT capacities. It compares (B2.1, 1) with (B2.1,
0) (early stage of dismantling), and (B9.6, 1) with (B9.7, 0) (final stage of dismantling)
in terms of energy price, total profit (wind + dispatchable), total profit of dispatchable
generators in day ahead (first stage), total profit of dispatchable generators in balancing
in real time (second stage), total profit of wind turbines in day ahead (first stage), total
profit of wind turbines in balancing in real time (second stage).
• Table 4.18 illustrates the effect of the generation mix (generation level) on the perfor-
mance of the agents depending on the ramping potential. It compares (B2.1, 1) with
(B9.6, 1), and (B2.1, 0) with (B9.7, 0) in terms of energy price, total profit (wind +
dispatchable), total profit of dispatchable generators in day ahead (first stage), total
profit of dispatchable generators in balancing in real time (second stage), total profit
of wind turbines in day ahead (first stage), total profit of wind turbines in balancing in
real time (second stage).
• Table 4.19 emphasizes the combined effect of the generation mix (generation level) and
the ramping model in the different configurations. It compares (B2.1, 0) with (B2.1,
1), (B9.7, 0) with (B9.6, 1), (B2.1, 1) with (B9.6, 1), and (B2.1, 0) with (B9.7, 0) in
terms of total profit (wind + dispatchable), total profit (first stage and second stage)
for the set of dispatchable generators, and total profit (first stage and second stage) for
the set of wind turbines.
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More detailed results including the values for scheduled generation and committed reserve
are given for each configuration in Tables 4.13 to 4.16. Table 4.13 is devoted to configuration
(B2.1, 1), Table 4.14 to configuration (B2.1, 0) ,Table 4.15 to (B9.6, 1), and Table 4.16 to
(B9, 0).
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4.5.8 Conclusion
The reduction of the price on the energy market as a result of wind penetration and the
lower utilization of CCGT units is the dominant phenomenon observed throughout in the
numerical results obtained with both high and low generation capacity. The phenomenon, in
the case of high generation capacity, reflects the fact that the marginal unit always sets the
energy price in the current market design based on short run marginal cost with excessive
capacities. This impacts the CCGT, which see both the price on the energy market and
the utilization of their plant drop. The situation results from the downturn of the economic
demand and the high penetration of wind. Market characteristics such as risk aversion or
feed-in premium barely change these basic phenomena. The phenomenon is intuitively clear,
it is observed in reality and it also appears in the results.
On the other hand, the phenomenon in the case of low generation capacity reflects the
fact that the energy price in day ahead is greater than the cost of the marginal unit because
the ramping constraints and/or the capacity bounds constraints for some dispatchable units
are tight. Only a very high wind forecast (for instance µ = 65%, as in Case 1) changes
this situation, because it provides the additional generation capacity necessary to avoid get
constrained by the capacity bounds and/or the ramping constraints for dispatchable units.
In the case of high generation capacity, the provision of ancillary services could have
offered some hope for CCGTs. But the results show that this is not the case as high wind
conditions release CCGT capacity for reserve, at the same time as they reduce the price. Wind
indirectly releases more reserve than it demands and the value of that reserve remains zero
and hence provides no revenue to the CCGT units. Requiring a long horizon for committing
plants for reserve suggests some hope: the change of a single apparently innocuous coefficient
(increasing my from 0.15 to 0.6) as a result of a longer horizon necessary for commitment
plants can completely modify important policy conclusions. But even that solution does not
happen very robust: improving ramping possibilities suffices to reset the price of this service
to zero, therefore confirming that CCGT need to withdraw from the market.
In a tighter market with low generation capacity, that is the one that results from decom-
missioning of CCGT capacities, as it is illustrated with configuration (B9.6, 1) and (B9.7, 0)
(see Sections 4.5.5 and 4.5.6), we observe that energy price in day ahead and firm’s profit are
considerably greater than in the similar configurations with high generation capacity, config-
urations (B2.1, 1) (Section 4.5.2, and configuration (B2.1, 0) Section 4.5.3). This is because
the reserve and ramping constraints, and sometimes the capacity bounds constraints, for
dispatchable units become tight in configurations with low generation capacity, which makes
the energy price greater than the generation cost of the marginal unit. The highest energy
prices and firm’s profits are obtained with the lower total dispatchable capacity even though
ramping capacities are higher, that is (B9.7, 0). In this last case the reserve constraints,
the ramping constraints and the upper capacity bound constraints for dispatchable units are
tight in the most of the cases considered, in fact they are tight for all the cases considered
except for the case with very high wind forecast (µ = 65%), because of the increase of total
generation capacity in this case.
We refer to the composition of the generation system and the flexibility embedded in the
ramping model as structural characteristics and here test their global impact and examine
how outcomes of the market vary with its structural characteristics. We index the preceding
information in Table 4.20. The preceding tables emphasize electricity price and total profits
made by conventional generators on the energy and ancillary services markets.
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Table 4.20: Summary of tables reporting results for Case Study 1
Parametric Ramping
Λ = 1 Λ = 0
B2 (4.7) Table 4.13 Table 4.14
B9 (4.8) Table 4.15 Table 4.16
The Impact of the Generation Capacity
One of the structural assumptions considered is the composition of the generation system,
which effects we discuss here. By construction the decommissioning of capacity increases the
price of electricity, which is an effect that benefits both wind and conventional generators,
whatever the ramping model. It is only when the wind forecast level is very high (µ = 65%,
column 3 in Tables 4.17 to 4.16) that the reduction of the conventional capacity does not
affect prices, because the wind is enough to replace the decommissioned dispatchable capacity.
This points to the fallacy of the existing policy that induces the development of wind power
irrespectively of the composition of the conventional generators.
The comparisons between the different structural assumptions reveal a few fundamental
features that we discuss in what follows in relation with the generation capacity.
The impact of the wind forecast, feed-in premium and risk aversion are not significantly
affected by the structural assumptions, whether capacities are high or low and ramping
possibilities ample of restricted. These impacts can be summarized as follows:
• The high wind forecast can drive the price of electricity to the fuel cost of the marginal
unit (usually a CCGT unit) and hence put the generation system in a situation where
neither energy or reserve can help recover fixed operating costs, see column 3 on Ta-
bles4.17, 4.15 and 4.16. There is no contribution to fixed cost in those circumstances.
• Wind premium does not change much the equilibrium on the energy market, even
though this equilibrium is different for the different structural assumptions.
• The same is true for risk aversion even if it seems to play a more important role when
capacity is low.
The revenues to conventional plants are quite different depending on the total generation
capacity. As it is expected they increase drastically when capacity is dismantled (see results
reported on Tables 4.15 and 4.16 and the comparative of profits in Table 4.17).
The Impact of ramping capabilities
The second structural assumption considered is the ramp capability, that we model in the
single period configurations using a parametric expression, the so called parametric ramping
described in Section 2.3. In the case studies we consider only the two extreme values of the
parameter for ramping, Λ = 1 that corresponds to a low ramp capability, and Λ = 0 that
corresponds to a high ramp capability.
The ramping constraints and the reserve constraints are related, in such a way that if the
reserve constraints are tight then the ramping constraints are tight also, the link between
these constraints is discussed with more detail in Section 4.5.6.
The simulations results for the single period model illustrate the following facts:
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• In the configurations with low ramping like (B2.1, 1) and (B9.6, 1), see column 2
(Case 1, µ = 4%) on Tables 4.13 and 4.15, the ramping constraints are tight but
the capacity constraints are not tight. In contrast with the configurations with high
ramping capability like (B9.7, 0), see Table 4.16, where the ramping constraints and
the capacity constraints are always simultaneously tight, in fact on Table 4.16 they are
tight for all the cases except for µ = 65% that corresponds to a very high wind forecast.
• As it was expected, the ramping constraints are more frequently hit in system with low
generation capacity like B9.6 (Table 4.15) and B9.7 (Table 4.16) than in systems with
high generation capacity like B2.1 (Tables 4.13 and 4.14). In (B9.6, 1) and (B9.7, 0)
the ramping constraints are tight for all the cases except for a very high wind forecast
(µ = 65%). In (B9.2, 1) with high generation capacity and low ramping capability,
the ramping constraints are hit only in Case 1 for µ = 4% and in Case 4 (my = 0.60).
And finally, in (B9.2, 0) with high generation capacity and high ramp capability, the
ramping constraint is tight only in Case 1 for µ = 4%.
• When the ramping constraints are tight, the energy price in day ahead is higher than the
generation cost of the marginal unit, as it is illustrated on Table 4.15, for configuration
(B9.6, 1) with low generation capacity and low ramping capability, where the capacity
constraints are not tight, and only the ramping constraints are hit for all the cases
except for Case 1 with µ = 65% (very high wind forecast). In the cases where the
capacity constraints are also tight the energy prices is even higher, as it illustrated with
the results reported on Table 4.16 for (B9.7, 0), system with low generation capacity
and high ramping capability.
• The ramping capability has a significant influence on the effect of factors like wind
forecast level (µ, Case 1) and the demand for flexibility reserve (in particular my, Case
4). In contrast, it has a little influence on the effect of other factors like the feed-in
premium (Case 2) and the level of risk aversion (Case 3).
In the case of ramping capability, as in the previous case of generation capacity, a high wind
forecast can drive the price of electricity to the generation cost of the marginal unit, as we
observed in the results for the case with wind forecast µ = 65% (column 3 in Tables 4.17,
4.15 and 4.16). This is because the wind generation replaces dispatchable generation that
can be used for ramping and reserve. In this situation neither energy nor reserve can help to
recover the fixed operating cost of dispatchable units.
Additional Comments on the Multiple Equilibria
We summarized here the results regarding the multiple equilibria in the cases previously
discussed in this section. In all the cases the multiple equilibria were found in Case 4, in
some situations we found two equilibria and up to three equilibria in other, two of them by
changing ρ+ from 0 to 80 e/MWh, and ρ+ from 80 e/MWh to 0, and the third one by
using two different versions of the solver PATH. We recall that Case 4 stands for: Average
wind forecast (µ = 23%), average risk aversion (λ = 0.4), wind induced demand for flexibility
reserve (my = 0.60), and feed-in premium to wind in the range ρ
+ ∈ [0, 80]e/MWh. The
results for Case 4 are summarized in what follows:
• High generation, low ramping (B2.1, 1): We have three equilibria for ρ+ = 0, with
energy prices 82.84 e/MWh, 54.23 e/MWh (see Fig. 4.8) and 54.52 e/MWh (see
Table 4.13). In this case the ramping constraints are tight in the three equilibria.
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And we found two equilibria for ρ+ = 80 e/MWh, with energy prices 82.84 e/MWh
and 54.23 e/MWh (see Fig. 4.8). In this case the ramping constraints are tight in both
equilibria.
• High generation, high ramping (B2.1, 0): Only one equilibrium, with energy price 43.45
e/MWh (slack ramping).
• Low generation, low ramping (B9.6, 1): We have three equilibria with for ρ+ = 0, with
energy prices 77.84 e/MWh, 88.32 e/MWh (see Fig. 4.13), and 101.44 e/MWh (see
Table 4.15). The ramping constraints are tight in the three equilibria.
And we found two equilibria for ρ+ = 80 e/MWh, with energy prices 77.84 e/MWh
and 88.32 e/MWh (see Fig. 4.13). The ramping constraints are tight in both equilibria.
• Lower generation, high ramping (B9.7, 0): We have only one equilibrium, with energy
price 69.85 e/MWh, but the ramping constraints are also tight in this case.
The conclusion is that we have, at least, three equilibria in some cases, but this multiplicity
of equilibria should be studied carefully to explain the causes and if there are more equilibria,
this is left as a future work.
4.6 Case Study 2: The Anticipated Dismantling of Conven-
tional Capacities
4.6.1 Introduction to Case Study 2
The European Union is currently undergoing a movement towards the dismantling (or at best
mothballing) of existing (sometimes new and highly efficient) conventional plants because of
the low electricity price on the energy market. We elaborate on the first case study by
extending it to a multi hour framework and investigate the extent to which the process might
be stopped by a demand for ancillary services provided by these conventional plants. The
question has two facets: one is to assess the capability of ancillary services provided by
conventional plants if priced at their market value (opportunity cost) to stop the process.
A second issue is the extent to which the current pricing of ancillary services can effectively
stop the destruction of asset value. We concentrate on the first question here. Because
we assume proper pricing of ancillary services, we further simplify the problem by assuming
fixed demand and a single firm that minimizes its cost or price responsive demand and surplus
maximization. The more complicated problem of the impact of the current pricing regime
requires the full equilibrium formulation used in Case Study 1 for a single hour. It is known
that the optimization formulation represents a perfect market (in particular that does not
discriminate in favor of wind plants in the use of ancillary services). The optimization model
is thus the reference counterfactual to value ancillary services provided by conventional plants.
We formalize the problem as follows. Starting from a given existing capacity we solve the
model and compute the remuneration of existing plants. Taking stock of the insight gained in
the first case study, we conjecture from the general theory of the “missing money” (Joskow [1])
that the remuneration obtained from the short term market will not cover the fixed operating
charge of existing plants as long as existing capacity is sufficient to cover demand in all case
(perfect reliability). We thus progressively decrease the existing capacity by dismantling the
existing plants that make the largest losses and stop when all capacities break even or make
a residual profit. Remaining in the spirit of the energy only model favored by European
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authorities, this simulation requires introducing a price cap (or a backup generator) and
allowing shortages at that price cap (or operating cost of the backup generator) when shortage
occurs in the fixed demand formulation. The process also requires to value ancillary services
received by existing conventional plant capacities at their marginal opportunity cost (that
is on the basis of dual variables of existing capacities). The relevant valuation formula are
given in the previous Section 4.3.1.
The rest of the section is organized as follows, first the settings (model and data) for
the simulations are described, second the main results in this section are discussed in three
subsections (4.6.3 to 4.6.5) focus on: i) the role of the price cap in the dismantling process
and its effect on energy price, ii) a discussion on how subsidies to dispatchable generation
could affect the dismantling of those units, iii) numerical details for relevant magnitudes
(energy price and installed capacity) at different dismantling stages for several test studies.
The following two subsections (4.6.6 and 4.6.7) elaborate shortly on the results for price
responsive demand and fixed demand, and the results are reported with the same format
used in the previous section (Case Study 1) to facilitate the comparison with the previous
results. The conclusion is that results for single period and multi-period are quite similar, at
least in qualitative terms, with price responsive or fixed demand. Finally, subsection 4.6.8
compares the results in multi-period with ramping products and without ramping products
and closes this part.
4.6.2 Setting for the Simulations
The results discussed here are obtained with the models described in Section 3.4 and Section
3.5. We recall that the model in Section 3.4 is a multi-period, single firm, equilibrium
model with price responsive demand posed as a welfare maximization stochastic program.
The model in Section 3.5 is a multi-period, single firm, equilibrium model with fixed demand
posed as a stochastic program that minimizes the operation cost. These models are applied to
the generation park composition (B9.5) and (B9.4), Table 4.9, Section 4.4.3, that correspond
to a final state of dismantling and have the following features:
• (B9.5): Total dispatchable capacity of 28100.60 MW, with a total of 10 units out of the
initial 15 units. The 5 CCGT units with the highest cost have been dismantled. This is
the final dismantling state for the model with price responsive demand (without price
cap), and the model with fixed demand and price cap with values 100 e/MWh and 300
e/MWh.
• (B9.4): Total dispatchable capacity of 33688.85 MW, with a total of 11 units out of the
initial 15 units. The 4 CCGT units with the highest cost have been dismantled. This is
the final dismantling state for the model with fixed demand and price cap with values
1000 e/MWh and 563.78718 e/MWh.
A total of ten test studies are considered here. For the sake of simplicity, each test study is
referenced using a short code composed of three elements: i) the composition of the generation
park, that can be B9.4 or B9.5, ii) the value of the price cap, that can be “-” in the case of no
price cap (price responsive demand) or, in the case of fixed demand, has the values 100, 300,
1000 or O (optimal value as described in detail in the next Section 4.6.3), iii) with ramping
products14 “rp” or without ramping products “nrp”. All the references for the test studies
considered in this chapter are listed in Table 4.21.
14The ramping products are described in Section 3.2.1.
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Table 4.21: Summary of the test studies for the multi-period configuration.
Demand15 B.
Gen.16
Gen. Reference
With
ramping
products
(rp)
Responsive (Sect. 3.4) - B9.5 (B9.5, -, rp), Table 4.26
Fixed demand
(Section 3.5)
100 B9.5 (B9.5, 100, rp), Table 4.27
300 B9.5 (B9.5, 300, rp), Table 4.28
1000 B9.4 (B9.4, 1000, rp), Table 4.29
Optimal17 B9.4 (B9.4, O, rp), Table 4.30
Without
ramping
products
(nrp)
Responsive (Sect. 3.4) - B9.5 (B9.5, -, nrp), Table A.29
Fixed demand
(Section 3.5)
100 B9.5 (B9.5, 100, nrp), Table A.17
300 B9.5 (B9.5, 300, nrp), Table A.20
1000 B9.4 (B9.4, 1000, nrp), Table A.23
Optimal17 B9.4 (B9.4, O, nrp), Table A.26
4.6.3 On the Role of the Price Cap
This section presents an in depth discussion of the mechanism at work during the disman-
tling process for the fixed demand model. It considers four values, 100, 300, 563.7 and 1000
e/MWh, of the generation cost for the backup generator. Note that the price cap cur-
rently coded in European market clearing software is 3000e/MWh (Pan-European Hybrid
Electricity Market Integration Algorithm, EUPHEMIA [79, 80]).
The process begins with a first phase where all the capacity in excess of the maximal
demand (computed over all hours and scenarios) is dismantled (taking into account the
need to satisfy reserve). During that process the energy price does not change because
the dismantled generators are those that were not committed for generation because other
generators with lower costs can supply the demand. As expected from a transposition of the
standard reasoning of the “missing money” (Joskow [1]) to fixed operating costs, several plants
are loosing money because they do not cover these costs during that phase. They are thus
progressively dismantled until the process enters a second phase where curtailment appears,
and the backup generator must be used to (fictitiously) supply demand. The use of backup
generator corresponds to a curtailment when the price is set at the cap. Experiment with the
model suggests two different outcomes of the dismantling process and their corresponding
mechanisms. These are illustrated in the numerical results reported in Tables 4.22 to 4.25,
and briefly described in what follows:
I) The first mechanism only resorts to the backup generator for ancillary services in
balancing but not to supply energy in day ahead. There is thus no curtailment in
the energy market (whether in day ahead or balancing) because of lack of generating
capacity. But there is a curtailment dues to the lack of ramping or reserve capacity.
In other words, there is enough generating capacity but not enough ancillary service
capacity.
15We consider two alternatives for demand: Price responsive demand (using a linear inverse demand func-
tion) or fixed demand.
16“B. Gen.” stands for the generation cost of the Backup Generator in e/MWh, and it represents a price
cap for the energy price in the system, it is described with more detail in Section 4.3.
17In this context “optimal” means the minimum value of the price cap (cost of the backup generator) that
gives the minimum energy price in day ahead.
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This case happens when the installed capacity that is not yet dismantled, is sufficient
to supply the energy demand in day ahead, but not to supply completely the ancillary
services needed for the technical operation of the system18.
The recourse to the back up generator (in other words, the price cap) has two effects
on the price of ancillary services:
1) Even though the backup generator can (fictitiously) provide ancillary services and
has infinite capacity, the shadow price of the committed reserve capacities of con-
ventional plants can be different from zero. The reason is that the model contains
separate constraints for the available capacity and for the committed reserve, thus
firms can assign values to the scheduled generation and the committed reserve to
hit some (or all) of the reserve constraints, even if the capacity constraints are not
tight. To summarize, reserve constraints tight does not imply capacity constraints
tight.
For instance, in the model in 3.3.2, the reserve constraints are (3.3.47)-(3.3.50), and
the capacity constraints for dispatchable generators are (3.3.63) and (3.3.64).
When some of the reserve constraints are tight, the corresponding reserve capacity
has a price greater than zero and the firms receive an income from their committed
reserve, as we can see in Tables 4.26 to 4.30. On the other hand, the committed
reserves set bounds to the scheduled generation, like those described by equation
(3.3.47), hence if the capacity constraints are not tight, the firms try to hit the
reserve constraints to get some revenues, but at the same time they avoid to introduce
additional constraints to the scheduled generation due to a shortage of committed
reserve.
2) The expected prices of energy from ancillary services increase when the backup
generator is used to provide that energy. This price is an expectation of the backup
price on a set of scenarios; because the backup generator is usually not used in all
the scenarios, the expected price of energy from ancillary services is usually lower
than the operating cost of the backup generator.
Depending on the generation cost of the backup generator (the price cap) we observed
two possible outcome of this first mechanism:
a) The increase in the price of energy due to the use of the back up generators in
ancillary services is sufficient to stop the mothballing. This only occurred with a
cost of 1000 e/MWh for the backup generator and the price of energy in day-ahead
increases from 44 e/MWh to 96 e/MWh in some hours (detailed results for prices
during dismantling in subsection 4.6.5).
b) The increase in the price of ancillary services is not sufficient to stop the dismantling,
which then continues until the second mechanism is activated.
II) The second mechanism consists of using the backup generator to supply energy in
day ahead. This means that the day ahead market clears at the price cap (some demand
18This case could be not possible in all the systems because the capacity is dismantled in blocks of discrete
size (the size of each unit), hence the sequence of capacity values during the dismantling process is a finite
set of discrete values. The configuration that makes feasible this first mechanism could be in a range between
two discrete points in the previous set, in this case the first mechanism will not be possible. In general this
mechanism will be feasible in large systems, where the size of dispatchable units is small in comparison to the
total energy demand, this is the typical case in real power systems.
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had to withdraw) in some hours and the energy price in those hours is equal to the price
cap (equal to the backup generator cost).
This second mechanism occurs when the price cap is not high enough to stop the
dismantling process with the first mechanism. The dismantling then continues until the
capacity of conventional units is no longer sufficient to supply the demand, and as a
consequence the backup generator is used in day ahead and the energy price hit the
price cap. This is a very costly solution.
The first mechanism leads to a solution of a cost considerably lower than the second
mechanism. This may look paradoxical because the highest generation cost leads to the
lowest energy price. For instance in the numerical experiments, the total cost is lower for the
case with a price cap of 1000 e/MWh than for a price cap of 100 e/MWh and 300 e/MWh.
The explanation is that the higher price cap reduces the number of hours of curtailment and
it is better to pay a very high price only for a few hours than a high price in many hours.
There exists a threshold value for the cost of the backup generator for which only the first
mechanism is active. We can get that value using the model; for instance, the value obtained
with the model with single firm, multi-period and fixed demand with ramping products is
563.78718 e/MWh and 563.79699 e/MWh in the configuration without ramping products19.
This threshold value for the price cap minimizes the increase of energy price that is necessary
to keep the dispatchable capacity without continue dismantling units. Thus the threshold
value for the price cap can be considered as the optimal price for flexibility, in the sense that
it minimizes the average energy price.
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Figure 4.15: Hourly average energy price in day ahead (e/MWh) vs backup generator cost
(e/MWh).
The influence of the backup generation cost (price cap) on the hourly average energy
price is illustrated in Fig. 4.15, for the system with multi-period, single firm with ramping
19We are given five decimals digits just for illustrative purposes, and because they are needed to get the
profitability margin of the last active generator in the dismantling process greater than zero and lower than
10−3e/h.
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products and fixed demand posed as a cost minimization problem (see Section 3.5). We
observe on the figure two straight lines with different slopes. The break point corresponds to
a value of 563.78718 e/MWh for the price cap. The final dismantling state (B9.5), with total
dispatchable capacity 28100.60 MW, is associated with the values of the backup generator cost
for the first segment (from left to right). For the other segment the associated configuration
is (B9.4), with total dispatchable capacity 33688.85 MW. A low value of the price cap leads
to a deeper dismantling and higher energy price than a high value of the price cap, this is
explained with more detail in the next Section 4.6.3.
4.6.4 Subsidizing Conventional Plants?
This section raises the question of the possible need to subsidize conventional generators for
reasons of security of supply in the context of high wind and low price cap (lower than 563.7
e/MWh in this case). The discussion is based on the previous analysis of the role of the
price cap and its representation in terms of backup generator in the dismantling process, we
consider two possible situations, one with subsidy to dispatchable generation and the other
without subsidy.
The no subsidy range
Dismantling without price cap (or without backup generator) can only reduce losses (by
eliminating fixed operating costs) but will not increase the profits of units that are not
profitable in the initial configuration, at least as long as demand can be satisfied. This can
be explained as follows:
• The energy price depends on the demand and the curve of generation cost for the
generation mix. Dismantling removes the part of the curve that is never used in the
energy market. The outcome of the energy market is thus unaltered.
• The reserve and ramping products are not altering the outcome of the market because:
1) As long as there is always enough dispatchable capacity to satisfy the peak demand
in low wind scenarios, the dispatchable units satisfy both the demand for energy
and ancillary services (which is at its lowest level when wind generation is low).
2) When increasing amounts of wind are integrated in the system, the displaced
dispatchable generation is usually sufficient to cover the variability of wind as can
be seen from the following:
– Let ∆y be the increasing amount of wind. The replaced amount of dispatch-
able generation is ∆x = ∆y. Let G∆ be the set of dispatchable generators
affected by this change.
– The increase in the required reserve is: my ·∆y
– The increase in the available upward reserve is:
∑
g∈G∆ Rg ·∆xg
– The increase in the available downward reserve is:
∑
g∈G∆ Rg ·∆xg
– To illustrate the situation, assume that Rg = Rg = R. The condition to have
sufficient reserve from the newly available dispatchable capacity is my ·∆y ≤
R ·∆x or my ≤ R. The typical values are my = 15% and R = 53.33% for
CCGT units, but to take into account the complete wind variability could
require values of my up to 60%.
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3) As the system must be able to satisfy the demand in all scenarios, the dispatchable
capacity must be sufficient to satisfy the demand in the worst scenario. In case
we consider also scenarios for demand variability, the overall result will differ
from the result where we only consider wind scenarios; but as in the case with
only wind scenarios the price does not change with the progressive dismantling of
dispatchable units as long as the set of dispatchable units in fact used for generation
does not change with the dismantling. The dispatchable units in this set meet two
conditions:
– They minimize the generation cost to satisfy the demand.
– Their total capacity has the minimum value that can satisfy the demand in
the worst scenario with minimum cost.
If we consider the variability of demand we still remain in the region of the cost
curve that we cannot mothball, for the same reason that in the first point, the
system must satisfy the demand in all the scenarios.
There is thus no reason for subsidizing the plants that have been dismantled so far, as they are
necessary neither to provide energy in the day head market nor to provide sufficient backup
for balancing. There remains an incentive for dismantling the plants with the highest costs
that cannot cover their fixed charges. One shall note that this result is compatible with the
standard reasoning of the “missing money” (Joskow [1]). Marginal plant cannot cover their
fixed costs as long as there is enough capacity to cover the whole demand. These results
simply extend that result to the case of a system with remuneration of energy and ancillary
services. This is where the subsidy problem intervenes.
The subsidy range
A certain amount of ramping capability is indeed needed for the technical operation of the
system. The main consequence of the current market configuration and the incentive to
dismantle is that it is driving to a system that cannot supply the demand. To solve this
situation, we have studied the two following alternatives:
1) Pay the plants that supply ramping capability (for instance the CCGT). We can use our
current model to quantify:
• The required amount of installed power from these plants.
• The value of the subsidy to these plants.
This payment is not a capacity payment or a capacity market as it depends on other
features than capacity.
2) Integrate in the market a proper pricing scheme for flexibility products that takes into
account the cost of lost load, and not only the generation cost. This is in line with the
theory of the missing money (Joskow [1]) in energy only markets and is explored next.
The proposal at MISO takes into account the high cost of the fast units that are used
only for peaks, we could also integrate this consideration in the pricing scheme.
4.6.5 Numerical Details for the Dismantling Process in Multi-Period
Here we focus the analysis on two outcomes, the total dispatchable capacity at the end of
the dismantling process, and the average energy price at that state for several representative
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values of the wind forecast. The results reported in this subsection concentrates on the
influence of two main factors on the previous outcomes: i) the demand model, fixed demand
or price responsive demand, and ii) the value of the price cap.
Each row in Tables 4.22 to 4.25 represents a step of the dismantling process, and each
column a daily wind pattern (see Table 4.11), from left to right Low, Average, High and Very
High wind. We can observe in Tables 4.22 to 4.24 that the energy prices do not change in the
beginning of the dismantling process and they only change at the end of the process. This
is because the units dismantled in the beginning are those with the highest cost, and they
are not used for generation. In contrast, the units dismantled at the end of the dismantling
process are units that would be used for generation if they were active. We find:
a) a curtailment of the demand that increases the energy price in day ahead, in the case of
price responsive demand.
b) The use of the backup generator, that also increases the energy price because of its high
generation cost, in the case of fixed demand.
Table 4.22: Price of energy in day ahead. Configuration of single firm and multi-period
starting in B9.0 and ending in B9.4. Cost of back up generator 1000 e/MWh.
Wind forecast (µ) Total
Mothballing 5.86 % 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 44.83 43.37 38.10 32.52 43597.49
2 44.83 43.37 38.10 32.52 40686.68
3 44.83 43.37 38.10 32.52 39136.63
4 44.83 43.37 38.10 32.52 37552.19
5 96.29 43.37 38.10 32.52 33688.85
Table 4.23: Price of energy in day ahead. Configuration of single firm and multi-period
starting in B9.0 and ending in B9.5. Cost of back up generator 300 e/MWh.
Wind forecast (µ) Total
Mothballing 5.86 % 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 44.83 43.37 38.10 32.52 43597.49
2 44.83 43.37 38.10 32.52 40686.68
3 44.83 43.37 38.10 32.52 39136.63
4 44.83 43.37 38.10 32.52 37552.19
5 96.29 43.37 38.10 32.52 33688.85
6 708.13 580.20 38.18 32.59 28100.60
We observe that the effect of dismantling is deeper in the scenarios with low wind forecast,
because the total available generation capacity is also lower in these situations.
The influence of the price cap value was discussed in general terms previously in Section
4.6.3. We observe in Tables 4.23 and 4.24 that part of the active dispatchable generators are
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Table 4.24: Price of energy in day ahead. Configuration of single firm and multi-period
starting in B9.0 and ending in B9.5. Cost of back up generator 100 e/MWh.
Wind forecast (µ) Total
Mothballing 5.86 % 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 44.83 43.37 38.10 32.52 43597.49
2 44.83 43.37 38.10 32.52 40686.68
3 44.83 43.37 38.10 32.52 39136.63
4 44.83 43.37 38.10 32.52 37552.19
5 47.76 43.37 38.10 32.52 33688.85
6 82.89 74.19 38.18 32.59 28100.60
Table 4.25: Summary of results, hourly average energy price for each wind day and configu-
ration considered in the final state of dismantling.
Gen. Cost
GW Backup Average
Wind average (%) 5.857 22.198 47.087 61.171
Wind probability 0.133 0.732 0.068 0.067
Energy price (e/MWh) e/MWh
Fixed demand 28.1 100.000 82.894 74.192 37.985 30.580 69.962
Fixed demand 28.1 300.000 221.835 186.638 37.985 30.580 170.737
Fixed demand 33.7 1000.000 96.294 43.369 37.900 30.465 49.184
Fixed demand 33.7 563.787 72.770 43.369 37.900 30.465 46.050
Price responsive 28.1 - 55.064 49.053 38.668 32.171 48.016
dismantled in the last two rounds for low values of the price cap (100 and 300 e/MWh). In
contrast, the active generators are affected by dismantling only in the last round in the case of
high price cap (1000 e/MWh, Table 4.22). That means that the total dispatchable capacity
after dismantling is higher in the situations with high price cap than in the situations with low
price cap. This complies with the theory of the missing money. This, in turn, leads to higher
energy prices in day ahead with a low price cap than with a high price cap. Illustrative values
are summarized in Table 4.25, where the values for the test studies considered are compared,
together with the frontier value (563.7 e/MWh) that separates the high price cap and the
low price cap. The energy price in day ahead reached a minimum value for the frontier value
of the price cap (see Table 4.25), this frontier value is called “optimal price cap” in other
parts of the text.
4.6.6 Price Responsive Demand in Multi-Period Setting
We here discuss the results for the model of single firm, multi-period, with price responsive
demand and posed as a two stage stochastic problem maximizing the social welfare (see
Section 3.4). Results for the test study (B9.5, -, rp) are reported in Table 4.26, we recall
that “rp” means “with ramping products”. Additional data on profitability and price for the
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dismantling process leading to the generation park composition B9.5 with the assumptions in
this test study are presented in Tables A.13 and A.14. Analogous data for test study without
ramping products (B9.5, -, nrp) are given in the Appendices, Tables A.27 to A.29.
The behavior of the model through the different Cases 1 to 4 is similar to the one of the
single period model and the discussion will not be repeated here. The ramping products add
ramping capability on the reserve requirement. Analogously to the single period models, in
this case the available ramping capacity binds the committed reserve and ramping products.
This fact is sometimes used by the firms to hit the capacity constraints to increase the energy
price, and/or to hit the reserve constraints with the objective to increase the reserve capacity
price.
The values of the available ramping capability reported in the tables (row “Max. available
reserve (MW)”) do not take into account the backup generator, thus when the value of the
committed reserve (or committed reserve plus ramping products) is greater than the available
reserve, that means the backup generator is providing the difference in ramping capability.
In the pure optimization approach, models in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, wind pays for the
reserve that it requires in the pure reserve model (but not for the ramping product), and
hence is less likely to saturate the available reserve.
To summarize, we have two opposite effects of the ramping products on the operation
cost and energy price: i) on one hand, a moderate use of the ramping products reduces the
cost of the operational flexibility, because ramping capability is scheduled well in advance
to avoid paying the high cost of the fast generators, ii) on the other hand, an abuse of the
ramping products can lead to higher prices for energy and reserve capacity if these ramping
products hit the capacity constraints and/or the reserve constraints.
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4.6.7 Fixed Demand in Multi-period Setting
Here we discuss the results for the multi-period single firm problem posed as a two stage
stochastic problem for cost minimization with fixed demand and a price cap (see Section 3.5)
(welfare maximization with fixed demand is cost minimization). The price cap is fixed by
the generation cost of the backup generator. Its impact is discussed in what follows, through
the results from simulations with four representative values, 100 (Table 4.27), 300 (Table
4.28), 1000 (Table 4.29) and 563.78718 e/MWh (Table 4.30). In principle each variant could
lead to a different generation park composition after the dismantling process, but the results
from the simulations show that only two different generation park configurations, B9.4 and
B9.5, result from the dismantling process. We get the composition B9.5 for a price cap of
1000 or 563.7 e/MWh, and the composition B9.6 for a price cap of 100 or 300 e/MWh.
Additional data of energy price in day ahead and profitability of dispatchable units during
the dismantling process for the previous test studies are given in the Appendices, Tables A.5
to A.12. Also the analogous set of results for the test studies without ramping products is
included in the Appendices, Tables A.15 to A.26.
The conclusions are the same to those in the previous section (please see Section 4.6.6),
and therefore are not repeated here.
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4.6.8 Comparison among Cases in Multi-Period
In this section we compare the results for the previous ten configurations. The results for
energy prices and profits for the different cases are rearranged together in Tables 4.31 and
4.32, to facilitate the comparison among configurations. We compare in the multi-period
setting results with price responsive demand vs fixed demand, and results with ramping
products vs results without ramping products.
The ramping products and the pure reserve criterion used in single period models and
transposed here pursue different but overlapping goals. The pure reserve criterion is meant
to account for forecasting error. It imposes an amount of reserve that depends on the time
span between the commitment of the reserves and real time. It also directly interacts with
the scheduling of wind and conventional generation, hence the requirement for reserve that
it imposes is dynamic. The ramping products require reserves dedicated to ramping. They
introduce a global constraint that reserve must accommodate the largest possible gradient of
wind generation over a certain period; this criterion is not dynamic. The two criteria clearly
overlap but it is impossible to ascertain how. We here assume that the ramping criterion
dominates and that it can be satisfied by the reserve aimed at dealing with forecast uncer-
tainty and some add up. By construction the ramping products therefore impose the total
amount of reserve and ramping reserve in each period in the model. Given our assumption
of dominance of the ramping criterion, the constraint is here imposed as the sum of the pure
reserve requirement and a complement intended for satisfying an exogenously given ramping
constraint. In contrast the no ramping product model leaves it to the model to endogenously
determine the reserve.
We now compare the impact of inserting the ramping product in the price sensitive model.
The comparison of the total reserve in the different cases shows that the insertion of the
ramping products leads to over commitment of reserve in Case 1 with low wind and in Cases
2 and 3 compared to the no ramping product model. The opposite is true in Case 1 with
high wind and in Case 4. Except for Case 1 the difference of behaviour is due to the coverage
factor of wind that is higher in Case 4 and hence induces a high demand for reserve. This
demand is constrained by the ramping product requirement in that case. This has in turn
an impact on the wind that can be scheduled leading to an increase of the electricity price.
Assuming a my = 0.6 coverage of wind for reason of forecasting difficulty, and at the same
time that the global requirement based on ramping is correct, the end result is a decrease of
wind generation and an increase of the price of electricity.
In contrast with this under-commitment (compared to the no ramping product model)
in Case 4, the ramping product model leads to an over-commitment of reserve in Cases 2
and 3. This now implies an increase of the price of electricity because of the reduction of
conventional capacity dedicated to the energy market that it implies. Whether by inducing
an over or under commitment of reserve, the introduction of ramping products increases the
price of electricity compared to the pure reserve case. The question of the selection of proper
criterion for modeling reserve demand is thus important. Consider now the case of the fixed
demand model with high price cap. The observed phenomena and their analysis are identi-
cal but price differences between the no ramping and ramping producers are much smaller.
Recall that a high price cap leads to less dismantling, which increases the capacity available
for reserve. The impact of over or under committing reserve is thus of less importance. The
case of the fixed demand with smaller price cap lead to similar phenomena albeit in a more
ambiguous way. It has been explained before that the lower price cap already lead to curtail-
ment in day ahead. Reserve is thus by nature less abundant with the result that the notion
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of over-committing reserve in Cases 2 and 3.
These results signal that an alternative formulation where both the ramping and forecast-
ing error criteria should probably be considered. The modeling could also introduce a way
wind should pay for ramping (wind here pays for error forecast but not for ramping). This
would justify a full investigation of those ramping products and is left for further research.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Renewable energy generation is seen as the best way to curb climate change, and intermit-
tent/variable sources like wind and solar are considered to be those with the highest potential.
But the subject remains full of controversies. One of them originates in the use of the lev-
elized cost to measure the competitiveness of these sources: on shore wind should be almost
competitive according to that metric. Renowned authors have argues that this is not a good
metric because intermittent sources lack the dispatchability properties of conventional plants.
This thesis takes up some of the questions related to dispatchability in a setting inspired by
the organization of the restructured European electricity market. Many questions arise but
we can address only a subset of them here.
In contrast with models designed for the US market that can be cast as full optimization,
we must account for the separation of the PX and the TSO that is one of the basic rules
of the European market design. This does not mean that one needs to avoid resorting
to optimization, but that optimization models should only considered as intermediate to
equilibrium models that represent the interplay between the PX and the TSO. Our reference
model is then a multi-firm equilibrium model of which we consider single firm models as a
particular case.
While one can discuss whether wind remains an intermittent source or has become a
variable source as a result of aggregation of generation on different sites, it remains today a
highly variable source affected by a lot of uncertainty. The models should thus account for
that characteristics. The equilibrium models should thus be stochastic equilibrium models.
One can sort out the different questions arising with wind penetration along two themes:
a) Some are due to the physics of the phenomena: Wind may require more reserve for
frequency control and certainly more ramping resources.
b) The other concern originates in the market design and in the many distortions to the
planned market mechanisms introduced by stakeholders in that design. These have to do
with the remuneration of conventional and wind generation as well with the remuneration
and charging for services.
We thus propose a general stochastic equilibrium model that accounts for the separation
between the PX and the TSO, allows for multiple firms and the remuneration and charging
of services in the presence of high penetration of renewable energy resources. We justify
resorting to an equilibrium instead of an optimization approach, even without market power,
because of two main reasons. A first reason is that the market is now composed of different
firms that trade energy and services; the equilibrium formulation is most natural for this
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situation. The second, possibly more compelling reason, is that renewable energy policies are
implemented through different market instruments that cannot necessarily be casted in an
optimization form. The proposed model is inspired by the Spanish situation but the approach
is general. We try to show that the approach can embed general features of market design
(a two settlement system), market idiosyncrasies (a somewhat detailed representation of the
balancing market) and general economic characteristics of agents like risk aversion. Like
stochastic programming, equilibrium models are amenable to a treatment of uncertainty.
The complex problem of renewable energy penetration can only be taken through small
steps. We thus illustrate the use of the model on two questions, both motivated by the cur-
rent European phenomena, that sees how conventional plants necessary for providing services
are driven out of the market because of low energy prices. We illustrate the use of the model
by focusing on a timely European question, namely the revenue accruing to conventional
plants. The common wisdom (and the observation of the market) is that renewable energy
induces a decrease of energy prices together with a reduction of the activity and the profit
of the conventional units, that puts in question their sustainability in the market. We use
the models to illustrate that this phenomenon indeed seems rather stable under different
structural assumptions (same orders of magnitude in the loss of revenue for quite different
assumptions of wind premium and risk aversion). But we also show that the phenomenon
may also crucially depend on the demand for ancillary services (here frequency maintenance)
induced by renewable resources integration, and on the pricing of these services by the market
design. Both subjects are contentious: The incremental demand of reserve due to renewable
resources integration is not well understood [34, 44, 45, 60, 61, 81–83] and the pricing of ancil-
lary services is as diverse as the number of power systems in Europe. We model the demand
for reserve through a coefficient and adopt an elementary but sound economic principle for
pricing both reserve capacity and energy. We find that a higher demand for load following
reserve and an economically sound pricing (marginal cost pricing) restore the revenue of the
conventional plants. The question of the sustainability of conventional plants then boils down
to the proper identification of the demand for services (taking into account their provision
by wind units themselves) and the acceptance that they be properly remunerated.
5.1 Contributions and Reached Objectives
We think that several relevant questions have been discussed and answered, but many other
related issues are still waiting; some of them are included in the future lines listed in the next
section. The main contributions in this Thesis, which were already announced in general
terms in the Introduction (Section 1.2), are summarized here in more concrete terms:
1) Formulation of a general stochastic equilibrium model posed as a complementarity problem
that accounts for the separation between the PX and the TSO, allows for multiple firms
and the testing of different remuneration and charging of services due to high wind. The
advantage of the complementarity formulation with respect to the optimization approach
is that it allows to model some characteristic of the real markets (like two different prices
for the same product) that cannot be modeled using a pure optimization approach.
2) Optimal operation with risk management of dispatchable generators and wind turbines
in a single firm setting, for a number of structural assumptions that include: Wind fore-
cast, value of the feed-in premium to wind, level of risk aversion, demand requirement
of flexibility reserve due to wind generation, ramping capability, ramping products, to-
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tal available dispatchable capacity, model for demand (fixed demand or price responsive
demand), and value of the price cap to energy in day ahead.
3) Influence of the structural assumptions (listed in the previous item) on the profitability
of dispatchable units and the corresponding dismantling process, and how it affects the
total dispatchable capacity and the energy price. We have found that in the case of fixed
demand the more relevant parameter is the value of the price cap to energy in day ahead.
Values of the price cap greater than a certain threshold leads to energy price lower than
the price in the system with price cap less than that threshold.
The previous contributions and others are explained in detail in the previous chapters,
most of the results are concentrated on Chapter 4. The data on the Appendices give additional
details for the discussions.
5.2 Future Work
During the development of this Thesis many issues around the initial questions have been
raised, some of them are important from the technical point of view, to complete the infor-
mation on the results, and others have some interest by their application to real systems.
We have already addressed some of these issues but many other interesting questions remain
only partially treated because of the limited amount of time available. In particular we plan
to continue the work to study the following issues:
1) Consider situations with several firms and study compositions of the generation park with
different ownership of wind turbines and dispatchable generators. For instance one firm
with only dispatchable generators and other firm with only wind turbines, and other
compositions with different rate between the total dispatchable capacity and the non-
dispatchable capacity installed.
2) Include a more detailed model of the TSO that goes beyond the sole minimization of
generation cost from reserves, in the complementarity formulation for the multi-firm set-
ting. In particular considering additional details of the technical system, like the network
constraints, for instance using a direct current linearized approach or an approach base in
Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDF).
3) Study other pricing schemes for reserve (energy and capacity) taking into account different
market imperfections, like for instance a myopic valuation of the reserve cost, or distortions
in the risk perception.
4) Study different balancing schemes, like the particular implementations in different coun-
tries with high penetration of non-dispatchable generation around the world, like Germany,
Denmark, or some States in the USA.
5) Include a more detailed model for the reserve and the ramping constraints, taking into
account technical details that are relevant in the technical operation, in particular those
related with the start-up and shutdown of the units (time and cost associated with these
operations), that usually require the inclusion of binary variables in the problem. Study
the options of including binary variables or approximate formulations that do not use
binary variables.
6) Analyze the effect of a price cap in the models with price responsive demand.
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7) Include an intra-day market in the models in a similar setting as it has been implemented
in some real markets like the Spanish system.
8) Extend the models to the long term and use them to study the influence of the incentives
to renewables and the cost of CO2 emissions in the investment (or dismantling) in the
different technologies.
9) Study in detail the multiple equilibrium, which are the causes and the economic interpre-
tation in terms of the market operation. The idea is to begin with the Lemke’s algorithm
applied to a linearized version of the complementarity problem and to study the applica-
tion of the results to the original problem.
10) A formal characterization of the solving strategy proposed for the complementarity prob-
lem. In particular a characterization of the convergence of the sequence of linear comple-
mentarity problems and if we are missing some solutions. For the results reported from
the simulations we have checked that the solution found is, in fact, a solution of the initial
problem, but we do not have a formal proof.
11) Consider agents with different competitive behaviour (price makers, price takers). Here
we have reported results for a single firm setting where the firm is a price taker in both
the day ahead and the balancing market. It would be interesting to study a number
of combinations, like different behaviour of the agents in each settlement (day ahead,
balancing), and also in the multi-firm setting, a different behaviour for each firm. The
issue of the same agent with different behaviour in day ahead and balancing has been
addressed by other authors, like for instance in [84], where they study a wind firm that is
a price taker in day ahead but a price maker in the balancing market, they use a framework
with significant differences respect to that proposed here, in particular in the modeling of
reserve and balancing.
The work in some of the previous topics has already been started, but it is not advanced
enough to be included here at the time to present this document.
Appendices
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Appendix A
Additional Data
A.1 Single Period, Data for the Dismantling Process of Con-
figurations B9.6 and B9.7 in Case Study 1
In this section are included additional data on the dismantling process that leads to the
configurations B9.6 and B9.7 used in the simulations discussed in Case Study 1 (Section
4.5). The dismantling process is described in detail in Section 4.3, to summarize we recall
that it consists of a sequential process starting with the total dispatchable capacity that at
each stage removes the non-profitable dispatchable unit with the higher generation cost. If a
dispatchable unit is profitable or not is determined on the basis of the difference between its
profit (incomes minus operation cost) and its fixed operation and maintenance cost (FOM).
If the firm’s FOM is higher than its profit then the dispatchable unit is considered non-
profitable.
The model used in the dismantling process, that is the same model used in the simulations,
is described in Section 2.5, it is a single firm, single period model with price responsive demand
posed as a complementarity problem.
Table A.1: (B9.6, 1) price of energy in day ahead. Low ramping, Λ = 1.
Wind Total
Mothballing 61.17% 47.09% 22.20% 5.86 % Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 40.965 43.748 44.461 45.174 43597.488
2 43.598 44.030 44.461 45.174 40686.678
3 43.598 44.030 44.461 45.174 39136.628
4 43.598 44.030 44.461 45.174 37552.188
5 43.598 44.030 44.461 45.174 33688.848
6 43.598 44.030 44.461 54.199 28100.603
7 40.987 44.030 57.239 69.991 25356.288
For the dismantling process in the configuration with low ramping (Λ = 1), the hourly
average energy prices for each wind pattern1 at each dismantling stage are listed in Table
A.1. The total dispatchable capacity is reduced at each dismantling stage and seven stages
are needed to reach the final state in which all the active units are profitable. The margin
1We are using four wind patterns to model the wind patterns in a whole year, see Section 4.4.
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profit for all the dispatchable generators at each dismantling stage is listed in Table A.2.
We observe in Table A.1 that energy prices rise when the total dispatchable generation
capacity is reduced, this effect is more significant in the configurations with the lowest total
generation capacity, hence for the wind patterns with the lowest wind forecast, µ = 5.86%
and µ = 22.20%, as it is illustrated on the table.
Table A.2: (B9.6, 1), Value of the margin (e/MWh) profit minus fixed operation and main-
tenance cost, in the progressive dismantling process. Low ramping, Λ = 1.
Dismantling iteration
g 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 -8340.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 -3733.7 -3473.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 -3772.5 -3511.0 -3171.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 -11005.8 -10746.2 -10404.7 -9191.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 -16295.1 -16036.2 -15692.7 -14474.0 -12937.0 0.0 0.0
6 -7139.9 -7037.5 -6749.0 -7077.8 -6696.3 -3121.6 0.0
7 -8561.3 -8504.1 -8266.8 -8634.7 -8200.2 -4209.0 6672.9
8 -4426.4 -4483.4 -4211.2 -4610.3 -4280.4 -2825.1 1408.6
9 -5058.7 -4980.6 -4957.6 -4924.1 -4855.0 -3552.9 1048.0
10 32457.5 33303.6 33303.6 33303.6 33303.6 34219.2 36620.6
11 134432.6 137803.9 137803.9 137803.9 137803.9 141452.2 151020.6
12 3776.0 4909.8 4909.8 4909.8 4909.8 6136.9 9355.0
13 5088.7 7939.6 7939.6 7939.6 7939.6 11024.9 19116.6
14 23618.2 24285.5 24285.5 24285.5 24285.5 25007.6 26901.4
15 37597.1 38680.6 38680.6 38680.6 38680.6 39853.1 42928.4
Cap.
(MW) 43597.5 40686.7 39136.6 37552.2 33688.8 28100.6 25356.3
Table A.3: (B9.7, 0), price of energy in day ahead. High ramping, Λ = 0.
Wind Total
Mothballing 61.17% 47.09 % 22.20% 5.86 % Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 43.448 43.88 44.621 45.174 43597.488
2 43.448 43.880 44.559 45.174 40686.678
3 43.448 43.880 44.560 45.174 39136.628
4 43.448 43.880 44.621 45.174 37552.188
5 43.448 43.880 44.743 45.174 33688.848
6 43.448 43.880 44.562 51.336 28100.603
7 43.448 43.880 51.473 66.741 25356.288
8 43.880 51.306 69.856 85.124 22081.311
For the configuration with high ramping (Λ = 0) the necessary dismantling is even deeper
than in the case of low ramping, because to get the ramping constraints tight contributes
to increase the energy prices, and it is more difficult to get them tight when the ramping
capability is higher. In this case eight dismantling stages are needed, as it is shown in Table
A.4 and, as it was in the previous case, the effect of dismantling capacity on the energy price
is stronger in the cases with the lowest wind forecast (µ = 5.86% and µ = 22.20%).
Appendix A. Additional Data 139
Table A.4: (B9.7, 0), value of the margin (e/MWh) profit minus fixed operation and main-
tenance cost, in the progressive dismantling process. High ramping, Λ = 0.
Dismantling iteration
g 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 -9243.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 -4179.6 -2964.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 -3938.3 -1356.0 -3201.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 -10668.9 -5580.7 -10426.2 -10229.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 -15499.1 -8606.6 -15715.4 -14175.9 -12912.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 -6710.7 -3326.7 -6573.0 -6420.0 -6206.4 -2396.2 0.0 0.0
7 -8069.8 -4185.0 -8065.4 -8033.7 -7750.8 -4647.2 4041.0 0.0
8 -4543.0 -1890.2 -4189.0 -4232.1 -3891.2 -2832.2 1073.7 16580.6
9 -5232.4 -2494.6 -5073.0 -5358.8 -5005.5 -4480.3 -1171.2 16732.0
10 33123.2 32633.9 33116.8 33123.2 33135.8 33742.2 36023.2 48139.5
11 137085.1 133587.0 137059.7 137085.1 137135.5 139551.7 148640.1 196917.4
12 4668.1 6579.0 4659.6 4668.1 4685.0 5497.7 8554.3 24791.2
13 7331.8 12219.8 7310.4 7331.8 7374.4 9417.8 17103.5 57930.1
14 24143.2 24328.4 24138.2 24143.2 24153.2 24631.4 26430.2 35985.6
15 38449.6 38591.1 38441.4 38449.6 38465.8 39242.3 42163.3 57679.3
Cap.
(MW) 43597.5 40686.7 39136.6 37552.2 33688.8 28100.6 25356.3 22081.3
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A.2 Multi-Period with Ramping Products
A.2.1 Multi-Period with Fixed Demand and Ramping Products
Progressive mothballing of multi-period with fixed demand and ramping products, problem
posed as a two stage stochastic minimization cost problem for a single firm, with average
premium (ρ+ = 30 e/MWh), average risk aversion (λ = 0.4), my = 0.15 and mx = 0.02. A
price cap is introduced through generation cost of a virtual generator, “backup generator”.
Results for different values of the backup generator cost are given in what follows.
Table A.5: Value of the margin (e/MWh) profit minus fixed operation and maintenance cost
for dispatchable generators g. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation cost is 100
e/MWh.
Dismantling iteration
g 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 -232864.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 -122454.0 -122454.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 -123586.3 -123586.3 -123586.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 0.0 0.0
5 -424344.8 -424344.8 -424344.8 -424344.8 -379800.9 0.0
6 -192834.4 -192834.4 -192834.4 -192834.4 -170959.5 1420991.4
7 -204524.4 -204524.4 -204524.4 -204524.4 -178419.5 1721612.4
8 -107864.9 -107864.9 -107864.9 -107864.9 -91471.9 1101681.3
9 -93184.2 -93184.2 -93184.2 -93184.2 -76018.6 1173525.1
10 708709.2 708709.2 708709.2 708709.2 720819.0 1602219.3
11 2946391.8 2946391.8 2946391.8 2946391.8 2994643.0 6506569.7
12 47794.6 47794.6 47933.8 47794.6 64161.9 1245305.9
13 36344.2 36344.2 36344.2 36344.2 77148.7 3047076.0
14 518113.2 518113.2 518113.2 518113.2 527663.4 1222767.7
15 823623.5 823623.5 823623.5 823623.5 839131.2 1967843.2
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cap.
(MW) 43597.5 40686.7 39136.6 37552.2 33688.8 28100.6
Table A.6: Price of energy in day ahead. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation
cost is 100 e/MWh.
Wind Total
Mothballing 5.86 % 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 43597.488
2 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 40686.678
3 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 39136.628
4 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 37552.188
5 47.759 43.369 37.900 30.465 33688.848
6 82.894 74.192 37.985 30.580 28100.603
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Table A.7: Value of the margin (e/MWh) profit minus fixed operation and maintenance cost
for dispatchable generators g. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation cost is 300
e/MWh.
Dismantling iteration
g 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 -232864.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 -122454.0 -122454.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 -123586.3 -123586.3 -123586.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 0.0 0.0
5 -424344.8 -424344.8 -424344.8 -424344.8 -216018.5 0.0
6 -192834.4 -192834.4 -192834.4 -192834.4 -90528.1 7308966.5
7 -204524.4 -204524.4 -204524.4 -204524.4 -82435.2 8748131.9
8 -107864.9 -107864.9 -107864.9 -107864.9 -31196.9 5514111.3
9 -93184.2 -93184.2 -93184.2 -93184.2 -12903.0 5793896.5
10 708709.2 708709.2 708709.2 708709.2 765345.2 4861753.4
11 2946391.8 2946391.8 2946391.8 2946391.8 3172056.9 19494136.5
12 47794.6 47933.8 47933.8 47933.8 123830.6 5613342.9
13 36344.2 36344.2 36344.2 36344.2 227182.2 14030257.7
14 518113.2 518113.2 518113.2 518113.2 562778.4 3793354.8
15 823623.5 823623.5 823623.5 823623.5 896150.9 6141968.4
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cap.
(MW) 43597.5 40686.7 39136.6 37552.2 33688.8 28100.6
Table A.8: Price of energy in day ahead. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation
cost is 300 e/MWh.
Wind Total
Mothballing 5.86 % 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 43597.488
2 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 40686.678
3 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 39136.628
4 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 37552.188
5 58.544 43.369 37.900 30.465 33688.848
6 221.835 186.638 37.985 30.580 28100.603
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Table A.9: Value of the margin (e/MWh) profit minus fixed operation and maintenance cost
for dispatchable generators g. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation cost is 1000
e/MWh.
Dismantling iteration
g 1 2 3 4 5
1 -232864.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 -122454.0 -122454.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 -123586.3 -123586.3 -123586.3 0.0 0.0
4 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 0.0
5 -424344.8 -424344.8 -424344.8 -424344.8 357220.0
6 -192834.4 -192834.4 -192834.4 -192834.4 190981.9
7 -204524.4 -204524.4 -204524.4 -204524.4 253509.7
8 -107864.9 -107864.9 -107864.9 -107864.9 179765.8
9 -93184.2 -93184.2 -93184.2 -93184.2 208001.6
10 708709.2 708709.2 708709.2 708709.2 921186.8
11 2946391.8 2946391.8 2946391.8 2946391.8 3793005.5
12 47794.6 47933.8 47794.6 47933.8 332531.5
13 36344.2 36344.2 36344.2 36344.2 752299.1
14 518113.2 518113.2 518113.2 518113.2 685680.7
15 823623.5 823623.5 823623.5 823623.5 1095720.1
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cap.
(MW) 43597.5 40686.7 39136.6 37552.2 33688.8
Table A.10: Price of energy in day ahead. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation
cost is 1000 e/MWh.
Wind Total
Mothballing 5.86 % 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 43597.488
2 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 40686.678
3 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 39136.628
4 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 37552.188
5 96.294 43.369 37.900 30.465 33688.848
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Table A.11: Value of the margin (e/MWh) profit minus fixed operation and maintenance
cost for dispatchable generators g. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation cost is
563.78718 e/MWh.
Dismantling iteration
g 1 2 3 4 5
1 -232864.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 -122454.0 -122454.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 -123586.3 -123586.3 -123586.3 0.0 0.0
4 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 0.0
5 -424344.8 -424344.8 -424344.8 -424344.8 0.0
6 -192834.4 -192834.4 -192834.4 -192834.4 15555.8
7 -204524.4 -204524.4 -204524.4 -204524.4 44161.9
8 -107864.9 -107864.9 -107864.9 -107864.9 48302.1
9 -93184.2 -93184.2 -93184.2 -93184.2 70342.4
10 708709.2 708709.2 708709.2 708709.2 824072.4
11 2946391.8 2946391.8 2946391.8 2946391.8 3406054.5
12 47794.6 47933.8 47794.6 47933.8 202529.7
13 36344.2 36344.2 36344.2 36344.2 425066.6
14 518113.2 518113.2 518113.2 518113.2 609092.8
15 823623.5 823623.5 823623.5 823623.5 971356.3
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cap.
(MW) 43597.5 40686.7 39136.6 37552.2 33688.8
Table A.12: Price of energy in day ahead. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation
cost is 563.78718 e/MWh.
Wind Total
Mothballing 5.86 % 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 43597.488
2 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 40686.678
3 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 39136.628
4 44.825 43.369 37.900 30.465 37552.188
5 72.770 43.369 37.900 30.465 33688.848
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A.2.2 Multi-Period with Price Responsive Demand and Ramping Pro-
ducts
Progressive mothballing of multi-period with price responsive demand, problem posed as a
two stage stochastic programming, with average premium (ρ+ = 30 e/MWh), average risk
aversion (λ = 0.4), my = 0.15 and mx = 0.02.
Single firm maximizing welfare, without price cap, one inverse demand function for each
period in each one day (4× 24 inverse demand functions). The inverse demand functions are
based on:
• Demand elasticity of −0.3.
• Reference demand from the fixed demand curve.
• Reference price from the dual variable for energy price (shadow price) in the problem
with fixed demand, multi-period and initial state without mothballing.
Table A.13: Value of the margin (e/MWh) profit minus fixed operation and maintenance
cost for a whole day (24 hours), in the progressive dismantling process without price cap
(without backup generator).
Dismantling iteration
g 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 -232864.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 -122454.0 -122454.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 -123586.3 -123586.3 -123586.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 0.0 0.0
5 -150633.0 -150633.0 -150633.0 -150633.0 -150633.0 0.0
6 1146585.6 1146585.6 1146585.6 1146585.6 1146608.7 867034.0
7 1713617.0 1713617.0 1713617.0 1713617.0 1713617.0 1780736.5
8 1233786.6 1233786.6 1221923.9 1221923.9 1233786.6 1472934.1
9 1521066.2 1521066.2 1516371.4 1521066.2 1521066.2 1783737.7
10 1114383.1 1114383.1 1114635.3 1114635.3 1114635.3 1304490.6
11 4472411.7 4473359.2 4473359.2 4473359.2 4473359.2 5229835.0
12 1700250.6 1700232.7 1700250.6 1700208.8 1700250.6 1952357.6
13 3774167.9 3774192.7 3772489.1 3774192.7 3774192.7 4413922.4
14 1077252.2 1074697.4 1077252.2 1077252.2 1077252.2 1226979.0
15 1741301.3 1741301.3 1741301.3 1741301.3 1741301.3 1980827.3
Cap.
(MW) 43597.5 40686.7 39136.6 37552.2 33688.8 28100.6
A.3 Multi-Period without Ramping Products
A.3.1 Multi-Period with Fixed Demand and without Ramping Products
Progressive mothballing of multi-period with fixed demand and without ramping products,
problem posed as a two stage stochastic minimization cost problem for a single firm, with
average premium (ρ+ = 30 e/MWh), average risk aversion (λ = 0.4), my = 0.15 and
mx = 0.02. A price cap is introduced through generation cost of a virtual generator, “backup
generator”. Results for different values of the backup generator cost are given in what follows.
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Table A.14: Price of energy in day ahead, single firm, multi-period, price responsive demand,
without price cap.
Wind Total
Mothballing 5.86 % 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 44,789 43,283 38,635 32,171 43597,488
2 44,789 43,283 38,635 32,171 40686,678
3 44,789 43,283 38,635 32,171 39136,628
4 44,789 43,283 38,635 32,171 37552,188
5 44,789 43,283 38,635 32,171 33688,848
6 55,064 49,053 38,668 32,171 28100,603
Table A.15: Value of the margin (e/MWh) profit minus fixed operation and maintenance
cost for dispatchable generators g. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation cost is
100 e/MWh.
Dismantling iteration
g 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 -232864.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 -122454.0 -122454.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 -123586.3 -123586.3 -123586.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 0.0 0.0
5 -424352.9 -424352.9 -424352.9 -424352.9 -379808.9 0.0
6 -192939.1 -192939.1 -192939.1 -192939.1 -171064.2 1483359.4
7 -207027.5 -207027.5 -207027.5 -207027.5 -180922.7 1793490.8
8 -114097.8 -114097.8 -114097.8 -114097.8 -97704.8 1142160.9
9 -100655.4 -100655.4 -100655.4 -100655.4 -83489.8 1214806.1
10 773353.2 773353.2 773353.2 773353.2 785463.0 1701372.0
11 3203964.8 3203964.8 3203964.8 3203964.8 3252216.0 6901642.4
12 83084.4 83084.4 83084.4 83084.4 99312.5 1326704.0
13 103170.3 103170.3 103170.3 103170.3 143974.9 3230181.4
14 562399.8 562399.8 562399.8 562399.8 571950.0 1294269.2
15 895125.0 895125.0 895125.0 895125.0 910632.7 2083536.2
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cap.
(MW) 43597.5 40686.7 39136.6 37552.2 33688.8 28100.6
Table A.16: Price of energy in day ahead. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation
cost is 100 e/MWh.
Wind Total
Mothballing 5.86 % 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 43597.488
2 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 40686.678
3 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 39136.628
4 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 37552.188
5 47.253 42.910 42.010 41.669 33688.848
6 82.390 74.814 42.011 41.669 28100.603
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Table A.18: Value of the margin (e/MWh) profit minus fixed operation and maintenance
cost for dispatchable generators g. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation cost is
300 e/MWh.
Dismantling iteration
g 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 -232864.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 -122454.0 -122454.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 -123586.3 -123586.3 -123586.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 0.0 0.0
5 -424352.9 -424352.9 -424352.9 -424352.9 -216026.5 0.0
6 -192939.1 -192939.1 -192939.1 -192939.1 -90632.7 7599497.7
7 -207027.5 -207027.5 -207027.5 -207027.5 -84938.4 9092293.0
8 -114097.8 -114097.8 -114097.8 -114097.8 -37429.7 5725575.6
9 -100655.4 -100655.4 -100655.4 -100655.4 -20374.2 6014220.1
10 773353.2 773353.2 773353.2 773353.2 829989.2 5087215.4
11 3203964.8 3203964.8 3203964.8 3203964.8 3429629.9 20392486.5
12 83084.4 83084.4 83084.4 83084.4 158981.1 5864005.6
13 103170.3 103170.3 103170.3 103170.3 294008.3 14638969.0
14 562399.8 562399.8 562399.8 562399.8 607064.9 3964468.3
15 895125.0 895125.0 895125.0 895125.0 967652.4 6419411.7
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cap.
(MW) 43597.5 40686.7 39136.6 37552.2 33688.8 28100.6
Table A.19: Price of energy in day ahead. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation
cost is 300 e/MWh.
Wind Total
Mothballing 5.86 % 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 43597.488
2 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 40686.678
3 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 39136.628
4 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 37552.188
5 58.039 42.910 42.010 41.669 33688.848
6 221.370 191.203 42.011 41.669 28100.603
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Table A.21: Value of the margin (e/MWh) profit minus fixed operation and maintenance
cost for dispatchable generators g. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation cost is
1000 e/MWh.
Dismantling iteration
g 1 2 3 4 5
1 -232864.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 -122454.0 -122454.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 -123586.3 -123586.3 -123586.3 0.0 0.0
4 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 0.0
5 -424352.9 -424352.9 -424352.9 -424352.9 357211.9
6 -192939.1 -192939.1 -192939.1 -192939.1 190877.3
7 -207027.5 -207027.5 -207027.5 -207027.5 251006.6
8 -114097.8 -114097.8 -114097.8 -114097.8 173533.0
9 -100655.4 -100655.4 -100655.4 -100655.4 200530.3
10 773353.2 773353.2 773353.2 773353.2 985830.8
11 3203964.8 3203964.8 3203964.8 3203964.8 4050578.5
12 83084.4 83084.4 83084.4 83084.4 367821.4
13 103170.3 103170.3 103170.3 103170.3 819125.2
14 562399.8 562399.8 562399.8 562399.8 729967.3
15 895125.0 895125.0 895125.0 895125.0 1167221.5
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cap.
(MW) 43597.5 40686.7 39136.6 37552.2 33688.8
Table A.22: Price of energy in day ahead. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation
cost is 1000 e/MWh.
Wind Total
Mothballing 5.86 % 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 43597.488
2 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 40686.678
3 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 39136.628
4 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 37552.188
5 95.788 42.910 42.010 41.669 33688.848
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Table A.24: Value of the margin (e/MWh) profit minus fixed operation and maintenance
cost for dispatchable generators g. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation cost is
563.79699 e/MWh.
Dismantling iteration
g 1 2 3 4 5
1 -232864.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 -122454.0 -122454.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 -123586.3 -123586.3 -123586.3 0.0 0.0
4 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 0.0
5 -424352.9 -424352.9 -424352.9 -424352.9 0.0
6 -192939.1 -192939.1 -192939.1 -192939.1 15455.1
7 -207027.5 -207027.5 -207027.5 -207027.5 41663.4
8 -114097.8 -114097.8 -114097.8 -114097.8 42072.2
9 -100655.4 -100655.4 -100655.4 -100655.4 62874.3
10 773353.2 773353.2 773353.2 773353.2 888718.5
11 3203964.8 3203964.8 3203964.8 3203964.8 3663636.1
12 83084.4 83084.4 83084.4 83084.4 237683.2
13 103170.3 103170.3 103170.3 103170.3 491900.1
14 562399.8 562399.8 562399.8 562399.8 653381.0
15 895125.0 895125.0 895125.0 895125.0 1042860.6
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cap.
(MW) 43597.5 40686.7 39136.6 37552.2 33688.8
Table A.25: Price of energy in day ahead. The backup generator is g = 16 and its generation
cost is 563.79699 e/MWh.
Wind Total
Mothballing 5.86 % 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 43597.488
2 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 40686.678
3 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 39136.628
4 44.320 42.910 42.010 41.669 37552.188
5 72.265 42.910 42.010 41.669 33688.848
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A.3.2 Multi-Period with Price Responsive Demand and without Ramping
Products
Progressive mothballing of multi-period with price responsive demand and no ramping pro-
ducts, problem posed as a two stage stochastic programming, with average premium (ρ+ = 30
e/MWh), average risk aversion (λ = 0.4), my = 0.15 and mx = 0.02.
Single firm maximizing welfare, without price cap, one inverse demand function for each
period in each one day (4× 24 inverse demand functions). The inverse demand functions are
based on:
• Demand elasticity of −0.3.
• Reference demand from the fixed demand curve.
• Reference price from the dual variable for energy price (shadow price) in the problem
with fixed demand, multi-period and initial state without mothballing.
Table A.27: Value of the margin (e/MWh) profit minus fixed operation and maintenance
cost for a whole day (24 hours), in the progressive dismantling process without price cap
(without backup generator).
Dismantling iteration
g 1 2 3 4 5
1 -232864.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 -122454.0 -122454.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 -123586.3 -123586.3 -123586.3 0.0 0.0
4 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 -297477.2 0.0
5 368236.2 377801.1 377801.1 377801.1 377801.1
6 1308372.6 1282976.2 1282976.2 1282976.2 1282976.2
7 1860192.5 1857749.4 1857749.4 1857749.4 1857749.4
8 1307281.1 1324595.1 1324595.1 1324608.0 1324595.1
9 1511904.7 1511168.1 1511168.1 1511168.1 1511168.1
10 1133351.5 1133215.9 1133215.9 1133215.9 1133215.9
11 4547874.0 4547333.7 4547333.7 4547333.7 4547333.7
12 1789689.5 1792058.9 1792058.9 1792058.9 1792058.9
13 4303790.4 4303473.2 4303473.2 4303473.2 4303473.2
14 1099268.7 1099161.8 1099161.8 1099161.8 1099161.8
15 1788633.0 1788459.4 1788459.4 1788459.4 1788459.4
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cap.
(MW) 43597.5 40686.7 39136.6 37552.2 33688.8
Table A.28: Price of energy in day ahead, single firm, multi-period, price responsive demand,
without price cap.
Wind Total
Mothballing 5.86 % 22.20% 47.09% 61.17% Capacity
round e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh e/MWh MW
1 44.289 42.9 41.923 39.705 43597.488
2 44.289 42.896 41.923 39.705 40686.678
3 44.289 42.896 41.923 39.705 39136.628
4 44.289 42.896 41.923 39.705 37552.188
5 44.289 42.896 41.923 39.705 33688.848
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A.4 Data on Wind Scenarios in Multi-Period
Table A.30: Wind scenarios in (%) for µ = 5.86% and µ = 22.20%.
t Wind forecast µ = 5.86%. Scenario (k)
(h) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 4.6 6.3 7.4 8.4 9.2 10.1 10.9 11.9 12.9 14.2 16.0 19.9
2 4.4 6.1 7.2 8.1 8.9 9.8 10.6 11.5 12.6 13.8 15.6 19.4
3 3.7 5.3 6.2 7.1 7.9 8.7 9.5 10.3 11.3 12.5 14.2 17.9
4 2.9 4.3 5.2 5.9 6.6 7.4 8.1 8.9 9.9 11.0 12.6 16.2
5 1.9 3.0 3.7 4.4 5.0 5.7 6.3 7.1 7.9 9.0 10.4 13.9
6 1.6 2.6 3.3 3.9 4.5 5.1 5.7 6.4 7.3 8.3 9.7 13.1
7 1.3 2.2 2.9 3.5 4.0 4.6 5.2 5.9 6.7 7.7 9.1 12.5
8 1.0 1.8 2.4 2.9 3.5 4.0 4.6 5.3 6.0 7.0 8.4 11.7
9 0.7 1.3 1.9 2.3 2.8 3.3 3.9 4.5 5.2 6.2 7.5 10.8
10 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.6 3.1 3.7 4.4 5.3 6.6 9.9
11 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.4 4.2 5.5 9.0
12 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.6 3.4 4.7 8.3
13 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.5 3.4 4.7 8.3
14 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.9 3.7 5.0 8.5
15 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.6 3.3 4.1 5.4 8.9
16 0.5 1.1 1.6 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.1 4.8 5.7 7.1 10.4
17 0.9 1.7 2.3 2.8 3.3 3.9 4.4 5.1 5.8 6.8 8.2 11.5
18 1.3 2.3 2.9 3.5 4.1 4.7 5.3 6.0 6.8 7.8 9.2 12.5
19 1.7 2.8 3.5 4.1 4.7 5.4 6.0 6.7 7.6 8.6 10.0 13.4
20 2.1 3.3 4.1 4.8 5.4 6.1 6.8 7.5 8.4 9.5 11.0 14.4
21 2.7 4.0 4.9 5.6 6.3 7.1 7.8 8.6 9.5 10.6 12.2 15.7
22 2.6 4.0 4.8 5.5 6.2 6.9 7.7 8.5 9.4 10.5 12.0 15.6
23 2.5 3.8 4.6 5.3 6.0 6.7 7.4 8.2 9.1 10.2 11.7 15.2
24 3.0 4.4 5.3 6.1 6.8 7.5 8.3 9.1 10.0 11.2 12.8 16.4
t Wind forecast µ = 22.20%. Scenario (k)
1 22.3 28.1 31.3 33.9 36.1 38.3 40.4 42.7 45.1 47.9 51.5 58.5
2 19.8 25.0 27.8 30.1 32.2 34.2 36.1 38.1 40.4 42.9 46.3 53.0
3 18.6 23.4 26.1 28.3 30.2 32.1 33.9 35.9 38.0 40.5 43.7 50.2
4 17.3 21.8 24.4 26.5 28.3 30.1 31.8 33.7 35.7 38.1 41.2 47.5
5 16.2 20.5 22.9 24.8 26.6 28.3 30.0 31.7 33.7 35.9 38.9 45.0
6 15.2 19.3 21.6 23.4 25.1 26.7 28.3 30.0 31.9 34.1 37.0 42.9
7 15.9 20.1 22.5 24.4 26.2 27.8 29.5 31.2 33.1 35.4 38.4 44.4
8 16.1 20.4 22.8 24.7 26.5 28.1 29.8 31.6 33.5 35.8 38.8 44.9
9 15.5 19.6 21.9 23.8 25.5 27.1 28.7 30.5 32.3 34.5 37.5 43.5
10 14.5 18.5 20.7 22.5 24.1 25.7 27.2 28.9 30.7 32.8 35.7 41.5
11 13.4 17.0 19.1 20.8 22.3 23.8 25.3 26.8 28.6 30.6 33.3 38.9
12 11.9 15.2 17.1 18.7 20.1 21.5 22.9 24.3 25.9 27.8 30.4 35.7
13 10.4 13.4 15.2 16.6 17.9 19.2 20.5 21.8 23.3 25.1 27.5 32.6
14 8.7 11.4 13.0 14.3 15.4 16.6 17.8 19.0 20.4 22.0 24.2 28.9
15 7.6 10.0 11.4 12.6 13.7 14.8 15.8 17.0 18.3 19.8 21.9 26.4
16 5.9 8.0 9.2 10.3 11.2 12.2 13.2 14.2 15.3 16.7 18.6 22.8
17 5.9 7.9 9.2 10.2 11.2 12.1 13.1 14.1 15.3 16.7 18.6 22.7
18 6.0 8.1 9.4 10.4 11.4 12.3 13.3 14.4 15.5 16.9 18.8 23.0
19 6.3 8.5 9.8 10.8 11.8 12.8 13.8 14.9 16.1 17.5 19.4 23.7
20 6.6 8.8 10.1 11.2 12.3 13.2 14.3 15.3 16.5 18.0 20.0 24.3
21 6.1 8.3 9.5 10.6 11.6 12.6 13.5 14.6 15.8 17.2 19.1 23.3
22 5.8 7.9 9.2 10.2 11.2 12.1 13.1 14.1 15.2 16.6 18.5 22.7
23 6.2 8.3 9.6 10.7 11.6 12.6 13.6 14.6 15.8 17.2 19.2 23.4
24 5.6 7.7 8.9 9.9 10.9 11.8 12.7 13.7 14.9 16.3 18.1 22.2
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Table A.31: Wind scenarios in (%) for µ = 47.09% and µ = 61.17%.
t Wind forecast µ = 47.09%. Scenario (k)
(h) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 23.3 29.3 32.7 35.3 37.7 39.9 42.2 44.5 46.9 49.8 53.5 60.7
2 25.0 31.4 35.0 37.9 40.4 42.8 45.1 47.5 50.2 53.2 57.0 64.3
3 25.9 32.7 36.4 39.4 42.0 44.5 46.9 49.4 52.1 55.2 59.1 66.5
4 24.5 30.9 34.4 37.2 39.7 42.0 44.3 46.7 49.3 52.2 56.0 63.3
5 25.2 31.7 35.4 38.2 40.8 43.2 45.6 48.0 50.6 53.6 57.5 64.9
6 26.1 32.9 36.6 39.6 42.2 44.7 47.1 49.6 52.3 55.4 59.4 66.8
7 27.3 34.5 38.5 41.6 44.4 47.0 49.5 52.1 54.9 58.1 62.2 69.7
8 28.3 35.9 40.0 43.3 46.1 48.8 51.5 54.2 57.0 60.3 64.4 71.9
9 27.7 35.1 39.1 42.3 45.1 47.7 50.3 52.9 55.8 59.0 63.1 70.6
10 27.3 34.6 38.5 41.6 44.4 47.0 49.6 52.2 55.0 58.1 62.2 69.7
11 27.0 34.1 38.0 41.1 43.9 46.4 48.9 51.5 54.3 57.5 61.5 69.0
12 27.8 35.2 39.2 42.4 45.3 47.9 50.5 53.1 56.0 59.2 63.3 70.8
13 28.5 36.1 40.2 43.5 46.4 49.1 51.8 54.5 57.4 60.6 64.8 72.3
14 29.1 37.0 41.2 44.6 47.6 50.3 53.1 55.8 58.8 62.1 66.2 73.8
15 29.4 37.4 41.7 45.1 48.1 50.9 53.7 56.4 59.4 62.7 66.9 74.5
16 29.8 37.8 42.2 45.7 48.7 51.5 54.3 57.1 60.1 63.5 67.7 75.2
17 28.5 36.1 40.2 43.5 46.4 49.1 51.7 54.4 57.3 60.6 64.7 72.2
18 27.1 34.2 38.1 41.2 43.9 46.5 49.0 51.6 54.4 57.5 61.6 69.0
19 25.2 31.8 35.4 38.3 40.9 43.3 45.6 48.1 50.7 53.7 57.6 65.0
20 24.7 31.0 34.6 37.4 39.9 42.2 44.6 47.0 49.6 52.5 56.3 63.6
21 24.5 30.8 34.3 37.1 39.5 41.9 44.2 46.6 49.2 52.1 55.9 63.2
22 25.0 31.5 35.1 38.0 40.5 42.9 45.2 47.7 50.3 53.3 57.1 64.5
23 25.5 32.1 35.8 38.7 41.2 43.7 46.1 48.5 51.2 54.2 58.1 65.5
24 25.9 32.7 36.4 39.4 42.0 44.5 46.9 49.4 52.1 55.2 59.1 66.5
t Wind forecast µ = 61.17%. Scenario (k)
1 31.1 39.7 44.3 48.0 51.2 54.1 57.0 59.9 63.0 66.5 70.8 78.2
2 31.6 40.4 45.2 49.0 52.2 55.3 58.2 61.2 64.3 67.8 72.1 79.5
3 30.6 39.0 43.5 47.1 50.2 53.2 56.0 58.9 61.9 65.4 69.6 77.1
4 30.5 38.8 43.4 46.9 50.1 53.0 55.8 58.7 61.7 65.1 69.4 76.9
5 29.7 37.8 42.1 45.6 48.6 51.5 54.2 57.0 60.0 63.4 67.6 75.1
6 31.1 39.6 44.3 47.9 51.1 54.1 57.0 59.9 63.0 66.5 70.7 78.2
7 31.7 40.5 45.3 49.1 52.4 55.4 58.4 61.3 64.5 68.0 72.3 79.7
8 32.8 42.2 47.2 51.1 54.6 57.8 60.8 63.9 67.1 70.6 75.0 82.3
9 32.7 42.0 47.0 50.9 54.3 57.5 60.6 63.6 66.8 70.4 74.7 82.0
10 32.6 41.9 46.8 50.8 54.2 57.3 60.3 63.4 66.6 70.1 74.5 81.8
11 32.8 42.2 47.2 51.2 54.6 57.8 60.8 63.9 67.1 70.7 75.0 82.3
12 33.1 42.6 47.7 51.7 55.2 58.4 61.5 64.6 67.8 71.4 75.7 83.0
13 34.6 44.9 50.5 54.8 58.5 61.9 65.2 68.4 71.8 75.4 79.7 86.7
14 35.4 46.3 52.2 56.7 60.6 64.1 67.4 70.7 74.1 77.8 82.1 88.7
15 35.9 47.2 53.2 57.9 61.8 65.4 68.8 72.2 75.6 79.3 83.5 90.0
16 36.1 47.6 53.7 58.4 62.4 66.0 69.5 72.9 76.3 79.9 84.2 90.5
17 36.1 47.6 53.7 58.4 62.4 66.0 69.5 72.9 76.3 79.9 84.2 90.5
18 36.0 47.3 53.3 58.0 62.0 65.6 69.0 72.4 75.8 79.4 83.7 90.1
19 35.7 46.8 52.8 57.4 61.3 64.9 68.3 71.6 75.0 78.7 82.9 89.4
20 35.8 46.9 52.9 57.5 61.4 65.0 68.4 71.8 75.2 78.8 83.1 89.6
21 36.1 47.6 53.7 58.4 62.4 66.0 69.5 72.8 76.3 79.9 84.1 90.5
22 36.2 47.8 54.0 58.7 62.7 66.4 69.9 73.3 76.7 80.3 84.6 90.8
23 36.3 47.9 54.1 58.9 62.9 66.6 70.1 73.4 76.9 80.5 84.7 91.0
24 36.0 47.3 53.4 58.0 62.0 65.7 69.1 72.4 75.9 79.5 83.8 90.2
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Resumen Extendido
B.1 Introduccio´n
En el contexto actual, las energ´ıas renovables son consideradas un instrumento indispensable
para sobrellevar, o al menos mitigar, el cambio clima´tico. Se trata de una cuestio´n global,
cuyo tratamiento, sin embargo, au´n depende de las decisiones que a nivel local se toman
en las diferentes regiones del planeta. Entre las energ´ıas renovables, la energ´ıa eo´lica y la
solar, son las formas ma´s extendidas debido a su coste relativamente bajo y a su potencial
de generacio´n, que posibilita una contribucio´n significativa en la reduccio´n de emisiones de
CO2. Y entre estas energ´ıas, es comu´nmente admitido que solamente la energ´ıa eo´lica esta´
pro´xima a ser rentable, cuando se la compara con las fuentes convencionales en te´rminos
de coste normalizado. Pero el coste normalizado, que considera tanto los costes variables
de explotacio´n como los costes fijos de inversio´n y amortizacio´n, proporciona so´lo una de-
scripcio´n incompleta de la competitividad de la energ´ıa eo´lica y otras fuentes intermitentes
(no despachables) en los sistemas de generacio´n (Joskow [1–3]), de forma que un sistema de
incentivos ha sido, y sigue siendo, necesario para promover el desarrollo y la integracio´n de las
fuentes renovables intermitentes en los sistemas de generacio´n. En ocasiones las pol´ıticas de
incentivos aplicadas conducen a niveles de integracio´n de fuentes intermitentes que no esta´n
en absoluto justificados por las condiciones del mercado y llevan a situaciones dif´ıcilmente
sostenibles en te´rminos econo´micos.
Las pol´ıticas de incentivos basadas en subsidios, tanto para fuentes basadas en com-
bustibles fo´siles (IMF Report [4]) como para fuentes renovables, son habitualmente dif´ıciles
de monitorizar, y la aparicio´n de consecuencias inesperadas suele ser la norma. Este es el
caso en la Unio´n Europea, que ha estado a la vanguardia en el uso de energ´ıas renovables,
con el resultado de que la generacio´n intermitente que fue instalada gracias al incentivo de
los subsidios, esta´ ahora poniendo en peligro la economı´a a corto plazo de las unidades con-
vencionales, hasta el punto de que la idoneidad del sistema esta´ siendo puesta en cuestio´n.
Esta tesis se centra sobre un punto muy concreto, pero potencialmente importante, en
la evolucio´n actual de los sistemas de generacio´n de energ´ıa ele´ctrica en algunos pa´ıses de la
Unio´n Europea. Los factores comunes en estos sistemas consisten en una alta penetracio´n
de energ´ıas renovables no despachables, combinada con campan˜as de ahorro energe´tico (re-
duccio´n del consumo, incremento de la eficiencia energe´tica, etc..), y otros eventos relaciona-
dos con el contexto de crisis econo´mica, que han conducido a una reduccio´n del precio de
mercado de la electricidad. Esta reduccio´n del precio de la electricidad ha llegado a un punto
en el que pone en cuestio´n la supervivencia de algunas plantas convencionales en el mer-
cado, en particular las plantas de turbinas de gas de ciclo combinado. El problema estar´ıa
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limitado a una (drama´tica) pe´rdida de valor de las unidades convencionales y al (tambie´n
drama´tico) coste de los subsidios asociados a estas pol´ıticas, si no fuera porque adicionalmente
las unidades convencionales que dejan de ser rentables resultan necesarias para la operacio´n
te´cnica del sistema, de forma que no es te´cnicamente posible satisfacer la demanda si esas
unidades convencionales son retiradas.
Varios estudios apuntan a las limitaciones a la penetracio´n de energ´ıas renovables en los
sistemas de generacio´n debido a restricciones te´cnicas de operacio´n, en particular debido a su
pobre desempen˜o para proporcionar servicios auxiliares al sistema, como reserva, capacidad
de rampa, y capacidad de regulacio´n de frecuencia y tensio´n, [5–12].
Un razonamiento econo´mico ba´sico nos dice que esta situacio´n no deber´ıa ocurrir, ya que
una escasez de los servicios de red ocasionada por la parada o desmantelamiento de gener-
adores convencionales debido a precios de mercado de la energ´ıa ele´ctrica ma´s bajos deber´ıa
incrementar el valor de mercado de estos servicios, y en consecuencia, la remuneracio´n de
las plantas que los proporcionan. En resumen los dos posibles resultados son: i) o los gen-
eradores no despachables proporcionan estos servicios y la la eliminacio´n de las unidades
convencionales continu´a; ii) o, ya que las unidades convencionales parecen estar mejor posi-
cionadas para proporcionar estos servicios, un adecuado disen˜o del mercado proporciona una
remuneracio´n suficiente a estas plantas convencionales para mantenerlas en funcionamiento.
Esta tesis presenta varios modelos con el objetivo de estudiar ese problema, identificando
los mecanismos que se ponen en funcionamiento y co´mo afectan los diferentes factores en el
sistema a los resultados.
Todos los modelos utilizados en esta tesis asumen agentes tomadores de precios. Esta
hipo´tesis se justifica aqu´ı con los siguientes argumentos: (i) tener en cuenta el poder de
mercado requiere hipo´tesis adicionales sobre como los gentes ejercen ese poder de mercado,
y existe una gran variedad de esas hipo´tesis, en particular para sistemas en los que se mane-
jan varios productos, como es el caso de los modelos aqu´ı estudiados; (ii) la hipo´tesis de
agentes tomadores de precios simplifica la discusio´n econo´mica de los resultados y permite
centrar el estudio en los aspectos f´ısicos y econo´micos ba´sicos del disen˜o del mercado, sin las
perturbaciones que conlleva el ejercicio de poder de mercado.
B.2 Breve Revisio´n de la Literatura
Debido a que las fuentes de energ´ıa renovables contribuyen a reducir la polucio´n y a diversificar
las fuentes de suministro de energ´ıa, muchos pa´ıses han aplicado programas de incentivos
para fomentar su desarrollo, en particular los incentivos a la energ´ıa eo´lica y a la energ´ıa
solar resultan bastante comunes. Varios pa´ıses en Europa, como por ejemplo Dinamarca con
4.16 GW de capacidad de generacio´n eo´lica instalada, y una contribucio´n media anual de
la energ´ıa eo´lica del 27% sobre el consumo total de energ´ıa ele´ctrica (datos de 2012, [36]),
Espan˜a con 22.21 GW y el 16%, y Alemania con 29.06 GW y el 11%, ya muestran una
alta penetracio´n de energ´ıa eo´lica en su parque de generacio´n ele´ctrica. Se espera que esta
tendencia continu´e y se extienda a otros muchos pa´ıses en el futuro pro´ximo.
Altas proporciones de energ´ıa eo´lica y solar en los sistemas de potencia conllevan impor-
tantes nuevos retos a los reguladores, los operadores del sistema y las firmas de generacio´n.
Como se destaca en [37–39], los principales retos incluyen: el impacto de las pol´ıticas de in-
centivos, el disen˜o del mercado y cuestiones operacionales (mercado de balance y flexibilidad
operacional). El comportamiento estrate´gico de los agentes, el coste real de la energ´ıa eo´lica
y el modelado de la generacio´n eo´lica tienen tambie´n una gran importancia.
“Green Targets”, “Feed-in Tariffs”, o “Feed-in Premiums”, [40] esta´n entre los incentivos
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ma´s comunes. Sus efectos sobre la energ´ıa eo´lica son estudiados en [38] para el mercado de
la electricidad en Reino Unido, y [41] muestra como los subsidios a la energ´ıa eo´lica junto
con la asignacio´n de prioridad en su uso frente a otras energ´ıas, puede conducir a las plantas
convencionales a ofertar energ´ıa a precios negativos, con el objetivo de evitar incurrir en los
costes por parada y arranque de la planta, lo que adema´s suele conllevar, parado´jicamente,
un incremento de los costes globales y de las emisiones contaminantes.
Los principales problemas operacionales asociados con una alta penetracio´n de energ´ıa
eo´lica son debidos a la naturaleza intermitente e impredecible (al menos no con precisio´n) de
este tipo de energ´ıa [42, 43]. En el caso de generacio´n eo´lica a gran escala, por ejemplo en el
caso de Espan˜a (muchos parques eo´licos sobre un a´rea geogra´ficamente extensa), la generacio´n
eo´lica total no es intermitente, pero au´n conserva una elevada variabilidad. De forma que el
mercado de balance y la flexibilidad operacional resultan elementos clave para la integracio´n
de la energ´ıa eo´lica. Las condiciones para que un mercado de balance resulte o´ptimo han sido
estudiadas por diversos autores, llegando a la conclusio´n de que una condicio´n esencial para
que un mercado de balance sea o´ptimo es que el precio de la desviacio´n debe reflejar el coste
real que supone su correccio´n, [32, 40].
El mercado de balance puede ser modelado a trave´s de relaciones econome´tricas para
los precios de balance como funciones de la energ´ıa, o se puede modelar mediante procesos
fundamentales que podr´ıan incluir un “unit commitment” [44]. Considerando que los mecan-
ismos de balance evolucionan con cierta rapidez y esta´n sujetos a una continu´a controversia,
descartamos la aproximacio´n econome´trica y optamos por un modelo de equilibrio (sin un
“unit commitment” expl´ıcito). Este modelo puede ser adaptado, en muchos casos so´lo con
ligeros cambios en las ecuaciones, a diferentes disen˜os de mercado, por ejemplo a diferentes
mecanismos de asignacio´n de precios.
Nos referimos aqu´ı con el te´rmino “reserva de flexibilidad” a la reserva usada en el balance
para corregir las desviaciones debidas a errores en la previsio´n eo´lica. La determinacio´n de
los valores o´ptimos para la cantidad y el precio de la reserva de flexibilidad es una cuestio´n
de gran intere´s, y por ello la comunidad cient´ıfica ha propuesto diferentes soluciones. En [45]
se propone una metodolog´ıa que tiene en cuenta la incertidumbre asociada a la demanda,
la previsio´n eo´lica y el fallo de las unidades de generacio´n, para cuantificar la cantidad de
reserva necesaria para que el sistema opera con un nivel dado de fiabilidad. Para mostrar la
utilidad de su metodolog´ıa la aplican al sistema de generacio´n ele´ctrica de Irlanda.
Una aproximacio´n habitual para tratar la incertidumbre en problemas de optimizacio´n,
es utilizar programacio´n estoca´stica, como por ejemplo en [33, 34]. El valor de la flexibilidad
operativa es otro concepto importante, que ha sido estudiado por ejemplo en [46].
Respecto al comportamiento de los agentes, una amplia variedad de estrategias para
realizar ofertas o´ptimas ha sido descrita en la literatura acade´mica. Estas estrategias suelen
centrarse en la incertidumbre en el sistema y con frecuencia esta´n basadas en programacio´n
estoca´stica. Por ejemplo, en [48] se propone un modelo para obtener la mejor estrategia de
oferta para un generador eo´lico, el problema es inicialmente formulado como un problema no
lineal entero mixto y finalmente reformulado y resuelto como un problema de optimizacio´n
lineal equivalente. Otras aproximaciones consideran un micro ana´lisis ma´s detallado del
comportamiento individual de los agentes operando bajo incertidumbre, como por ejemplo
en [49].
La programacio´n estoca´stica permite obtener estrategias de operacio´n o´ptimas para un
productor eo´lico bajo incertidumbre ma´s precisas que otros me´todos que consideran menos
informacio´n. Este hecho se muestra en [50], y tambie´n en [51], donde se utiliza un modelo
estoca´stico en dos etapas y se tienen en cuenta las restricciones de red en una subasta con
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un nu´mero significativo de productores eo´licos. En [52], ofertas o´ptimas en cantidad son
calculadas para productores eo´licos mediante programacio´n estoca´stica en dos etapas, en la
cual la informacio´n sobre los precios y la energ´ıa eo´lica disponible son incorporadas al modelo
mediante un a´rbol de escenarios. Y utilizan el Valor Condicional en Riesgo (CVaR) [85] como
medida para la gestio´n del riesgo.
Otras aproximaciones incluyen programacio´n co´nica de segundo orden, como en [35],
donde esa te´cnica fue usada para resolver un problema de auto-programacio´n en un sistema de
firma u´nica con restricciones de seguridad basadas en un flujo de cargas o´ptimo, gestionando
adicionalmente el riesgo mediante el uso del CVaR.
B.3 Metodolog´ıa Aplicada
Se describe aqu´ı la metodolog´ıa y el marco conceptual utilizado para estudiar los diversos
factores que afectan a la integracio´n de la energ´ıa eo´lica en el sistema ele´ctrico, y como a
su vez esa integracio´n afecta al conjunto del sistema ele´ctrico. La metodolog´ıa consiste en
la definicio´n y uso de modelos del sistema basados en principios generales del mercado, pero
que incorporan detalles particulares sobre la regulacio´n aplicada a la energ´ıa eo´lica y reglas
de operacio´n (balance, productos de rampa, etc..) inspirados en el mercado ele´ctrico espan˜ol
o en el Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO). Recurrir a implementaciones
particulares resulta inevitable en este caso porque tratamos con cuestiones que au´n no esta´n
estandarizadas en la industria.
Debido a la importancia de las pol´ıticas de incentivos en la regulacio´n y operacio´n de las
energ´ıas renovables, y la particular atencio´n puesta en las primas a la generacio´n renovable
en la historia reciente del sistema ele´ctrico espan˜ol, as´ı como en las actuales discusiones en
el seno de la Unio´n Europea [15], el modelo se ha construido sobre la base de esa pol´ıtica de
incentivos pero con la vista puesta tambie´n en el estudio de otros factores relevantes en los
sistemas ele´ctricos reales. En concreto, todos los factores que se han considerado son:
1) Prima a la generacio´n eo´lica.
2) Nivel de disponibilidad de la energ´ıa eo´lica.
3) Aversio´n al riesgo de cada empresa.
4) Distribucio´n de error para la previsio´n de generacio´n eo´lica.
5) Demanda de reserva fijada como referencia por el Operador del Sistema (TSO).
6) Nivel de demanda respecto a la capacidad total instalada.
7) Parada de plantas convencionales en funcionamiento.
8) Mecanismo de asignacio´n de precios para la capacidad de reserva usada en las operaciones
de balance.
9) Mecanismo de asignacio´n de precios para la energ´ıa procedente de la reserva (usada en las
operaciones de balance).
10) Nu´mero de firmas.
11) Capacidad te´cnica de rampa de los generadores despachables.
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12) Mecanismo de balance para correccio´n de desviaciones respecto a los valores programados.
13) Estimacio´n a la baja de los costes reales (no considerar alguno de los costes) por parte de
los generadores.
B.4 Descripcio´n de los Modelos
Consideramos seis modelos de base que corresponden a diferentes estructuras de mercado, a su
vez para algunos de esos modelos hemos estudiado diferentes variantes cambiando pequen˜os
detalles. Los modelos son los siguientes:
a) Modelos para un u´nico per´ıodo. En este caso las restricciones de rampa se han adap-
tado para considerar u´nicamente la informacio´n disponible (correspondiente a un u´nico
per´ıodo), y el efecto de los otros per´ıodos se ha considerado de forma aproximada me-
diante la introduccio´n de un para´metro exo´geno, dando lugar a lo que hemos llamado
“modelo parame´trico de restricciones de rampa”. Dentro de los modelos de per´ıodo u´nico
consideramos tres variantes:
1) Modelo con mu´ltiples firmas, formulado como un problema de complementariedad, y
con demanda que responde al precio de la energ´ıa.
2) Modelo con una u´nica firma, formulado como un problema estoca´stico con demanda
fija y en el que se minimiza el coste de generacio´n. E´ste fue el modelo de referencia
utilizado por los reguladores. Este modelo puede interpretarse como una descripcio´n
de un mercado perfectamente competitivo, en el que una firma integrada minimiza
su coste de operacio´n sujeta a una demanda fija exo´gena. La firma puede poseer
tanto generadores despachables como aerogeneradores y utiliza el CVaR, [85], de su
coste de balance como medida de riesgo. El problema es formulado como un problema
de optimizacio´n estoca´stico de dos etapas, lo que evita la formulacio´n expl´ıcita de
los mecanismos de formacio´n de precios que resulta inevitable en los otros modelos
considerados.
3) Modelo con una u´nica firma, formulado como un problema estoca´stico en el que se
maximiza el beneficio social, y con demanda que responde al precio de la energ´ıa. La
capacidad de respuesta de la demanda en este modelo puede ser interpretada, en el
contexto de la integracio´n de energ´ıa eo´lica en el sistema, como la actuacio´n de un
sistema de gestio´n de demanda implementado en el sistema y que permite acomodar
parte de la variabilidad de la energ´ıa eo´lica mediante ajustes de la demanda.
b) Modelos para mu´ltiples per´ıodos. En este caso se ha considerado el modelo de restricciones
de rampa que se utiliza habitualmente en el problema de “unit commitment” [62], ya
que toda la informacio´n necesaria para ello se encuentra en el modelo como variables
endo´genas. Aqu´ı tambie´n se han considerado tres variantes, ana´logas a las descritas
anteriormente, siendo las principales diferencias el modelo de restriccio´n de rampa y la
introduccio´n de productos de rampa adicionales. Estos productos de rampa esta´n definidos
sobre varios per´ıodos y su objetivo es incrementar la flexibilidad operativa del sistema y
reducir el coste asociado a esa flexibilidad operativa. Los productos de rampa considerados
aqu´ı han sido propuestos en el MISO [14, 72], y todav´ıa no han sido implementados, se
encuentran en fase de discusio´n.
1) Modelo con mu´ltiples firmas, formulado como un problema de complementariedad, y
con demanda que responde al precio de la energ´ıa. El intere´s de esta extensio´n (tambie´n
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aplicable al modelo con mu´ltiples firmas y per´ıodo u´nico) consiste en tener en cuenta
que las incertidumbres asociadas a la generacio´n eo´lica y sus efectos sobre el precio
de la energ´ıa no son necesariamente internalizadas en un modelo de firma u´nica, o
alternativamente en un modelo donde el riesgo en el corto plazo puede ser objeto de
negocio. Mientras que en un modelo con mu´ltiples firmas, como el presentado aqu´ı, y
exceptuando la implementacio´n de un mercado intradiario sofisticado o algu´n mercado
financiero que permita ofertas virtuales, este tipo de gestio´n del riesgo no es posible.
2) Modelo con una u´nica firma, formulado como un problema estoca´stico con demanda
fija y en el que se minimiza el coste de generacio´n.
3) Modelo con una u´nica firma, formulado como un problema estoca´stico en el que se
maximiza el beneficio social, y con demanda que responde al precio de la energ´ıa.
Seguidamente describimos con ma´s detalle los dos modelos base (per´ıodo u´nico y mu´ltiples
per´ıodos) para mu´ltiples firmas, por contener los principales elementos representativos pre-
sentens en todos los modelos estudiados.
El modelo ma´s general es formulado como un problema de equilibrio para mu´ltiples firmas.
Este modelo representa una industria en competencia perfecta donde la demanda responde
al precio de la energ´ıa, esta respuesta es modelada mediante una funcio´n de demanda inversa
lineal. Cada firma puede ser propietaria de generadores convencionales (despachables) y/o
de aerogeneradores (no despachables). La generacio´n eo´lica disponible en cada instante es
el u´nico para´metro con incertidumbre considerado en el modelo. Esta incertidumbre tiene
un impacto sobre los ingresos y los costes de las firmas que deben acudir al mecanismo de
balance, lo que se traduce en un riesgo para estas firmas. Esta incertidumbre es incorporada
al modelo mediante un a´rbol de escenarios, consistente en diferentes escenarios de energ´ıa
eo´lica disponible. Cada firma utiliza el CVaR, [85], como medida de su riesgo asociado a esa
incertidumbre. Las firmas venden a su coste marginal y minimizan su coste de operacio´n,
incluyendo el coste de balance medido a trave´s de su CVaR. Por lo tanto, cada firma resuelve
un problema estoca´stico de dos etapas, una primera etapa que corresponde a las decisiones
en el mercado diario (que no dependen expl´ıcitamente de los escenarios) y una segunda etapa
para la operacio´n en tiempo real, que corresponde al mecanismo de balance, y en el que las
decisiones dependen expl´ıcitamente de los escenarios. El modelo en su conjunto es formu-
lado como un problema de complementariedad, que incluye las condiciones de Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) de los problemas de las firmas y algunas ecuaciones adicionales necesarias para
el cierre del mercado. En concreto, el modelo se compone de los tres siguientes grupos de
ecuaciones:
a) Las condiciones de KKT correspondientes a los problemas de cada firma.
b) Las ecuaciones de balance global del mercado, que en este caso corresponden a la demanda
de reserva en el sistema. El valor de referencia para la demanda de reserva es establecido
por el TSO. En este caso no es necesario introducir ecuaciones globales para el balance de
energ´ıa en el sistema porque ese balance se realiza a nivel de cada firma, la cantidad de
energ´ıa que venden es igual a la cantidad de energ´ıa que generan.
c) Las condiciones de KKT para el problema de minimizacio´n del coste de la energ´ıa utilizada
de la reserva. Este problema representa una subasta de precio u´nico organizada por el
TSO con el objetivo de minimizar el coste de la correccio´n de desviaciones (desajustes
entre la generacio´n programada y la demanda programada). En este modelo solamente se
consideran las desviaciones debidas a los aerogeneradores (incertidumbre en la generacio´n
eo´lica).
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Cuando el modelo para mu´ltiples firmas es particularizado para una sola firma eso no
implica que se trate de un monopolio, ya que se sigue manteniendo la hipo´tesis de competencia
perfecta y la firma vende a su coste marginal. El problema para firma u´nica resulta ma´s
sencillo de analizar en te´rminos econo´micos ya que la firma internaliza los riesgos asociados
a ambos tipos de generadores, unidades despachables y aerogeneradores.
Los casos estudiados con los modelos de per´ıodo u´nico ponen de manifiesto la importancia
de las restricciones de rampa. Las restricciones de rampa suelen estar definidas habitual-
mente sobre mu´ltiples per´ıodos, por lo que hemos extendido los modelos de per´ıodo u´nico
para considerar mu´ltiples per´ıodos, en concreto, en los casos de estudio consideramos una
representacio´n horaria del mercado durante un d´ıa completo (24 per´ıodos de una hora). Los
principales cambios de los modelos con per´ıodos mu´ltiples respecto a los modelos de per´ıodo
u´nico son:
• Un nuevo ı´ndice t que representa el per´ıodo de tiempo se an˜ade a las variables primales
y duales, excepto a ζf , Q
k,−
f y σ
k
f .
• El valor de la funcio´n objetivo se calcula ahora como la suma sobre el conjunto de
per´ıodos.
• Las restricciones de rampa siguen el modelo habitual usado en “unit commitment”, que
incluye la capacidad de rampa movilizada para cambiar la generacio´n entre per´ıodos de
acuerdo a los valores programados.
• Nuevos productos de rampa, siguiendo las propuestas en MISO, [14, 72], son consider-
ados en algunas de las variantes de los modelos.
B.5 Conclusiones
Las energ´ıas renovables son consideradas como una de las mejores opciones para frenar el
cambio clima´tico, y entre estas fuentes, la energ´ıa eo´lica y la energ´ıa solar parecen ser las
alternativas con mayor potencial. No obstante se trata de un tema sobre el que existen
muchas controversias. Una de estas controversias a nivel pra´ctico tiene su origen en el uso
del “coste normalizado” como una medida de la competitividad de estas fuentes renovables.
De acuerdo con este me´trica los aerogeneradores instalados en la costa o el territorio interior
son “casi” competitivos comparados con los generadores convencionales. Pero renombrados
autores han argumentado que el coste normalizado no es una medida completa, ya que no
es so´lo una cuestio´n de coste, sino tambie´n de operacio´n, y las fuentes intermitentes no son
despachables, lo que es una gran desventaja respecto a los generadores convencionales. En
esta tesis consideramos algunas de las cuestiones relacionadas con la despachabilidad en el
marco de los mercados ele´ctricos europeos reestructurados. Surgen muchas cuestiones pero
solo podemos abordar aqu´ı algunas de ellas.
En contraste con los modelos disen˜ados para el mercado ele´ctrico en Estados Unidos,
que pueden ser formulados como problemas de optimizacio´n completos, nosotros debemos
tener en cuenta la separacio´n del mercado de la energ´ıa, PX por una parte, y la gestio´n de
la red y los servicios auxiliares, TSO, por otra parte. Porque esta separacio´n es una de las
reglas ba´sicas de disen˜o de los mercados de energ´ıa ele´ctrica en Europa. Esto no significa
que no podamos usar los modelos de optimizacio´n, sino que debemos considerarlos como
una representacio´n parcial (intermedia) en relacio´n a los modelos de equilibrio que tienen
en cuenta la interaccio´n entre el PX y el TSO. De esta forma nosotros consideramos aqu´ı
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como modelo de referencia un modelo de equilibrio con mu´ltiples firmas, del cual estudiamos
algunos casos particulares con una firma u´nica.
Si bien se puede discutir si el viento sigue siendo una fuente intermitente o se ha con-
vertido en una fuente variable como resultado de la agregacio´n de la generacio´n en un a´rea
suficientemente extensa, lo cierto es que la generacio´n eo´lica sigue siendo hoy en d´ıa una
fuente con alta variabilidad y afectada por una considerable incertidumbre. As´ı pues, los
modelos deben tener en cuenta esas caracter´ısticas. De este modo se justifica el uso de un
modelo de equilibrio estoca´stico como el que se utiliza en esta tesis.
Clasificamos aqu´ı las cuestiones que surgen en relacio´n a una alta penetracio´n de energ´ıa
eo´lica en los dos grupos siguientes:
a) Cuestiones debidas principalmente a aspectos f´ısicos y tecnolo´gicos: Una mayor pene-
tracio´n eo´lica podr´ıa requerir una mayor reserva para el control de frecuencia en el sistema
y tambie´n una mayor capacidad de rampa disponible.
b) En el otro grupo de cuestiones se encuentran las relacionadas con el disen˜o del mercado
y las modificaciones que las partes interesadas han ido introduciendo en los mecanismos
inicialmente propuestos. En concreto en relacio´n a la remuneracio´n de las unidades con-
vencionales y de los generadores eo´licos as´ı como la remuneracio´n y las comisiones por los
servicios prestados.
Por todo lo anterior, proponemos aqu´ı un modelo general de equilibrio estoca´stico que
tiene en cuenta la separacio´n entre el PX y el TSO, permite mu´ltiples firmas y considerar
la remuneracio´n y el cobro de los servicios auxiliares, y todo ello en un sistema con alta
penetracio´n de energ´ıas renovables, en concreto de energ´ıa eo´lica. Recurrimos a un equilibrio
en lugar de a un enfoque de optimizacio´n, incluso en este caso sin poder de mercado, debido
a las dos siguientes razones. Una primera razo´n es que el mercado esta´ actualmente formado
por diferentes empresas que comercializan la energ´ıa y los servicios, y la formulacio´n como
equilibrio es la expresio´n natural para esta situacio´n. La segunda razo´n, quiza´ ma´s convin-
cente, es que las pol´ıticas sobre energ´ıas renovables se implementan a trave´s de diferentes
instrumentos de mercado, muchos de los cuales no pueden ser modelados en una forma de
optimizacio´n. El modelo propuesto se inspira en sistema espan˜ol, pero el enfoque es gen-
eral. La aproximacio´n propuesta puede considerar caracter´ısticas generales del disen˜o del
mercado (un sistema formado por dos subsistemas, PX y TSO), la idiosincrasia del mercado
(una representacio´n hasta cierto punto detallada del mercado de balance) y las caracter´ısticas
econo´micas generales de los agentes, en particular su aversio´n al riesgo. Al igual que en el
caso de la programacio´n estoca´stica, los modelos de equilibrio son susceptibles de incluir un
tratamiento de la incertidumbre.
La penetracio´n de energ´ıas renovables en el sistema ele´ctrico es un problema de consider-
able complejidad, por lo que parece recomendable abordarlo de forma progresiva avanzando
en pequen˜os pasos. De esta forma ilustramos aqu´ı el uso de los modelos propuestos sobre dos
cuestiones, ambas motivadas por feno´menos observados en los actuales mercados ele´ctricos
europeos, que ven como plantas convencionales necesarias para proporcionar servicios en el
sistema son expulsadas del mercado debido a los bajos precios de la energ´ıa, que hacen que
esas plantas no sean rentables.
Las principales contribuciones de este trabajo respecto a la literatura existente se resumen
a continuacio´n. En contraste con la mayor parte de la literatura en la que el problema de
integracio´n eo´lica se formula como un problema de optimizacio´n estoca´stico (por ejemplo
[33, 34]) o robusto (por ejemplo [35]), nosotros lo formulamos en te´rminos de equilibrio con
agentes con aversio´n al riesgo. Justificamos nuestra formulacio´n en las siguientes razones:
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• Los incentivos utilizados habitualmente para promover la integracio´n de energ´ıa eo´lica
como “Feed-in premium” y “Feed-in Tariffs” implican distorsiones en el mercado que son
incompatibles con las condiciones de competencia perfecta que implica una formulacio´n
basada puramente en la optimizacio´n, como por ejemplo la existencia de dos precios
para un mismo producto en un u´nico mercado.
• Los incentivos como “Feed-in premium” y “Feed-in Tariffs” conllevan exposiciones al
riesgo que pueden ser muy diferentes para las unidades convencionales y para los aero-
generadores. Exceptuando un mecanismo de ofertas virtuales que no existe actualmente
en Europa, estos riesgos no son negociables. Por lo que es necesario considerar varios
agentes que se enfrentan a diferentes riesgos no negociables para estudiar el sistema
real. Esto no puede hacerse con una formulacio´n de firma u´nica, ya sea estoca´stica,
robusta o de optimizacio´n de la funcio´n de riesgo, del problema.
• Los sistemas europeas implementan idiosincrasias que introducen distorsiones adicionales
en el mercado, como por ejemplo la que se considera en los modelos aqu´ı desarrollados,
y que consiste en usar los precios del mercado diario en el mercado de balance indepen-
dientemente del estado del mundo en tiempo real. Este paso hacia adelante del precio
de la energ´ıa es justamente lo contrario de lo que sucede en la programacio´n estoca´stica,
en la que los precios en el mercado diario tiene el valor de la esperanza matema´tica de
los precios en tiempo real.
De forma que en resumen creemos que la formulacio´n como modelo de equilibrio es un buen
punto de partida que resulta de utilidad para estudiar el disen˜o de los mercados ele´ctricos en
Europa.
Utilizamos este marco conceptual para indagar en la pe´rdida de competitividad de las
unidades convencionales que ha acompan˜ado al incremento de la penetracio´n de energ´ıa
eo´lica en Europa. Examinas el efecto combinado del impacto de las primas a la generacio´n
eo´lica y de una asignacio´n adecuada del precio a la reserva sobre los ingresos de las unidades
convencionales, y contrastamos los resultados debidos a ambos factores. La posibilidad de
contratar abundante reserva para flexibilidad con escasa antelacio´n a su uso lleva a una
pe´rdida de competitividad de las plantas convencionales, mientras que por el contrario, la
necesidad de programar la reserva con muchas horas de antelacio´n lleva a unos ingresos para
las plantas convencionales que compensan sus pe´rdidas en el mercado de la energ´ıa.
De esta forma hemos desarrollado un modelo de equilibrio en el corto plazo para sistemas
de energ´ıa ele´ctrica con alta penetracio´n de energ´ıa eo´lica, en los que los productores eo´licos
se benefician de una prima a la generacio´n eo´lica, y cada agente resuelve un problema de
programacio´n estoca´stica en dos etapas. El mecanismo de balance y el mercado de reserva
son gestionados por el TSO. En particular el modelo se usa para estudiar las siguientes
cuestiones:
• Operacio´n o´ptima de los generadores bajo incertidumbre.
• Efecto de la prima a la generacio´n eo´lica y del nivel de aversio´n al riesgo de los agentes
sobre el equilibrio de mercado.
• Impacto de diferentes factores estructurales sobre los ingresos de los generadores despach-
ables y de los aerogeneradores.
Ilustramos el uso de los modelos propuestos centra´ndonos en una cuestio´n que ha estado
presente en los mercados ele´ctricos europeos por un largo per´ıodo de tiempo y que sigue
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estando presente en los mercados actuales, y que consiste en los conceptos por los que las
plantas convencionales reciben ingresos. La idea comu´nmente admitida actualmente, que
coincide con lo que se observa en los mercados, es que un incremento en la penetracio´n de
energ´ıas renovables en el mercado induce una reduccio´n del precio de la energ´ıa y, al mismo
tiempo, una reduccio´n de la actividad y de los ingresos de las plantas convencionales, que
puede hacer que estas plantas no sean econo´micamente sostenibles en el mercado. Aqu´ı us-
amos los modelos para ilustrar que este feno´meno resulta bastante estable ante diferentes
hipo´tesis estructurales, por ejemplo, resulta el mismo orden de magnitud en las pe´rdidas de
ingresos para hipo´tesis bastante diferentes de primas a la generacio´n eo´lica y nivel de aversio´n
al riesgo de los agentes. Por otra parte, los modelos tambie´n muestran que el feno´meno puede
depender fuertemente de la demanda de servicios auxiliares (aqu´ı consideramos u´nicamente
mantenimiento de la frecuencia) inducida por la integracio´n de fuentes renovables, y el mecan-
ismo de asignacio´n de precios a estos servicios auxiliares. Ambas cuestiones son pole´micas:
el incremento en la demanda de reserva debido a la integracio´n de generacio´n renovable no es
una cuestio´n totalmente resuelta [34, 44, 45, 60, 61, 81–83], y el mecanismo de asignacio´n de
precios a los servicios auxiliares presenta tantas variantes como sistemas ele´ctricos hay en Eu-
ropa. Aqu´ı modelamos la demanda de reserva mediante un coeficiente exo´geno y adoptamos
un mecanismo de asignacio´n de precios para los servicios auxiliares, tanto para capacidad
de reserva como para energ´ıa procedente de la reserva, que es sencillo pero consistente con
los principios econo´micos. Como resultado hemos encontrado que incrementar la demanda
de reserva, junto con una asignacio´n de precios econo´micamente coherente para este servicio
(precio a coste marginal) restablece los ingresos de las plantas convencionales. De esta forma
la cuestio´n de la sostenibilidad econo´mica de las plantas convencionales lleva a una adecuada
identificacio´n de la demanda de servicios auxiliares (teniendo en cuenta tambie´n la posible
provisio´n de estos servicios por los propios aerogeneradores) y la aceptacio´n de que estos
servicios sean remunerados apropiadamente.
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